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ABSTRACT 
 
DAVID PIZZO: “To Devour the Land of Mkwawa”: 
Colonial Violence and the German-Hehe War in East Africa c. 1884-1914 
(Under the direction of Christopher R. Browning and Lisa Lindsay) 
 
 
David Pizzo 
UNC Chapel Hill 
2007 
 
 
 
“’To Devour the Land of Mkwawa’: Colonial Violence and the German-Hehe 
War in East Africa” focuses on the German-Hehe War, which raged across the 
Southern Highlands of what is now Tanzania in the 1890s, and is based on archival 
and field research done in Berlin, Freiburg, Dar es Salaam, and Iringa.  The central 
question of the dissertation is nature of imperial violence in the African context, in 
this case perpetrated by German-led colonial forces in their attempt to subdue the 
large, martially proficient Hehe conquest state, which was similar other states based 
on the Zulu model.  The extreme brutality and destruction that characterized this 
nearly decade-long campaign resulted not simply from some sort of “special path” of 
the German Empire or some sort of culturally encoded national pathology, but rather 
arose from the interplay of conditions and exigencies “on the spot” in East Africa and 
broader, overlapping circuits of violence that connected processes and events across 
the globe.  I also seek to destabilize the traditional binary of omnipotent European 
invaders and passive African victims—indeed, the Hehe under Chief Mkwawa were 
highly effective killers and administrators whose tenacious resistance to the Germans 
 vii
  viii
itself brought forth extreme responses from German colonial forces.  My work is 
transnational and comparative: it is the former insofar as the violence that 
characterized the Hehe-German War was the result of and drew on several concurrent 
developments that transcended national or other established political boundaries.  It is 
the latter in that I explicitly compare the Hehe-German War with other cases of 
intense colonial violence across Africa and Asia in order to illuminate what is 
specific about both the German imperial experience and about the powerful Hehe 
Mfecane State.  These events are a part of world history, not just East African or 
German history, and they offer one an opportunity to explore the larger issue of how 
violence and warfare—particularly irregular, “asymmetrical” warfare—shaped and 
continue to shape our world. 
 
 1 
 
 
 
Chapter I: 
Introduction, Literature, Questions and Argument 
Faced with tenacious guerrilla resistance and a murderous enemy that he cold not 
see, the German Colonel Eduard von Liebert stated bluntly: “there was nothing 
left for us to do other than continue with the campaign of annihilation 
[Vernichtungsfeldzug] and war of destruction [Zerstörungskrieg] of earlier 
expeditions in order to cut his followers off from the means of existence ”2  He 
went on to argue that his forces could only achieve victory if they prosecuted a 
strategy of attempting to “devour the land of Mkwawa” [das Land des Mkwawa 
aufzufressen], in other words the intentional causing of famine in “rebel areas” in 
order to bring about an end to hostilities.3  One would be forgiven for assuming 
                                                 
1 Karl Weule, “Ostafrikanische Eingeborenen-Zeichnungen: Psychologische Einblicke in die 
Künstlerseele des Negers,” in Ipek: Jahrbuch für Prähistorische und Ethnographische Kunst 2 
(1926): between 96 and 97.   
 
2 Eduard von Liebert, Neunzig tage im Zelt. Meine Resien nach Uhehe Juni bis September 1897 
(Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1898), 33. 
 
3 Ibid., 48.   
 this incident is a story from the Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union during the Second 
World War; but this was not Eastern Europe in the 1940s, it was East Africa in 
the 1890s.  These eerie and disturbing similarities across time and space have 
tempted many, from Hannah Arendt and Frantz Fanon to Fritz Fischer and Hans-
Ulrich Wehler, to seek connections—be they structural, ideological, or cultural—
between the various atrocities attributable to the Germany and the Germans in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.4  Indeed this present study began as just such 
a search for some sort of Sonderweg (“special path”) in the tropics, for something 
intrinsically German that made their colonies the scenes of slaughter and misery 
that they were.  Several years of work and discussions on three continents, 
however, have led this work towards some rather different conclusions.  Indeed, 
in focusing on colonial Africa, this study faces the challenge that both the 
Germans and the East Africans (in this case the Hehe) are frequently exoticized, 
and all too often they are embedded in historical narratives focusing on savagery 
and deviance.  Restoring the African and European participants in the German-
Hehe War to their mundane human reality offers some conclusions that seek to 
get away from many of the stereotypes about Germans, about East Africans, and 
about the colonial project(s), conclusions that are perhaps more disturbing than 
linear, monocausal renderings of modern history that posit wicked Germans 
preprogrammed to kill Africans, who in turn are either seen at best as innocent 
bystanders or victims to colonialism or at worst as savage beasts. 
                                                 
4 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (SanDiego; Harcourt Brace & Company, 1951), 
Part Two: Imperialism; Frantz Fanon , The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 
1963); Fritz Fischer, From Kaiserreich to Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German History, 
1871-1945 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire 
(Providence: Berg Publishers, 1993). 
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  In attempting to move away from “special path” or “national 
pathology” based arguments about the “colonial encounter” and the “colonial 
situation,” in this case as they apply to the German-Hehe War of 1891-1898, a 
central question remains to be answered.  If Germans are not culturally 
programmed automatons and Africans are not mere primitives existing as a 
backdrop for European efforts and designs, why was there so much killing in 
German East Africa?  Why were there such extreme levels of destruction and 
brutality?  What are the roots of German colonial violence in the African context?  
Conventional answers are only partially satisfactory: Sven Lindqvist, George 
Mosse, Enzo Traverso and others focus on a lineage of Western contempt and 
racism.  Others focus instead on the superiority of European weapons or the 
bestiality and primitivism/barbarism of Africa itself.  This latter explanation is 
implicit in Conrad and among many of the German participants of the events of 
the 1890s in East Africa, particularly the missionaries and administrators that had 
come to the colony to bring it Kultur und Ordnung.  Indeed this narrative 
framework is very much with us today from Samuel P. Huntington’s claim that 
Africa “does not possess a civilization” to the writings of Robert Kaplan and the 
warped, disingenuous coverage of current events in the so-called Dark 
Continent.5  Still others offer cultural explanations and focus on particular 
dysfunctions or pathologies of the German Empire and of Germans, particularly 
                                                 
5 Samnuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New 
York: Touchstone, 1997) and Robert Kaplan, The coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the 
Post Cold War (New York: Random House, 2000).  On coverage of Africa see, for example The 
Media and the Rwanda Genocide, ed. Allan Thompson (London: Pluto Press, 2007) and Asgede 
Hagos, Hardened Images: the Western Media and the Marginalization of Africa (Trenton, NJ: 
Africa World Press, 2000). 
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 when they are seeking to sketch some sort of lineage of atrocity from the deserts 
of Namibia to the steppes of the Soviet Union.  Jan-Bart Gewald makes an 
argument for a continuity of unique fantasies of superiority and violence from 
Hegel to Hitler which amounts to a “lineage” of the Holocaust.  Isabel V. Hull’s 
recent work, Absolute Destruction posits instead a uniquely self-destructive and 
self-defeating military culture from the Kaiserreich to the Third Reich.6  Finally, 
some authors argue that the tremendous violence of colonization was the result of 
a clash of civilizations or cultures that are discrete, inimical, and perpetually set 
against one another.  This line of argumentation has become extremely popular in 
the context of the United States’ Global War on Terror.7 
                                                
None of these explanatory frameworks are satisfactory on their own.  This 
dissertation argues that violence in German Eats Africa was not some sort of 
whole-cloth cultural import from the Fatherland, the result of African savagery, or 
a clash of discrete, bounded “civilizations.”  The carnage of the 1890s in German 
East Africa did not face off a collection of malevolent, culturally pathological 
Germans against a pristine, primitive African landscape upon which the former 
could inscribe their designs; it was rather the result of a collision between two 
aspiring, globally embedded polities that both possessed sophisticated political 
and logistical systems.  In order to defeat the Hehe state, the Germans ultimately 
 
6 Jan-Bart Gewald, Learning to Wage and Win Wars in Africa: a Provisional History of German 
Military Activity in Congo, Tanzania, China and Namibia (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2005) 
and Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial 
Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
 
7 See, for example, Efraim Karsh, Islamic Imperialism: A History (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2006) and Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the 
Descent of the West (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).  
 4
 decided on a policy of terrorism and property destruction, both designed to 
maximize Hehe casualties, a policy to which they recoursed not out of some 
culturally specific “code of violence,” but out of the contingencies of their 
situation.  They were a tiny minority in a sea of “hostiles” with paltry resources at 
their disposal with an assignment from the metropolis that was as vague as it was 
murderous: pacify the colony quickly, cheapy and—as much as was feasible—
totally.  And it was precisely the capacity of the Hehe polity to resist German 
designs, at times destroying entire colonial detachments, that convinced the 
Germans that victory was only achievable through the utmost severity and 
ruthlessness.  The Hehe were anything but helpless, and the Germans were hardly 
the masters of the situation that they often claimed they were after the fact (or that 
the literature on colonialism often implies that they were).  What the colonial state 
lacked in numbers, understanding, and resources, it made up for with a “war of 
annihilation” along the lines described above by Governor von Liebert. 
As stated, both of these rival polities were dynamic, emerging, and active 
historical agents in East Africa.  The Hehe and German Empires, while of course 
grounded in very different continental contexts, both evolved in precisely the 
same period (the 1820s-1870s), and understanding the violence of the German-
Hehe War requires getting beyond reified notions of “Germanness” and 
“Africanness”.  The atrocities and terror tactics that characterize the events of the 
German-Hehe War were the result of a convergence of a series of processes, 
events, and structures that were in part globally determined and in part embedded 
in an extremely dense local context.  German colonial violence was, in other 
 5
 words both “more” and “less” than German, being primarily determined by levels 
of causation larger and smaller than the “nation-state.”  Eric Wolf offered a 
caution against the tyranny of nation-state based historiography and social 
sciences in Europe and the People Without History:  
Since social relations have been severed from their economic, political, or 
ideological context, it is easy to conceive of the nation-state as a structure 
of social ties informed by moral [or cultural] consensus rather than as a 
nexus of economic, political, and ideological relationships connected to 
other nexuses.  Contentless social relations, rather than economic, 
political, or ideological forces, this become the prime movers of 
sociological theory.  Since these social relations take place within the 
charmed circle of the single nation-state, the significant actors in history 
are seen as nation-states, each driven by its integral social relations.  Each 
society is then a thing, moving in response to an inner clockwork.8 
 
Recently many prominent historians of Germany have made similar pleas to get 
away from the tyranny of the nation-state paradigm, whether used in its positivist 
guise or (particularly in the German case) in its negative from, in which 
everything “German” is somehow “evil” or “deviant” from some other normative 
model.9  Some have begun to call for “transnational histories” that take into 
account processes and actors that cannot be neatly forced into nation-state based 
analytical categories.10 
                                                 
8 Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997), 9.  
 
9 See Konrad H. Jarausch and Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories 
(Princeton” Princeton University Press, 2003, 46-61.    
 
10 This was the subject of Michael Geyer’s keynote address at the September 2006 meeting of the 
German Studies Association.  See also Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 
1871-1914, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2004). 
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 To rephrase, the source of violence and brutality in German East Africa 
and indeed across what was becoming “colonial Africa” in this period was not 
located merely at an intersection of “German” and “Tanzanian” forces as argued 
by the older national historiographies of both countries (in the former case 
represented by the master narrative of German unification and dismemberment, in 
the latter as part of the nationalistic “Dar School” of historiography), but rather at 
layers scaled above and below that.  Those other layers determined the 
environment in which (German) colonial violence was embedded: the “local 
context,” as in the situation vor Ort, and the global, meaning forces that were 
global and transnational in character.  This shift of focus away from more 
conventional examinations of “German Colonialism” (which was never one thing 
in any case, but rather several “colonial projects” intertwined and in dialogue, 
including pan-German, migrationist, Kultur-colony, and Liberal ideological 
threads11) or a search for the German Sonderweg in Africa gives as a fuller, more 
nuanced—and at times disturbing—picture of events like the Hehe War, the Maji 
Maji Revolt, or the First World War.  Even new chronologies (such as James 
Giblin and Jamie Monson’s argument for a unified “time of troubles” from the 
mid-nineteenth century to the 1920s, discussed below) become necessary and 
logical when one shifts the focus to convergent, synchronous developments.  The 
role of the Askari, African mercenaries who did the vast majority of fighting, 
killing, and dying for their German employers, is a case in point.  While they were 
indeed led by German officers, they themselves came from a wide variety of 
                                                 
11 See Woodruff Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986).  
 7
 locations including Sudan, Mozambique, Eritrea, Turkey, and India, and they 
brought with them extensive experience in the art of waging war.   History 
emanates and is generated from all directions; it is not just a case of Germany or 
Europe radiating outward and acting on “Africa.” Developments like the Mfecane 
(the Zulu military diaspora) defy any simple Eurocentric chronology or 
characterization under terms like “Asiatic mode of production” or “tribal 
warfare.”  Just as the Germans were plugged into a whole range of global 
developments, many of them related to the rise of global capitalism in the late 
nineteenth century, the Hehe existed at the intersection of the Shaka military 
revolution, which began 2,000 km away, Indian Ocean trade networks that 
extended to Java, commerce with Europe and the United States, and numerous 
local networks of prestige and authority.12  The collision of the European 
technological and administrative revolution, Mfecane state building, and the 
Indian Ocean Economy provided both the stakes and the means by which both 
sides would fight tooth and claw for the better part of a decade.  Often, the 
interlocutors in these transactions are neither African nor European per se, but are 
rather products of both.  All of these forces, whatever their origin, intersected, 
influenced one another, and collided in the “shatter zones of empire” in a manner 
that defies easy categorization as “African” or “German.” 
Because the violent events of the German-Hehe War were mutually 
determined, and conjunctural, we need an account that takes all the factors and 
players seriously, African as well as European.  Even utilizing this continental 
                                                 
12 See Jeremy Presthold, “On the Global Repercussions of East African Consumerism,” American 
Historical Review, 109, 3 (2004): 755-81.   
 8
 dichotomy is problematic, as is the modernity—pre-modernity bipolarity implicit 
within discussions of Africa and Europe.13  Colonial violence was produced by 
convergent, overlapping revolutions: commercial, industrial, and—most 
crucially—simultaneous military/administrative revolutions in Central Europe 
and Eastern Africa, both of which are global in scope, not discrete from one 
another.  The German colonial state (especially in its early “freebooter phase”) 
and the Hehe Mfecane state (itself a product of the Zulu military revolution in 
Southern Africa) were equally dynamic, almost the same age, and represented 
opposing but in the East African context comparable modes of authority.  Indeed, 
they had more in common than is usually recognized.  Both were up and coming, 
rapacious tributary states that sought to control the same resources and 
diplomatic-political capital.  Uhehe and the German colonial state were also both 
states in the becoming in a region that was undergoing tremendous dislocation and 
disruption in this period (for example the end, or rather the transformation, of the 
slave trade).  Both made extensive use of rule by terror and demonstrative 
displays of brutality in a highly competitive atmosphere in which “Big Men” and 
“Big Women” rose and fell with breathtaking speed.  Both were highly proficient 
at coercion, collection (be it people, military recruits, skeletons, tribute, or 
Schutzgeld—“protection money”), and killing.   This is why, Giblin, Monson, and 
other researchers who have collected extensive oral evidence in East Africa have 
found that villagers on the ground (in Giblin and Monson’s case the Bena people) 
                                                 
13 See Marshall Hodgson’s argument for the term “Afro-Eurasia” in reference to the land mass in 
the eastern hemisphere, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) and Kären E.Wigen and Martin W. Lewis, The Myth 
of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).  
 9
 perceive little difference between the various warlords that sought to impose their 
authority from about 1830 to 1920, whatever their skin color or country of 
origin.14  They perceived a continuum and continuity of mass killing and plunder.  
The profound difficulties faced by a modern army confronting partisans in what 
can only be described as a “colonial situation” led to a downward spiral of reprisal 
and increasingly hysterical exhortations for even greater terror.  Michael Pesek 
and Trutz von Trotha have written extensively on the symbolic and psychological 
aspects of violence and massacre.15  Terror can be an economical means of 
imposing the “occidental state structure” when men and money are lacking.  This 
was exacerbated in the case of German East Africa by a lethal combination of 
lack of accountability and total authority and feelings of extreme vulnerability 
and fear.  In other words, the Germans simultaneously were the putative masters 
of life and death in vast territories (made possible by the latest means of killing 
made available by the industrial revolution) and continually faced “the credible 
threat of destruction” at the hands of “hostile Africans.”16  “Administrative 
                                                 
14 Michael Pesek, Koloniale Herrschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika: Expeditionen, Militär und 
Verwaltung seit 1880 (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. 2005), 191-2.  German expeditions were barely 
distinguishable from “Arab” Caravan expeditions, both in equipment and in personnel.  The 
Germans had to distinguish themselves over time and thereby demonstrate the end of the era of  
“Arab rule” in East Africa.  See James L. Giblin, A History of the Excluded: Making Family a 
Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania (Oxford: James Currey Ltd., 2005), Jamie 
Monson, Agricultural Transformation in the Inner Kilombero Valley of Tanzania 1840-1940 (Los 
Angeles: PhD Thesis at UCLA, 1991), and “Relocating Maji Maji: The Politics of Alliance and 
Authority in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. 1870-1918,” Journal of African History, 39 
(1998), 95-120. 
 
15 Trutz von Trotha, “‘The Fellows Can Just Starve’: On Wars of ‘Pacification’ in the African 
Colonies of Imperial Germany and the Concept of ‘Total War’,” in Anticipating Total War: The 
German and American Experiences, 1871-1914, eds. Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering, and 
Stig Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 415-35 and Pesek, Op. cit. 
 
16 Von Trotha, 424.  
 
 10
 massacre”—to borrow Hannah Arendt’s phrase—was the norm in such situations 
rather than the exception.  “Thus, massacre is not ‘pathological’.  Massacre is the 
rule in the conquest and pacification of rural societies.  But massacre also is the 
proclamation and condensed expression of rule in the ‘colonial situation’.”17 
 Beyond these larger conceptual issues, this study seeks to break down a 
series of dichotomies and binaries that characterize to a greater or lesser degree 
much of the literature on colonial violence.  The first, and perhaps most insidious 
(because it is so ingrained in our society) of these binaries is “modernity versus 
pre-modernity:”   In our era the American space shuttle and the Laotian ox cart do 
not exist in “separate times,” as if Laos is somehow caught back evolutionarily in 
the past.  The shuttle and the ox cart exist in the same reality of fluctuation, 
commodification, technological transfer, consumption, and modes of thinking.  
They are both products of the modern world in intercourse with itself.  Likewise, 
the Hehe Empire and the German Reich did not exist in separate temporal worlds: 
whether it was epidemiology, climate, global population movements, or bullets, 
they were very much products of the same interconnected world system.  The 
German and Hehe States even formed at the same time!  The Hehe, like the 
Seminoles or the Zulu were an ethnicity that formed in the early nineteenth 
century out of other constituent communities, and their society was hardly a 
stranger to rapid social, political, or economic change.  And the Germans were not 
the universal carriers of modernity that they would have us believe, as 
demonstrated by the overwhelming proportion of aristocratic colonial officers 
                                                 
17 Von Trotha, 425.  See also Georges Balandier, Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique noire: 
dynamique sociale en Afrique centrale (Paris: Puf, 1982). 
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 with “von and zu” in their names.  Overall,  Africa was not “out there” waiting for 
the arrival of colonialism; it was part and parcel of the whole range of processes 
of the nineteenth century, sometimes on Africans’ own terms (as demonstrated by 
Presthold, cited above), often not if they were ordinary people… just like 
everywhere else. 
A second problematic binary is the concept of the pre-colonial versus the 
colonial (and post—as argued by Fred Cooper and others).18  The colonial rupture 
was not as total as many scholars and indeed many of the European participants at 
the time assumed.  Africans were well acquainted with violent interlopers, 
technology transfers, and political upheaval before the arrival of the Wazungu in 
the 1870s.  The colonial state’s acts of violence, massacre, and plunder were in 
fact embedded in a preceding system that was horrific in its own right, even if in 
different ways and to different degrees.  When it came to inflicting harm on the 
enemies of colonial power, the German colonial state—whether it recognized it or 
not—made frequent and liberal use of personnel, techniques, and ideas of the 
“pre-colonial” era.  Ultimately, the Germans plugged themselves into the pre-
existing and constantly fluctuating alliance system, making them the biggest of 
the “Big Men.” 
 A third problematic dichotomy, one that comes out of the Africanist field, 
is that of primary versus secondary resistance (primary being the initial armed 
response to colonial intrusion, secondary being revolts that broke out after the 
establishment of colonial rule).  A concept made famous by T. O. Ranger of the 
                                                 
18 See Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), introduction.    
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 Dar es Salaam school of historians, the notion of primary and secondary 
resistance in its more rigid incarnations ignores a considerable amount of the 
ambiguity, continuity, and complexity that characterizes African politics in real 
life.19  When does resistance cease to be “primary?”  When the Germans declare 
themselves to be the sovereign authority in a territory, or when the Africans that 
live there actually recognize that authority?  If it is the latter, then almost all of 
the resistance until the very end of German colonial rule was primary.   In the 
case of the German-Hehe War, the former generally claimed that the latter were 
not soldiers of an opposing sovereign power; the Hehe were instead rendered as 
“bandits,” “rebels,” and “criminals” in colonial documents, despite the fact that 
Mkwawa and his followers essentially never accepted German authority.       
Another debate that can obfuscate more than it clarifies when taken to its 
extremes is the so-called “merrie Africa” versus “Livingston’s Africa” debate.  
Many of the missionaries and early administrators portrayed “Darkest Africa” as a 
hellish place in desperate need of saving, and subsequent scholarly works 
understandably sought to contradict this notion by emphasizing the degree to 
which pre-colonial African systems functioned well and allowed Africans to 
control their environment.20  The reality was rather somewhere in between: 
nineteenth-century East Africa (like nineteenth-century Asia, Europe and the 
Americas) was indeed a difficult place to live.  People toiled constantly to survive 
                                                 
19 T. O. Ranger, “Connections between ‘Primary Resistance’ Movements and Modern Mass 
Nationalism in East and Central Africa,” Journal of African History, IX, 3 (1968): 437-53 and IX, 
4 (1968): 631-41.  
 
20 See Helge Kjekshus, Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History 
(London: James Curry, 1996).  
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 and had to deal with any number of sources of insecurity.  The slave trade, while 
it had not “emptied the continent” as was disingenuously claimed by some 
Europeans interested in claiming “open lands,” severely traumatized many of the 
communities in East Africa in this period.  In other words Africa was neither 
paradise nor hell—just like everywhere else.  
 Scholars have also engaged in an ongoing debate as to whether 
colonialism was an opportunity or tragedy.  Again, it was both, sometimes even 
for the same person at different times in his or her life.  Colonialism created new 
opportunities at the same time that it closed down others, and many Africans (as 
will be clear in the narrative) were quite deft and positioning themselves to take 
advantage of those possibilities that did appear.  The resistance versus 
collaboration debate should likewise be looked at as a fluctuating spectrum rather 
than an either or proposition.  During the course of the German-Hehe War, it is 
often it is unclear who is using whom.  Similarly, the victim and perpetrator 
pairing can in some cases unintentionally infantilize and primitivize Africans, 
who appear like semi-helpless objects in the face of European power and designs.  
Many Africans, one thinks of the Germans’ Askari mercenaries, could be 
simultaneously victim and perpetrator.  The career of Mkwawa, leader of the 
Hehe, is perhaps the best case in point, particularly when viewed from the 
perspective of African third parties like the Bena or Kinga, who had faced and 
been subjugated by Hehe armies. 
A further debate regards the arguments about German versus other 
colonialisms. Usually more decisive than the country of origin of a given 
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 European actor were the objective conditions on ground, which were affected by 
politics, ecology, geography, and any of a number of other factors.  The Germans’ 
response to Rwanda had more in common with British policy in Uganda (which it 
resembles demographically, socially, and politically) than it did with policies in 
other German colonies.  And so-called “stateless peoples” of Africa tended to be 
viewed with disdain and contempt everywhere, not just by the Germans.  Robert 
F. Berkhofer has forcefully argued against contrasting “French,” “Spanish,” and 
“British” colonization of the New World:  
Such a comparison appears to me to emphasize the seeming differences in 
aims at the expense of their similarities, and it implies the outcomes 
depended more upon these aims and motives than upon the natural 
resources and the level of tribal socio-political organization available for 
exploitation by the three nations’ policy makers and settlers in any given 
area.  Where aims or, more importantly, consequences appear to differ 
among the colonial powers, one should look more to dissimilar physical 
environments and differing tribal governments and social organization 
than to fundamental contrasts in national idealism or racial sentiment.  I do 
not mean to suggest that policies did not differ at all or that race prejudice 
and missionary zeal did not vary among the three nations.  Rather I 
maintain that these latter are minor matters compared to the larger 
similarities of aims among the three nations’ policy makers and settlers. 21  
 
I contend that Berkhofer’s assertion is equally valid in the African context when 
attempting to compare and contrast Belgian, German, French, or British 
colonization.  
The final binary concerns those who emphasize the colonizers’ ideology 
that they brought with them from Europe and those who instead privilege 
practical experience in the field.  Often it is argued (especially with the Germans) 
that the men who projected European military and administrative force in Africa 
                                                 
21 Robert F. Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus 
to the Present (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 116.  
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 arrived with an “ideological toolbox” (or in a recent variation by Isabel Hull, 
institutional framework) that informed their behavior in the colonies, one that 
prefigured and inherently gave rise to extreme violence.  And there is no doubt 
that the officers of the Schutztruppe, the German colonial military, came with a 
complex array of ideas about race, gender, progress, class and hierarchy, and “law 
and order.”  But this approach perhaps focuses too much on a one-way flow of 
ideas and people from Europe outwards.  I contend that much of what they came 
to believe about the places they were conquering and the people they were 
subjugating was formed as a result of practical, real-life experiences of “men on 
the ground.” I am not necessarily privileging one of the other (in the field vs. 
metropolitan thought).  The political-economy of colonial war and the 
subjectivities and ideas of war operated dialectically.  I get this impression based 
on common features of their writings, essays, official correspondence, and 
speaking appearances.  My argument is that the colonial officers involved in these 
campaigns were, in fact, themselves involved in the articulation and formation of 
racial conquest ideologies.  They were part of an intellectually creative 
(generative) process that paralleled the physically destructive policies they 
utilized to forge a lasting colonial order in Africa.  Their experiences with the 
ferocity of colonial warfare and the initially effective strategies of African 
resistance interacted with the experiences, ideas, and expectations that Europeans 
carried with them to Africa.  Colonial actors had to resolve the profound 
contradictions that emerged between their expectations and the reality of what is 
required to quell “native rebellions,” a resolution that was achieved through the 
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 creation of an explanatory model.  This model posited a Manichaean world in 
which conflicts between African and European opponents were profoundly, if 
ambiguously, racial in nature, resolvable only through the application of 
overwhelming, deadly force.  This ideology was not an unmoved mover that 
colonial troops simply obeyed in their encounters with African “others.”  As with 
military policy in the colonies, colonial ideology on the question of race and 
warfare was in large part formulated on the ground as a result of the nature of the 
conflicts that colonization caused. 
 
Literary Review: 
This project necessarily draws on several historiographies.  The historiography of 
the German Empire is extensive, though most of the literature focuses on the 
Empire’s domestic and European facets.  A series of works emerged in the wake 
of the First World War that, while based on solid empirical data, tended to have a 
strong anti-German bias.  Representative of this genre is Mary Townsend’s The 
Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire.22  A series of important works were 
published in both East and West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s.  In East 
Germany, Helmuth Stoecker and Heinrich Loth used documents then unavailable 
to Western historians.23  Their works remain useful in spite of their dogmatism 
and polemical style.  Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s The German Empire and the works of 
Helmut Bley were extremely valuable contributions from West German 
                                                 
22 Mary Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire (New York: Macmillan, 
1930). 
 
23 Helmuth Stoecker, ed., German Imperialism in Africa (Berlin: Akadamie-Verlag, 1986) and 
Heinrich Loth, Griff nach Ostafrika (Berlin: VEB Deutcher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1968). 
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 scholarship in the late 1960s and early 1970s.24  New monographs dealing with 
the German Empire have begun to incorporate more discussion of the connections 
between overseas imperialism and the empire in Europe.25 
The historiography of the German overseas empire is rather small in 
comparison with its French and English counterparts; the best general (and 
practically the only) survey in English of the German imperial enterprise is 
Woodruff Smith’s The German Colonial Empire.26  Wilifred Westphal’s 
Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien also presents a good overview of German 
overseas expansion.27  There has been a series of works in the last five years 
applying newer cultural methodologies to German imperialism.  Susanne 
Zantrop’s engaging Colonial Fantasies examines the German cultural fascination 
and encounter with colonialism before unification.28  Nina Berman applies 
Edward Said’s conceptual framework to the German case in her Orientalismus, 
Kolonialismus und Moderne, and the cultural resonance and implications of the 
                                                 
24 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, op. cit.; Helmut Bley, Namibia under German Rule 
(Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1996); Helmut Bley, “The History of European Expansion: A review of 
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(Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1979), 140-160. 
 
25 Michael Stürmer, The German Empire 1870-1918 (New York: The Modern Library, 2000) and 
Edgar Feuchtwanger, Imperial Germany 1850-1918 (London: Routledge, 2001). 
 
26 Woodruff Smith, The German Colonial Empire (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1978).  He has also written a general work on imperialism that extends Wehler’s politically 
driven “social-imperialist” model with some revision to all European empires.  Woodruff Smith, 
European Imperialism in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1982).  Smith has 
also written about the imperialist roots of Nazi ideology: Woodruff Smith, The Ideological 
Origins of Nazi Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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1984). 
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1770-1870 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). 
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 imperial question are further explored in Russell Berman’s Enlightenment or 
Empire.29  Studies of gender in the German empire have begun to emerge as well: 
Krista O’Donnel’s article “Poisonous Women” offers an excellent and detailed 
study of the intersection of questions of race and gender in German Southwest 
Africa.30  Lora Wildenthal’s German Women for Empire offers one of the most 
systematic, and indeed disturbing, treatments of the intersection between 
Wilhelmine notions of gender and the overseas imperial project.31  A collection of 
essays similar to those in The Imperialist Imagination has also appeared on the 
German experience in Asia, which discusses German and other encounters with 
and interpretations of Islam, China, Japan, and India.32  Helmut Bley’s student 
Gesine Krüger’s work on German Southwest Africa applies new historical and 
anthropological methodologies as well in Kriegsbewältigung und 
Geschichtsbewußtsein.33  Most recently, Isabel Hull’s work Absolute Destruction: 
Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany attempts to link 
the repeated instances of extreme violence perpetrated by the Germans in Africa 
with subsequent events in Europe via an argument about the Kasierreich’s 
                                                 
29 Nina Berman, Orientalismus, Kolonialismus und Moderne: Zum Bild des Orients in der 
deutschen Kultur um 1900 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1997) and Russell A. Berman, Enlightenment or 
Empire: Colonial Discourse in German Culture (Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, 1998). 
30 Krista O’Donnel, “Poisonous Women: Sexual Danger, Illicit Violence, and Domestic Work in 
German Southern Africa, 1904-1915,” Journal of Women’s History, Vol. 11 No. 3 (autumn), 31- 
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31 Lora Wildenthal, German Women for Empire, 1884-1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2001). 
 
32 “Barbaren” und “Weiße Teufel”: Kulturkonflikte und Imperialismus in Asien vom 18. bis zum 
20. Jahrhundert, ed. Eva-Maria Auch and Stig Förster (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1997). 
 
33 Gesine Krüger, Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein: Realität, Deutung und 
Verarbeitung des deutschen Kolonialkrieges in Namibia 1904 bis 1907 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1999).  
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 institutional military culture.34  The book makes a compelling argument for the 
connections between colonial violence and German behavior in the world wars, 
though it focuses almost entirely on the genocide of the Herero and Nama from 
1904 to 1907.  One of the problems with the debate on German colonialism is the 
frequent tendency to emphasize events in Southwest Africa to the exclusion of 
everywhere else.  GSWA was not representative of the practices and goals of any 
other colony—it was the Reich’s only proper settler colony due to its malaria-free 
environment.  As Mark Levene has recently argued: 
Indeed, to go down this Holocaust-centric path carries further dangers of 
both distorting as well as isolating German actions in South-West Africa 
from the broader picture of imperial advance.  After all, there were many 
elements in the German administration, particularly in the Colonial Office, 
as well as in German society at large who were resolutely opposed to the 
von Trotha [exterminationist] approach.  This includes one very central 
player: Leutwein, whose whole governance of the colony from the time of 
his appointment, in 1889, had been consciously geared towards imitation 
of the British model of divide and rule.  But this itself would be to assume 
that Leutwein was incapable of using the iron fist, when we know that he 
repeatedly put down native resistance with uncompromising ferocity.  It 
would also be to accept at face value that the British themselves were 
paragons of colonial virtue.35   
 
As with settler colonies everywhere (Algeria, Kenya, South Africa), the 
willingness and ability of the colonial state to perpetrate violence far exceeded 
that of other types of colonies, whether that state was German, British or French.  
The army that crushed the Nama and Herero, for example, was an almost all-
white force, a situation that would have been impossible (and indeed lethal) in 
Togo, Cameroon, or East Africa due to the prevalence of disease in the latter 
                                                 
34 Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial 
Germany, op. cit. 
 
35 Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Volume II: The Rise of the West and the 
Coming of Genocide (London: I. B. Taurus, 2005), 237.  
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 cases.  For this reason, one must be cautious in generalizing German colonial 
practice from the Southwest African experience.  Events in East Africa deserve a 
similar treatment and emphasis. 
An extensive historiography also exists for East Africa.  The doyen of the 
field, John Iliffe, has written several works on East Africa and German rule.  His 
Tanganyika under German Rule 1905-1912 and A Modern History of Tanganyika 
remain the foundations of studying the region.36  M. H. Y. Kaniki’s edited volume 
Tanzania under Colonial Rule offers the insightful perspectives of prominent 
Tanzanian scholars.37  Several influential studies have appeared that deal with 
German East Africa as a social and economic unit.  Helge Kjekshus’s Ecology 
Control and Economic Development in East African History  incorporates social 
and environmental history in his examination of the effects of conquest on 
indigenous society.38  Kjekshus’s work dovetails closely with the work of Mike 
Davis, whose Late Victorian Holocausts makes vividly clear the manner in which 
ecological catastrophe and colonial conquest fed on one another, often with 
millions of dead indigenes as a result.39  In a similar vein, Juhani Koponen’ 
                                                 
36 John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule 1905-1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969) and A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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 Development for Exploitation examines the social and economic transformations 
unleashed by the conquest.40   
More recently, Jonathan Glassman’s Feasts and Riot has attempted to use 
oral data and methodological advances in African studies to explicate the coastal 
revolts of 1888-1890.41  Jan-Georg Deutsch has likewise given us a much clearer 
picture of the long and difficult course of emancipation in the German colony—
slavery was, in fact, never explicitly abolished in German East Africa for reasons 
that had much more to do with expediency and local context than metropolitan 
ideologies (which were generally against chattel slavery).42  Erick J. Mann’s 
book, Mikono ya Damu: “Hands of Blood”, also provides an excellent overview 
of the “politics of conflict” in German East Africa and contains a useful treatment 
of the complicated events in the southern highlands in the 1890s.43            
 Finally, I will be tapping into the historiography of African resistance, which 
is extensive.  Two of the best works remain Michael Crowder’s edited volume 
West African Resistance and Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui’s Protest and 
Power in Black Africa.44  Bruce Vandervort’s recent Wars of Imperial Conquest 
                                                 
40 Juhani Koponen, Development for Exploitation: German Colonial Policies in Mainland 
Tanzania, 1884-1914 (Helsinki: Lit Verlag, 1994). 
 
41 Jonathan Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the 
Swahili Coast, 1856-1888 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995). 
 
42 Jan Georg Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition in German East Africa c. 1884-1914 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2006). 
 
43 Erick J. Mann, Mikono ya Damu: “Hands of Blood”: African Mercenaries and the Politics of 
Conflct in German East Africa (Frankfurt: Peter Lang GmbH, 2002).  
 
44 Michael Crowder ed., West African Resistance: The Military Response to Colonial Occupation 
(London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1971) and Robert I. Rotberg and Ali Mazrui, eds., Protest and 
Power in Black Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). 
 
 22
 in Africa attempts to bring recent innovations and insights in the field to the study 
of colonial conquest.45 
Far less has been written about the Hehe-German war itself.  Iliffe’s study 
of German rule begins in 1905, and his A Modern History of Tanganyika devotes 
only a few pages to the episode.  It is treated largely as a prologue to the Maji 
Maji Rebellion of 1905.  Koponen and Kjekshus address the war only in general 
terms as part of the larger phenomenon of conquest, doing little to distinguish the 
Hehe War from that waged by the Germans against the Swahili, Yao, or others.  
Rotberg’s article on indigenous resistance to the German invasion also deals with 
the Hehe war in only a few pages.46  Kirsten Zirkel’s excellent study of the 
German military in the colonies likewise addresses the Hehe example only 
briefly.47  Alison Redmayne’s doctoral dissertation and her article “Mkwawa and 
the Hehe Wars” examine the revolt at length, but are now over three decades 
old.48  I believe that the newer scholarship on the German Empire and on African 
resistance can add much to her perspective.  A thorough anthropological treatment 
of the Hehe is provided by Brown and Hutt in their Anthropology in Action, but 
their work offers little discussion about the revolt as a turning point in Hehe 
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 history and is, needless to say, rather dated.49  Finally, Martin Baer and Olaf 
Schröter’s Eine Kopfjagd: Deutsche in Ostafrika, Spuren kolonialer Herrschaft 
offers an excellent treatment of the context of the German-Hehe War and also 
chronicles the visit by Mwawa’s great-grandson, Is-Haka Musa Sapi Mkwawa, to 
Germany.50  The work is, however, biographical and somewhat episodic and 
leaves much to be done in terms of examining the particularities of the conflict 
from a social and political standpoint. 
I believe that insights offered by the “new military history” can be 
fruitfully applied to the Hehe case.  Exemplary in this regard is James Belich’s 
The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict: the Maori, the British, and the 
New Zealand Wars.  Belich offers compelling arguments for the study of such 
conflicts and demonstrates how much can be accomplished in this regard relying 
on almost entirely European sources (he is essentially applying Ethnohistory to 
colonial warfare).  Another outstanding work that attempts to reexamine colonial 
revolts using a wide range of newer methodologies and explanatory frameworks 
is Mahir Saul and Patrick Royer’s West African Challenge to Empire.51  Their 
discussion of French military policies and indigenous responses to colonization 
offers an excellent comparison with events in Tanzania.  German policies in East 
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 Africa bear a striking resemblance not only to similar methods used elsewhere 
during the conquest of Africa and the Pacific, but also to the tactics employed by 
German forces four decades later.  Also useful, therefore, will be the theoretical 
and thematic issues that have been raised by the new studies of German 
occupation policy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.52  Utilizing the 
questions illuminated by these other fields and by newer studies of East Africa, I 
intend to offer a more extensive and sophisticated treatment of the Hehe-German 
conflict, one that contextualizes the war within East African history and within 
the history of conquest and resistance more broadly.  Ideally, my treatment will 
also recapture as much as possible the perceptions, experience, and significance 
of the war for both African and European actors.    
 
Objectives and Methodology 
The Hehe were anything but passive actors, and Africa was not a tabula rasa 
upon which Europeans could inscribe their will.  German forces resorted to highly 
destructive tactics precisely because the Hehe proved so effective at negating 
German technological and organizational advantages.  This study must of 
necessity examine the Hehes’ mode of resistance, their worldview, and what the 
war meant for their society.  Hehe tactics proved highly successful in the initial 
stages of revolt, and their subsequent actions and decisions set the parameters 
within which colonial power was forced to act.  Any treatment of the war must 
view the conduct of both sides dialectically.  The behavior of the Hehe is 
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 inexplicable without an effective exploration of German policy, and German 
actions are incomprehensible unless viewed vis-à-vis those of the Hehe.  Also 
crucial to the story is the role of the “auxiliaries” that fought on the Hehes’ side.  
Indeed, there may have been more Bena, Gogo, and other allies present at Rugaro 
than actual Hehe, and in the final stages of the war, the Germans made use of 
detachments of “friendly Hehe” that far outnumbered their own forces—or those 
of Mkwawa. 
Central to any narrative of the German-Hehe War, therefore, is an 
examination the so-called “friendlies” that fought on the German side, without 
whom the conquest would have come to nil.  Imperial power was forced to 
compromise and make considerable adjustments in the face of local conditions, 
local resistance, and local accommodation.53  Without a range of allies, both local 
and imported, the German colonizers were practically helpless.  An examination 
of the key role played both by the Askaris and the Germans’ indigenous allies 
does much to destabilize a simple view of the German-Hehe War as a “European-
African conflict.”  Colonization was about compromise and alliance just as it was 
about conquest and aggression, and it was a process in which all players had 
varying degrees of agency.                  
Some of these allies were local adversaries of Mkwawa, the Hehe leader.  
As Jamie Monson compellingly demonstrates in her discussion of events a decade 
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 later, politics in the southern highlands were highly fluid and extremely volatile.54  
The Hehes’ repeated successes against their Songea and Bena neighbors had 
created a considerable well of resentment.  It was this local political context upon 
which the Germans were able to capitalize.  But likewise, the Hehes’ enemies saw 
the Germans as a potentially powerful ally in destroying their rival’s hegemony.  
For them, the German invasion was as much an opportunity as an imposition.  
The motivations and perspectives of these indigenous adversaries of the Hehe are 
central to the story of the war, a war that was almost as much a civil war as an 
external invasion. 
The Germans also brought in personnel from outside the colony in the 
form of mercenary troops known as Askaris.  Initially these were Muslim levies 
from Sudan or Shangaan from Mozambique, but these were gradually replaced 
with Muslim soldiers from the coast and then Nyamwezi from the East African 
central caravn route.55  The Askaris, directed by white officers, provided the 
majority of the Germans’ professional manpower in East Africa, and as such they 
acted as one of the primary instruments of conquest.  Needless to say, their view 
of their role and of the tasks they were given was not identical to that held by their 
“superiors.”  In many regards, Africa—like India—was conquered through the 
harnessing of its own people to that end, and generally indigenous populations 
paid for conquest as well.  In large part, East Africans conquered East Africa.  
The conquest was conducted with European direction and logistical systems to be 
sure, and almost always to European ends, but both the Askaris serving in German 
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 forces and the various allies that assisted them in the defeat of Mkwawa had their 
own political and social agendas.  These must be taken into account, therefore 
destabilizing monolithic models of “colonizers” and “colonized.”  A portion of 
this work will focus on the crucial, mediating role of the Askaris.56   
This study seeks to be transnational and comparative: it is the former 
insofar as the violence that characterized the German-Hehe War was the result of 
and drew on several concurrent developments that crossed or ignored national or 
other established political boundaries.  These events are a part of world history, 
not just German or East African history.  The violence and brutality of these 
conflicts was the product of several overlapping currents and circuits of violence.  
As a case in point: the Hehe-German war involved, on the one hand, involved a 
“European” army with German officers (a country that itself was barely two 
decades old at the time), soldiers from the coast (“Kiswahili”), soldiers from the 
interior (increasingly, Nyamwezi), “Zulu” (actually Shangaani from Portuguese 
East Africa), and Sudanese (proficient killers from the Anglo-Sudanese army 
evicted by the Mahdists) carrying weapons from Germany and the United States.  
Recruiters scoured Egypt, Aden, and Ethiopia in search of potential troops.  Their 
opponent, the Hehe “conquest state,” was an amalgam of Zulu tactics (transmitted 
via the Ngoni and Sangu), experience against the Maasai, and an innovative, 
highly effective logistical system.  Mkwawa had “Arab” advisors and architects 
                                                 
56 There exist few extensive studies of the Askaris at the present time, but there are works dealing 
with similar formations from other areas of colonial Africa that may serve as a basis for 
comparison.  See Timothy H. Parsons, The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial 
Military Service in the King’s African Rifles, 1902-1964 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999) and 
Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857-
1960 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1991).  Fortunately, Erick J. Mann’s Mikono ya Damu does 
deal with the Askari at length, Op. cit.  
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 and could call on auxiliaries from dozens of neighboring communities (the Bena, 
the Sagara, Kinga, etc.), and he had complex diplomatic relations with the 
Nyamwezi, the Ngoni, and (allegedly) the Abushiri rebels of the coast.  Both sides 
in this conflict were hybridized amalgams of a variety of historical actors—both 
were dynamic, rapidly evolving, and extremely proficient at inflicting violence. 
 The account presented here also emphasizes the conditions on the ground, 
or vor Ort, which had a profound effect in shaping not only German (and Hehe) 
practices and policies, but also the ideologies that simultaneously justified and 
grew out of colonial warfare.  German policies were, far more than is generally 
appreciated, formulated by men on the spot with broad, often deliberately vague 
mandates to achieve “victory” in the name of Kultur and civilization.  It is also 
comparative, as the final chapter briefly discusses the manner in which similar 
“colonial situations” on the ground called forth similarly ferocious responses, 
whether it was the disastrous ambush and then war of terror called forth by 
Isandhlwana and Little Big Horn or the scorched earth and mass killing of the 
Philippines and Kaffir Wars.  This is not to say they are all identical, but rather 
than the same lethal mix of local imperatives/violence and global circuits of 
violence leads to similar results.  
 It is also my desire to place the Hehe-German War in context, both as a part of 
Tanzanian history, and as an episode that can shed light on the conquest and 
colonization of Africa as a whole.  In a broader sense, what does the destruction 
of the Hehe polity say about the colonial project’s goals and methods?  How 
distinct was “German colonialism” (an ongoing debate) from others?  Did those 
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 distinctions that do exist arise from German policy goals or from the situation 
colonialism’s agents encountered on the ground?  What does this episode say 
about the state, particularly the colonial state, as a project and a process?  
It is my hope that this study will restore the German-Hehe War to the 
center of recent discussions on the complex history of German colonialism in 
Africa.  Rather than being seen as a prelude to Maji Maji or as a postscript to the 
pre-colonial period, Hehe resistance must viewed in its own right as the key 
limitation on German pretensions in the southern highlands and therefore in the 
colony as a whole.  The war was also an opportunity for the Songea, Bena, and 
others to form alliances with the invaders, and the relations that crystallized 
during the Hehe War would prove key axes of political maneuvering when the 
even larger Maji Maji Revolt erupted in 1905.  Neither African nor German 
actions during the outbreak and suppression of Maji Maji are fully 
comprehensible without a clear understanding of the war that did so much to set 
the stage for the events to come. 
This study of the Hehe-German War draws on several fields of history and 
methodological approaches.  It is both a social and a political history.  German 
military policy as it evolved over the course of the conflict is analyzed in detail 
using German documents and memoirs.  German actions did not, however, occur 
in a vacuum.  One cannot understand the policies that they selected without a 
comprehensive examination of both the sociology of the German forces and a 
detailed study of Hehe society and policies.  In contrast to much of the 
historiography of colonial warfare, German and Hehe actions must be seen in a 
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 dialectical relationship with one another.  Hehe tactics proved to be anything but 
ineffectual.  The Hehe military system, made up of warriors with an enormous 
amount of experience gained in wars with the Bena, Songea and others, proved to 
be quite successful in the initial stages of revolt.  Even once the Hehe had lost 
their initial momentum and were forced to recourse to guerrilla warfare, their 
actions and decisions set the parameters within which the Germans had to 
proceed, both militarily and politically. 
  Such an examination involves several approaches.  Considerable 
advances have been made in Africanist historiography in the field of resistance 
studies.  Studies such as those of the uprisings in German Southwest Africa, 
Mozambique, and French West Africa offer an impressive toolbox of questions 
and techniques with which to examine African initiatives and actions.57  Such 
works highlight the centrality not only of commanders, but also of soldiers of the 
line (often Africans on both sides), of technology, of logistics, and of tactics on 
both sides of a given conflict.  Resistance studies elucidate the complicated ways 
in which Africans managed to negate many of the advantages of European armies 
and form broader coalitions and alliances with groups and peoples who in the pre-
colonial period had been either unaffiliated or even opposed to one another.  
These authors also highlight the cultural modes of resistance and warfare in 
indigenous societies. 
                                                 
57 See Jan-Bart Gewald, Towards Redemption: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia 
1890-1923 (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 1996);  Allen F. Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance 
in Mozambique: The Zambesi valley 1850-1921 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); 
and Michael Crowder, ed., West African Resistance, Op. cit. 
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 Reconstructing such elements of the Hehe polity and people seems at first 
a daunting task due to the dearth of documentation from the African perspective.  
All of the written source material was crafted by German and other European 
authors, and this material is riddled with biases, blind spots, and in some cases 
outright deception (particularly those reports intended for the government in 
Berlin).  Historians in many fields, however, have been forced to confront the 
dilemma of recapturing the actions and beliefs of “subaltern” groups unable 
represent themselves in the documentary record.  Much of labor history had to 
proceed with similar limitations, and gender historians like Kathleen Brown have 
successfully confronted this problem for some time now.58  Historians of colonial 
warfare have attempted to do the same.  James Belich in his study of the Maori-
British Wars offers compelling evidence that this can be accomplished though the 
analysis of precisely those biases that at first glance seem so limiting to our 
analysis of their indigenous opponents, noting that: 
…a type of bias exists, based on shared preconceptions and shared 
conditioning, which may be subject to general rules.  If a given set of 
cultural factors interacts in a relatively consistent way with a given type of 
event, then this may produce an interpretive tendency which, broadly 
speaking, remains constant from case to case.  If such a pattern of 
interpretation, or misinterpretation, can be established, it may be of some 
use in alleviating the problem of one-sided evidence.59 
 
                                                 
58 Kathleen Brown, Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and 
Power in Colonial Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).   Nearly all of 
her sources are written by men about women.  Women’s own voice is almost totally absent from 
the documentation available but Brown nonetheless draws a tremendous amount of convincing 
data and lines of argumentation from them.  
 
59 James Belich, The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict: The Maori, The British, and the 
New Zealand Wars (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1989), 13. 
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  I have attempted to undertake such an evaluation of the German 
evidence based on the method utilized by Belich and others.  This involved a 
careful examination of both the content and the language of German evidence.  
As David Omissi has pointed out, one in effect needs to be a sensitive “translator” 
in order to make sense of terms from the imperial lexicon: “This is partly a matter 
of semantics: an awareness that ‘native cunning’ is imperial jargon for ‘tactical 
skill’.”60  Likewise, various German observers discuss and seem to explain Hehe 
actions in a relatively consistent—and generally negative—manner that can be 
subjected to interpretation.  It is significant that the Germans consistently refer to 
Hehe forces as “bandist,” “criminals,” and “rebels,” not as soldiers or warriors.  
As such, my study, in addition to studying Hehe and German politics and society, 
will inevitably have to briefly examine the cultural modes of the participants’ 
thinking and the cultured way in which they acted and reacted to one another. 
 I have also tried where possible to augment such techniques with oral 
evidence from the descendents of the Hehe in the Southern Highlands of 
Tanzania.  Initially one is justifiably skeptical of the utility of this exercise 
regarding events over a century distant.  But as Jon Glassman has demonstrated in 
this Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the 
Swahili Coast, 1856-1888, there is a tremendous potential for successful 
incorporation of oral data collected from Tanzanians about events for which we 
have no documentary evidence.61  With all the necessary caveats about memory, 
                                                 
 60 David E. Omissi, Air power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 108.  
 
61 Op. cit. 
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 representation, and presentism, I believe that the Hehe to whom I spoke in Iringa 
and Dar es Salaam were inordinately helpful, indeed indispensable, in clearly 
understanding the actions of both sides. 
 German policy itself required a good deal of reconstruction, and I 
relied on the archival material in Berlin, Freiburg, Potsdam, and Dar es Salaam as 
well as the extensive memoir literature written by the participants.62  There exist 
as yet no monographs in English on the Hehe War, so the foundation of analyzing 
the Germans’ overall orientation and strategy required a detailed examination of 
the actual tactics they employed and the course of the war they waged.  For better 
or for worse, a certain amount of establishing “who did what to whom 
successfully” was necessary before broader interpretative conclusions could be 
reached.  Fortunately, there exists an excellent, if rather small, literature on 
colonial warfare and on irregular warfare more generally.  Many of these rely on a 
comparative framework in drawing conclusions and seeking pertinent lines of 
inquiry, and I draw on their insights to a considerable degree.  Four of the most 
effective recent works are those offered by Bruce Vandervort, Ian F. W. Beckett, 
V. G. Kiernan, and H. L. Wesseling.63  These authors offer compelling 
descriptions and interpretations of colonial warfare generally, and in the case of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
62 See Ernst Nigmann, Die Wahehe: Ihre Geschichte, Kult-, Rechts-, Kreigs- und Jagd-Gebräuche 
(Berlin: Ernst Sigfried Mittler und Sohn, 1908), Tom von Prince, Gegen Araber und Wahehe: 
Erinnerungen aus meiner ostafrikanischen Leutnantszeit 1890-1895 (Berlin: Ernst Sigfried Mittler 
und Sohn, 1914) and Alfons M. Adams, Im Dienste des Kreuzes (Oberbayern: St. Ottilien, 1899). 
 
63 See Bruce Vandervort, op. cit.; Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-
Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750 (London: Routledge, 2001); V. G. 
Kiernan, Colonial Empires and Armies 1815-1960 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1998); J. A. 
De Moor and H. L. Wesseling, Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa 
(Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1989).  
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 Vandervort on warfare in Africa specifically.  Their strong emphasis on the 
necessity of examining the local context will be crucial for two reasons: military 
commanders in German East Africa enjoyed a high degree of autonomy to enact 
policy as they saw fit as long as they could deliver victory, and African decisions 
and actions set the parameters within which those policies were carried out.64   
Recent works have also offered innovative approaches to the culture and 
ideology of the conquerors.  The edited volume Guardians of Empire: The Armed 
Forces of the Colonial Powers c.1700-1964 attempts to incorporate new 
understandings of culture in the exploration of conquest and the articulation of 
power.65  Most of these focus on the British and French colonial experience with 
its far greater repertoire of secondary material, but I believe that the ideology of 
the Germans and the evolving “culture of conquest” can and must be explicated.  
A highly effective attempt in this regard has already been undertaken in the case 
of German Southwest Africa by Gesine Krüger and more recently by Isabel 
Hull.66  
   A final interpretative theme important for my work will be the 
theoretical frameworks developed by those seeking to examine the articulation 
and exercise of power in the colonial context.  Considerable theoretical work has 
been done about state formation and the systematization of violence in East 
Africa.  One of the best works in this regard is Bruce Berman and John 
                                                 
64 See Kirsten Zirkel, op. cit. 
 
65 Op. cit. 
 
66 Gesine Krüger, Op. cit. and Isabel Hull, Op.cit. 
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Lonsdale’s Unhappy Valley, which makes a convincing and highly nuanced 
argument for the utility of certain Marxian modes of interpretation in the colonial 
African context.67 Trutz von Trotha’s work on Togo also offers many insights in 
this regard in his discussions on the utility of “administrative massacres” in 
instantiating German colonial power on the ground in Africa.  More specific to 
the conditions in East Africa, Juhani Koponen’s monumental work, Development 
for Exploitation, offers a similarly detailed exploration of the highly contradictory 
nature of German state and military policy, which on the one hand imposed one of 
the most brutal regimes on East Africans that existed anywhere, but at the same 
time built one of the best school and public health networks in the entire region.68  
I hope to use their insights about the subtle, complex ways in which the colonial 
state and its proxies implemented their designs and—crucially—the manner in 
which the German colonizers were forced to compromise and make significant 
adjustments in the face of local conditions, local resistance, and local 
accommodation. 
 
 
67 Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa (London: James 
Currey, 1992).   The crucial insight offered by Berman and Lonsdale is their focus on the state’s 
highly contradictory position in colonial societies and economies.  Its two primary overriding 
goals—facilitating accumulation and guaranteeing social and political stability—often 
countermanded one another.   The conditions necessary to ensure a steady flow of labor 
undermined the institutions of control such as direct rule, while maintaining political stability 
required that the state not act, or at least not appear to act, as a mere proxy of European economic 
interests.    
 
68 Juhani Koponen, Op. cit. 
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Chapter II: 
The Birth and Collision of Two Empires 
 
The entire colonial story is just a swindle, but we need it for the elections. 
            - Chancellor Bismarck, 188470 
 
If I send one Prussian lieutenant there [to Sudan], then I will have to send 
more to him, to get him out again.  That leads us very far.  The English sphere 
of interest extends to the source of the Nile, and the risk to me is too great.  
Their map of Africa is indeed very beautiful, but my map of Africa lies here in 
Europe.  Here lies Russia and here lies France and we are in the middle; that 
is my map of Africa. 
                           -Chancellor Bismarck, 188871 
 
Whatever the “Iron Chancellor” may have wanted, German rule in 
Tanganyika began with a dramatic display of violence and calculated terror.  
The imperial government in Berlin felt compelled to take over the colony 
from the incompetent and under-funded German East Africa Company in 
1889 after a massive rebellion on the coast erupted which attempted to eject 
both the company and the region’s nominal overlords, the functionaries of the 
Sultan of Zanzibar.72  The insurgents, disorganized and outgunned, were 
                                                 
69 Karl Weule, “Ostafrikanische Eingeborenen-Zeichnungen: Psychologische Einblicke in die 
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71 Ibid., 59. 
 
72 Robert D. Jackson, “Resistance to the German Invasion of the Tanganyikan Coast, 1888-
1891,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Ali Mazrui, eds., Protest and Power in Black Africa (New 
 defeated after only a few months, and the coast—that crucial nexus of Indian 
Ocean trade so desired by German colonial interests—was now “pacified” 
(beruhigt).  German authorities hoped they would merely have to tap the 
caravan routes from the coast to the interior, particularly the central route 
leading to Lake Tanganyika, in order to turn the “jewel” of their African 
empire into a profitable colony.   
Events would soon prove such expectations illusory—the route to the 
interior was dangerous and unreliable due to raiding by the most powerful 
polity in the southern highlands, through which the route passed.  That polity, 
Uhehe, was seen as the only major obstacle to the profitable trade with the 
interior.  German forces were dispatched in summer 1891 under Commander 
Emil von Zelewski with orders to reduce the Hehe and other “rebellions 
tribes” to submission and secure “peace” in the region.  The column, in fact, 
engaged in a rampage of destruction as it meandered westward, and word of 
the column’s depredations quickly reached the Hehe.73  The column was 
nearly annihilated by a well-planned Hehe ambush on 17 August 1891.74  Far 
from the easy victory anticipated by German officials, the war with the Hehe 
would prove every bit as bloody and far more difficult to win than the coastal 
rebellion of 1888.  
                                                                                                                                           
York: Oxford University Press, 1970). 37-79.  More recently, see Jonathan Glassman’s 
excellent Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili 
Coast, 1856-1888 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995). 
 
73 Ernst Nigmann, Die Wahehe: Ihre Geschichte, Kult-, Rechts-, Kriegs- und Jagd-Gebräuche 
(Berlin: Ernst Sigfried Mittler und Sohn, 1908), 15-6 and John Iliffe, A Modern History of 
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74 For the classic account of the ambush and its consequences for the Hehe, see Alison 
Redmayne, “Mkwawa and the Hehe Wars,” Journal of African History, IX, 3 (1968): 409-36. 
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 Thus, the Hehe War of 1891 to 1898 began with the most humiliating 
defeat ever suffered by the German colonizers in East Africa, or indeed in any 
of Germany’s African colonies.  The destruction of Zelewski’s column at 
Rugaro75 in Tanganyika’s southern highlands was colonial Germany’s “Battle 
of Little Big Horn,” their Isandhlwana, and it sparked off a major war between 
the Hehe under Chief Mkwawa and the German authorities based in Dar es 
Salaam.  A large punitive expedition destroyed Mkwawa’s fortress at Iringa in 
1894, but far from being defeated, the Hehe waged a sustained guerrilla war 
for a further four years.  German victory in 1898 came only after a protracted 
campaign of verbrannte Erde—scorched earth—and a brutal hunt for Chief 
Mkwawa, which culminated in the removal of his head to be sent back to 
Germany.76   
The German-Hehe War was the longest and most difficult conflict 
waged by the Germans in East Africa before the outbreak of the infamous 
Maji Maji Revolt in 1905.77  The Schutztruppe officer Ernst Nigmann would 
later argue that “no campaign cost us more blood and treasure than this 
                                                 
75 There is some confusion as to the name of the Battle of Rugaro, as many German sources 
refer to it as Lula-Rugaro, and modern works often call it the Battle of Lugalo. Lula was the 
actual spot where the engagement took place, Rugaro was the nearest village, and Lugalo is 
the modern name of the same village.  I am using “Rugaro” for consistency.  
 
76 See Martin Baer and Olaf Schröter, Eine Kopfjagd: Deutsche in Ostafrika, Spuren 
kolonialer Herrschaft (Berlin: Links Verlag, 2001).  See also Dr. Emil Werth, Der Wahehe – 
Sultan Mkwawa mid den Drei Köpfen (Augsburg: Institut für Menschen und 
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reputation for brutality and ruthlessness while pacifying the Swahili rebels.  See Jonathan 
Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili 
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 one.”78    Protracted and expensive as it was, the German victory was 
seemingly so total that the Hehe never again offered serious opposition to 
German rule, even serving as allies against their rebelling neighbors in the 
1905-1907 war.  The defeat of the Hehe must be seen as a fundamental 
turning point, both for the history of the Hehe and the southern highlands and 
for the history of German power in East Africa.  As such, reanalyzing the 
German-Hehe struggle allows us to acquire a new understanding of several 
important and difficult questions about the experience of German colonization 
in East Africa, and indeed regarding the European imperial project more 
generally.  How is it that the Germans were able to defeat a polity that had 
proved practically invincible in conflicts with its neighbors?  How were a 
handful of inexperienced, vastly outnumbered German conquistadors able to 
instantiate imperial power in a territory over twice the size of imperial 
Germany and nearly as large as Western Europe?  What does the conflict with 
the AvaDaliki (Germans in Kihehe) tell us about the nature of power in 
southeastern Africa, particularly among the so-called Mfecane-states created 
by the cascading violence and instability unleashed by Shaka’s “African 
military revolution”?  To what extent was the extreme violence that 
characterized the German conquest and incorporation of Tanganyika 
something intrinsic to German culture—as is often asserted—or the German 
colonial project in Africa?  Finally, what light does the German-Hehe war 
shed on the process of colonization, and what does it tell us about the near 
                                                 
78 Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 62.  Indeed, The Germans lost fewer troops fighting the Maji Maji 
rebels than defeating the Wahehe.  
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 continual military violence that characterized German rule in East Africa?  
This chapter will focus on one of the primary sources of that violence—the 
collision between two ambitious, emergent policies in East Africa, Deutsch 
Ostafrika and the Hehe Empire. 
79 
 
The Establishment of German Power in East Africa 
While the newly unified German Reich would eventually become one of the 
most important movers in the so-called “Scramble for Africa,” as the quotes at 
the beginning of this chapter make clear, Chancellor Bismarck was hardly a 
fervent advocate of colonization.  He was the target of constant and ever-
strengthening pressure, however, to stake or defend German claims in the 
“Dark Continent,” particularly from merchants like Hansing and O’Swald and 
the House of Woerrmann based out of Hamburg.  O’Swald enjoyed a 
                                                 
79 Image of an Askari, or colonial mercenary soldier, bearing the imperial German flag.  From 
Uwe Timm, Deutsche Kolonien (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1986), 55. 
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 controlling interest particularly in the trade flowing in and out if Zanzibar in 
East Africa, facing real competition only from the British-backed Indian 
trading firms that carried goods from Bombay to Zanzibar and back.80  
Pundits and publicists from the German Empire’s emerging civil and 
associational society also attempted to bring public pressure on Bismarck and 
the imperial government to make good those claims that did exist in Africa 
and elsewhere.  Liberal imperialists like Max Weber and Friedrich Naumann 
felt that England’s colonial empire and the India Raj in particular had made 
Britain a great and civilized nation, an experience that should be emulated by 
the new Germany for the same reasons.  The most famous and influential of 
these pundits, however, was Friedrich Fabri, who’s Bedarf Deutschland der 
Kolonien? was extremely influential on public and academic opinion with 
regards to the “colonial question” and helped create a domestic movement for 
joining France, Britain, Portugal, and Belgium (whose King, Leopold II, was 
at this time in the process of acquiring a vast domain in the Congo River 
Basin) in the evolving partition of the world.81  Bismarck and other civilian 
leaders in Berlin remained lukewarm to the idea, having been quite explicit 
about their desire to avoid the costly and bloody entanglements that so often 
characterized the conquest of new colonial territory.  As the chancellor put 
it,“(t)he German Empire cannot carry on a system of colonization like that of 
                                                 
80 Mary Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire (New York: Macmillan, 
1930), 46-7.  Townsend’s study remains the classic work on the German colonial empire from 
a metropolitan perspective and offers extremely detailed discussion of the motives of 
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81 Friedrich Fabri, Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien?: eine politisch-ökonomische 
Betrachtung (Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1879).  See also Arne Perras, Carl Peters and German 
Imperialism 1856-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), introduction. 
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 France.  It cannot send out warships to conquer territories overseas, that is, it 
will not take the initiative; but it will protect the German merchant even in the 
land that he acquires.  Germany will do what England has always done, 
establish Chartered Companies, so that the responsibility always rests with 
them.”82  Bismarck further claimed “it was not part of the Reich’s functions 
and not in accordance with colonial policy, to restore state institutions among 
uncivilized peoples, and by means of military might to break down opposition 
of the Native chiefs to enterprises of German nationals which had not yet 
established themselves.”83  This “liberal imperial,” company-driven 
orientation was in line with the constellation of German politics of the 1870s, 
which featured an alliance between the Bismarckian state and the National 
Liberals.84  The German government would only act in a supportive role; the 
flag would follow trade, but only reluctantly and cautiously.     
 Events from 1879 onwards, however, would serve to change the 
situatio d
                                                
n ramatically and would convince Bismarck to turn toward direct 
annexation and imperial administration.   Internally, Bismarck’s alliance with 
the Liberals broke apart, and in 1879 he shifted the focus of his 
Sammlungspolitik—the policy of gathering together large, if unwieldy, 
coalitions of parties and interest groups—away from the National Liberal 
Party and towards an alliance of the conservatives and the Catholics (who 
 
82 Townsend, 119. 
 
83 Jon Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 
42. 
 
84 See Gründer, chapter IV, “Die Kolonialfrage im Spektrum der politischen Parteien.”  
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 before 1879 had themselves been the target of Bismarck’s persecution).85  
Bismarck became ever more concerned with stabilizing this coalition at the 
polls, and he came to the conclusion that the “colonial question” was an 
effective way to do this.86  As he put it rather bluntly, “The entire colonial 
story is just a swindle, but we need it for the elections.”87  This political 
realignment combined with the difficulties brought about by the ongoing 
Great Depression—which began in 1873—meant a gradual but important shift 
from laissez faire economics to a more direct, state-managed political-
economy.  Events on the ground in East Africa also profoundly changed the 
colonial equation, and some argue that the political efforts of self-styled 
conquistadores like Carl Peters, both on the ground in Africa and back in the 
metropole as nationalist agitators, were the most decisive reason for the 
“conversion” of Bismarck and other reluctant imperialists towards a German 
colonial Empire.88   
Born in Hanover in 1856, Carl Peters seems like an unlikely candidate 
for the
                                                
 “founder of German East Africa,” particularly when compared to 
roughhewn, martial adventurers like Henry Morton Stanley or Hermann 
Wissmann, who at this time were both heavily involved in the “exploration” 
 
85For a discussion of Bismarck’s shift from an alliance with Liberalism to a coalition of the 
conservatives and the Catholic Zentrum party, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das Deutsche 
Kaiserreich, 1871-1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1994), especially chapter  III, 
“Herrschaftssystem und Politik.” 
 
86 Townsend, chapter IV, “Bismarck Stabilizes and Organizes the Colonial Policy under the 
Slogan ‘Safety First’.”  
 
87 Gründer, 58.  All translations mine unless otherwise specified. 
 
88 Arne, 9-12. 
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 of Leopold II’s Congo.89  Peters was an academic and a pundit, not a soldier 
or a scientist, and he fancied himself to be a German Cecil Rhodes.  In 1884 
and 1885 Carl Peters “claimed” vast stretches of East Africa for Germany on 
his own initiative (Bismarck, when asked for state support for the expedition, 
had asked Peters not to go at all).  He and his self-financed band of 
“explorers” travelled along the caravan routes leading inland from Zanzibar 
and signed a series of “protection treaties” with local African leaders.90  These 
legally and morally flimsy documents would become the basis for the 
authority of Peters’s Deutsch Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft (German East 
Africa Company) and, by extension, of the German Reich.  The DOAG was 
modeled after other trading companies like the East India Company and the 
British Imperial East Africa Company.91   
But rather than working towards the establishment of political 
stability
     
, he spread destruction in his wake with total contempt for his 
instructions not to foment any expensive trouble in German East Africa.92  As 
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92 Chancellor Bismarck, never an avid proponent of colonialism, was quite explicit on this 
point in his biting criticism of the expansionist pretensions of the Deutsch-Ostafrikanisc
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give up the whole East African colonial venture than agree to a military campaign in the 
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 he himself proudly described one incident: “The Sultan shall have peace, but 
eternal peace. I shall show the Vagogo [sic.] what the Germans are!  Plunder 
the villages, throw fire into the houses, and smash anything that will not 
burn.”93  Peters has justly gone down in history as prime example of the 
brutality and incompetence of German imperialism in Africa, but he was in 
very good company: the exploits of Henry Morton Stanley (known to Africans 
as Bula Mutari, breaker of stones) and other “explorers” of the 1860s-1880s 
offer countless examples of abuse, violence, and gross errors in judgment, 
which, more often than not, resulted in the deaths of countless Africans.94  
Much as he resented Peters, Bismarck felt that he should acknowledge the 
95 
conquistador’s claims in East Africa for domestic political reasons and as a 
bargaining chip to be used in future negotiations with other European powers, 
                                                                                                                                           
 
93 Quoted in Sven Lindqvist, Exterminate All The Brutes (New York: The New Press, 1996), 
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94 See See Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998) 
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95`Image of Carl Peters taken from http://www.planet- 
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 particularly Britain (indeed, he would later exchange Uganda for the tiny 
Baltic island of Helgoland, much the chagrin of Peters and other colonial 
advocates).  East Africa, in theory under DOAG administration, would now be 
added to German Southwest Africa—which the chancellor had claimed during 
the Berlin Conference of winter 1884-1885 to resolve how partition should 
proceed and what should be done with regards to Leopold’s growing claims in 
the Congo Basin. 
But Bismarck and his government’s hopes that the DOAG would be an 
effective and inexpensive method of colonizing East Africa were dashed 
almost immediately.  The company struggled from 1885 to 1888 to even break 
even and was nearly bankrupt by the eve of the so-called “Arab Revolt.”  It 
had precious few personnel at its disposal—no more than a few dozen—and 
those employees it did have were hardly shining examples of the benefits that 
German Kultur had to offer.  This rebellion, which broke out all along the 
German coast in 1888, was ignited in part by the arrogant behavior of the 
same Emil von Zelewski who was to be martyred in 1891.   A contingent 
Germans arrived at the coast during the important Muslim religious holiday, 
Idd al-Hajj, and at one point burst into a mosque during prayers wearing boots 
and accompanied by Zelewski’s hunting dogs.  Zelewski then proceeded to 
pull down the flag of the Sultan of Zanzibar (in whose name the company was 
nominally administrating the land along the coast) and replace it with the flag 
of the German Reich.  Behavior of this sort, which was frequent, caused an 
uproar on the coast and did much to ignite an already volatile political 
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 situation.   By 1889 nearly every community in coastal East Africa was in full 
rebellion against company authority.  It was this rebellion that forced 
Bismarck to accede to annexation, as he felt compelled to dispatch a military 
contingent under the aforementioned explorer Herrmann Wissmann to pacify 
the coast and to bring it under direct imperial administration.96 Wissmann 
97 
recruited whatever African mercenaries he could, most of his recruits coming 
from Cairo.  There, he hired several hundred Sudanese, who were languishing 
in the capital of British Egypt after their expulsion from Sudan by the so-
called “fuzzy wuzzies” of the Mahdi.98   This force of Sudanese and other 
mercenaries formed the core of what would become the Schutztruppe 
(protection troops) for East Africa, which was sometimes known as the 
Wissmanische Truppe in honor of its founder.  Upon its arrival in East Africa, 
                                                 
96 Jonathan Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the 
Swahili Coast, 1856-1888 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995), 5.  Glassman’s book 
provides an excellent treatment of the Buschiri Revolt. 
 
97 Photograph of Wissmann and his Schutztruppe in front of Buschiri’s camp, 1890.  Scanned 
from Uwe Timm, Deutsche Kolonien (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1986). 
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 Wissmann’s force of several hundred Askari began the systematic subjugation 
of the coast, destroying dozens of villages, razing every city that participated 
in the rebellion, hanging and shooting countless Africans, and slowly driving 
the rebels of Bwana Hari and Buschiri to desperation and eventual 
surrender.99  Their prolific use of machine guns and other innovations of the 
late nineteenth century made conquest seem all too easy—and bloody—and 
represented the culmination of decades of European technological 
development in the art of killing.  Even today African informants can recall 
stories that have been told 
100 
for over a century about the brutality of the German (re)conquest of the 
Tanzanian coast during what they refer to as the Buschiri Revolt.  In 
Bagamoyo in 2005, I was shown the chinja chinja tree—meaning the 
slaughtering tree—from which Wissmann’s troops supposedly hung captured 
rebels.  Whether this tree actually served this purpose is beside the point: the 
                                                 
99 See Glassman, epilogue.  
 
100 Photograph taken by author of the “hanging tree” in Bagamoyo. 
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 force that would become the Schutztruppe spread so much fear in its time that 
it is remembered 115 years later.   
Officers like Tom von Prince, Emil von Zelewski, and Wissmann 
himself underwent their “trial by fire” in the Arab Revolt, and their 
overwhelming success—bought at the expense of an untold number of lives 
and sta
                                                
ggering destruction of African property—convinced them that the 
pacification of the rest of the interior would go quickly and relatively easily 
now that an actual military force was available.  The “Arabs” had been, after 
all, the most sophisticated and dangerous element opposing German designs 
on East Africa—or so they thought.101  They proceeded to establish a series of 
coastal stations and then began a slow advance along the caravan routes into 
the interior.  The “Wissmann-Truppe” was made the official military of the 
new “protectorate” (Schutzgebiet) of German East Africa, and its numbers 
were increased to just over 1,200.102  While sufficient to control the (recently 
devastated) East African coast, this was a miniscule number to “pacify” a 
region of over one million square kilometers.  This number would slowly 
grow such that on the eve of the First World War the Schutztruppe numbered 
approximately 15,000 Askari and 3,500 German personnel, but even this was 
hardly up to the task of comprehensively patrolling and securing a territory 
 
101 See Norman Robert Bennet, Arab versus European: Diplomacy and War in Nineteenth-
Century East Central Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1986).  
 
102 On the methodical build of of the Schutztruppe see Ernst Nigmann, Geschichte der 
Kaiserlichen Schutztruppe für Deutsch-Ostafrika (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 
1911), Rochus Schmidt, Der Araber-Aufstand. Seine Ursachen und Folgezustände (Frankfurt 
an der Oder, Sigfried Verlag, 1893), and Alexander Becker, Aus Deutsch-Ostafrikas Sturm- 
und Drangperiode: Erinnerungen eines alten Afrikaners (Halle and der Saale: S. O. Hendel, 
1911).  
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 twice the size of the entire German Empire in Europe.  Indeed, one could 
argue that the entire undertaking, like countless other colonial vetures, 
bordered on the absurd.  It was precisely this sweeping mandate—pacification 
of the colony—combined with scant men and resources that made extreme 
violence all that more likely, as the Arab Revolt along the coast had made 
brutally clear. 
It was during their push inwards along the central caravan route, 
however, and not on the coast, that the Germans faced the greatest challenge 
to the “pacification” of East Africa, a fact that Schutztruppe officers would 
realize 
onicled their efforts 
ften all too often have assumed that Africa was a blank slate, a place of 
Europeans could inscribe their 
too late to prevent the worst disaster they ever suffered during their 
subjugation of Tanganyika.  There, several hundred miles from the coast in 
the southern-central part of the colony, the imperial juggernaut collided with 
another aggressive, emerging polity: the Hehe Empire.     
 
African Politics in the Southern Highlands 
The German colonizers and the historians who have chr
o
primordial savagery upon which “civilized” 
will.  Indeed, it was generally thought that Africans had little political or 
social organization at all.  The African societies encountered by the Germans 
in Tanganyika were indeed highly decentralized, operated locally and on a 
small-scale, and seldom even had institutions that could be described as a 
professional military.  Many were, in fact “acephalous” or “polycephalous” 
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 societies, known at the time as “stateless people,” who possessed no 
discernible centralized political authority of any kind (to European observers 
anyway).103  Notable exceptions in this regard were the large, hierarchical 
polities of the Great Lakes Region—the Rwandan, Bukoban, and Burundian 
monarchies—and the Swahili city-states of the coast.  The other region that 
went against this norm was the southern highlands, where several emerging 
polities were locked in a harsh struggle for supremacy over one another and 
over the smaller societies that surrounded them.  These included the Mbunga, 
the Bena, the Sangu, the Ngoni, and the Hehe, who ultimately achieved a near 
total if ultimately temporary hegemony over the southern highlands.104  One 
of these, the Hehe, would eventually outdo all of their rivals to such an extent 
that the Germans would refer to them as an African Herrenvolk.  While it 
would be inaccurate to depict the “Hehe-Empire” as a centralized state 
directly equivalent to states in Asia or Europe, it was organized on a scale that 
far surpassed anything the Germans had encountered on the coast, and indeed 
anything that had existed in East Africa before the mid-nineteenth century.105 
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usthitic peoples of the Great Lakes region.  While many authors recognize the 
portance of the Sangu and Hehe polities, few acknowledge the existence of the Mbunga 
 
104 All of these groups were Bantu-speaking peoples, as opposed to the Nilotic-speaking 
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 A veritable “military revolution” was caused by the Ngoni 
incursions from the southwest into the region in the 1840s, themselves a part 
of the massive disruption of southern African life unleashed by the Zulu in the 
1830s, known as the Mfecane (the scattering) or the Difaqane (the 
crushing).   The exact causes and consequences of the Mfecane remain hotly 
contested in the literature on southern Africa, but it is agreed that the 
innovations introduced by Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa peoples and Zwide of 
the Ndwandwe near the Tugela River in modern KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa 
created the basis for a dramatic and sanguinary project of conquest and state 
formation under Shaka and the people that would become the Zulu.   The 
creation of the Zulu state in the 1820s displaced hundreds of thousands and 
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 maybe even millions of Africans, who fled in various direction northwards 
and, in seeking to establish themselves in new areas, likewise displaced 
thousands more.  Some have called this narrative into dispute as being a 
dubious argument created by the intellectuals of Apartheid, who claimed that 
the area into which the Boer settlers moved was “empty” or “deserted,” 
thereby legitimating the claims of South African whites to those lands.109  
While it is certainly true that Apartheid historians instrumentalized accounts 
of the Mfecane to justify the policies of their regime from 1948 to 1994, the 
fact remains that the Zulu state and the military innovations introduced by 
Dingiswayo and Shaka had profound political and demographic effects on the 
entire region from Natal to Maasailand in Tanzania.  Refugee groups of the 
Mfecane in turn formed their own powerful states in the 1830s and 1840s 
based on the Zulu model, both in terms of standing, age-regiment driven 
armies and centralized monarchical organization, in modern Zimbabwe 
(Mzilikazi’s Ndebele), Malawi (Sebitwane’s Makololo), Swaziland 
(Sobhuza’s Swazi), Mozambique (Shoshangane’s Gaza), and—most 
importantly for the Hehe—Zwangendaba’s Ngoni in Tanzania.  Even those 
polities which consciously sought to distinguish and defend themselves from 
the Zulu, such as Moshoeshoe’s Basuto (which formed the core of modern 
Lesotho), could only do so by creating new forms of allegiance, acquiring 
                                                 
109 This argument has been put forward most strongly by Julian Cobbing of Rhodes 
University which gave rise to a debate known as the “Cobbing Controversy.”  
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large numbers of firearms from European traders, and relocating to 
inaccessible locations like the formidable mesa-fortress Thaba Bosiu.110  
What is also certain as that the Zulu system of warfare dramatically increased 
                                                
the lethality and destructiveness of conflicts in southeastern Africa, and it was 
this system as adopted and perfected by the Hehe that would prove so 
intractable to German designs in the 1890s. 
 
110 See Anthony Atmore and Peter Sanders, “Sotho Arms and Ammunition in the Nineteenth 
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 111 
Closely related to the dreaded Zulu both ethnically and linguistically, 
the Ngoni had adopted Zulu tactics and used them to devastating effect as they 
moved northeast across the Zambezi River.  Originally having fled the Zulu 
advance in the early 1820s, Zwangendaba and his forces centered around the 
Jere clan proved as formidable and destructive as Shaka’s Zulu.  They crossed 
into what is now southwestern Tanzania in the 1840s, eventually establishing 
themselves in the region around the modern city of Songea.  Like the Zulu of 
southern Africa, the warfare waged by the Ngoni represented an African form 
of “total war” that far surpassed its predecessors in terms of ruthlessness and 
devastation.  Like the beginnings of the Mfecane, the extent of this devastation 
in Tanzania is debated by scholars, as it served as one of the primary 
justifications for European missionary and imperial intervention in the 1880s 
                                                 
111 Map from http://encarta.msn.com/media_461543363/Migrations_of_the_Mfecane.html 
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 (just as theory of “empty lands” created by Shaka served to legitimate 
Apartheid).112  Kjekshus, Koponen, and others argue that the effects of the 
Ngoni Mfecane on Tanzania have been exaggerated by self-interested 
European observers, particularly missionaries and abolitionists, arguing for 
humanitarian intervention, and it is true that one must be circumspect when 
reading European accounts of “peopleless deserts” left behind by Ngoni 
depredations.113  The fact remains, however, that written accounts as late as 
the 1890s note razed villages and areas cleared of people by Ngoni raiding 
(including one by the very same Emil von Zelewski that would attempt in 
1891 to “pacify” the Hehe).114  Likewise, oral accounts of the nineteenth 
century given to John Iliffe, Alison Redmayne, George Park, James Giblin, 
Felicitas Becker, and others are adamant that the invasion of the Ngoni and 
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 their subsequent operations brought a new level of violence to the region as 
the Ngoni burned villages, seized food supplies, and in some cases killed 
every adult male of those they defeated.115  Koponen’s assertion that the 
Ngoni generally spared women and children, who were incorporated in Ngoni 
communities rather than killed, does not negate the argument than Ngoni 
raiding was extremely disruptive of local societies and transmitted Zulu 
organizational and fighting techniques to the peoples of Tanzania.116      
117 
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 The loosely organized, small-scale, polycephalous societies of the 
region initially proved no match for the Ngonis’ highly centralized military 
state or its well-disciplined, tightly controlled regiments.  Ngoni males were 
almost exclusively employed as warriors, agricultural work being done by 
women and the thousands of dependents captured and incorporated as a result 
of Ngoni conquests.  The first emerging “state” subjected to Ngoni attacks 
was the Sangu people near modern Mbeya, who were initially almost helpless 
to stop Ngoni raiding despite the purchase and use of firearms from the so-
called Arabs (often they were Swahili-speaking, Muslimized Africans) 
moving along the caravan routes from the coast to the Great Lakes.  The 
Sangu under Merere I, however, adopted the “Zulu system” in turn, and soon 
were strong enough not only to hold off the Ngoni but also wage war upon the 
hapless Bena and Hehe who bordered them to the north and east.  By the 
1860s, however, the Hehe under the able Chief Munyigumba—founder of the 
Muyinga dynasty—turned the tables once again, mastering Ngoni and Sangu 
modes of warfare and soon defeating every polity in the region one after the 
other.118  The Hehe arose around the year 1865 out of a small chiefdom under 
the leadership of the Jinga Clan, based in Nguruhe.  It was from this clan that 
the future leaders of the Hehe came.  Munyigumba (political leader from 1855 
to 1879) expanded their territory by several provinces through the strength of 
arms, and his empire would eventually become the northern-most and one of 
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 the most successful of the Mfecane-states.119  Indeed, Munyigumba is still 
revered today as the Great Founder of the Hehe “nation” and remembered as 
the individual who turned the peoples that would become the Hehe from 
victims to determiners of their own destiny.120  Peaceful phases of expansion 
alternated with ever longer periods of warfare during which they consolidated 
themselves as “Hehe,” waging war against Arab slave and ivory traders, the 
Sangu, the Ngoni, the Maasai, the Bena, the Kinga, and even with each other. 
This violent history parallels the overall chaos and bloodshed that afflicted 
East Africa in the mid-nineteenth century.  Based on oral evidence collected 
among the Bena of the Njombe region, James Giblin has even argued that the 
period prior to German intervention, the era of “Big Man” state formation and 
political consolidation, was so tumultuous that less “successful” peoples like 
the Bena remember the entire period of 1840 to 1940 as one of continual if 
intermittent violence, a sort of “time of troubles” in which one invader after 
the other (the coastal Arabs, Ngoni, Sangu, Hehe, the Germans, the British) 
inflicted successive waves of dislocation and suffering on the population.121  
The German missionary Alfons Adams likewise recounts the frequent 
“Bruder-Kriege” (wars among brothers) in the early years in an environment 
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 in which it is clear only in retrospect who is “Hehe” versus the diverse peoples 
around them.   
The “Hehe” thus formed out of a “mixture of all the peoples 
subjugated by the royal family in the course of 40 to 50 years,” and were 
therefore a “created ethnicity” like the Zulu of southern Africa or the 
Seminoles of Florida.122  While it is now generally understood that nations 
and nation-states, even putatively “old ones” like France or Britain, are 
ideological constructs that grew out of contingency, circumstance, and the 
gradual development of a collective, composite identity, it is all too often 
assumed that “tribes” in Africa are primordial entities that predate European 
states and are indeed some sort of “fossil” from a previous age.123  Nothing 
could be further from the case.  The mighty Zulu and the peoples that 
surrounded them were a product of the Mfecane, which scattered some 
peoples and incorporated others under the auspisces of a state-imposed 
“official identity”—Shaka went as far as to prohibit the use of older languages 
and the telling of pre-conquest stories in order to foster a new Zulu identity 
among the diverse array of peoples subjugated by his armies.124  Likewise, 
Munyigumba and his son Mkwawa would methodically and voraciously seek 
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 to conquer and incorporate new subjects in the southern highlands, thereby 
creating a new state-sanctioned identity as “Hehe.”  Their very name is the 
result of this process: according to Nigmann and informants living in Iringa 
today, the term comes from the characteristic war cry let loose by 
Munyigumba’s armies before battle, which then became their moniker among 
the peoples that surrounded—and feared—them. 
              125 
 Tomb of Munyigumba “the Founder” 
 
Many of the Sangus’ erstwhile vassals, most of the Bena people, and 
countless small polities like the Gogo, the Sagara, and the Kinga fell under 
Hehe control.  The Germans themselves were well aware of this African 
military revolution, and they conceptualized it in terms of an evolutionary 
scale, the state of a people’s weaponry being an open indication of their “level 
of advancement.”  Ernst Nigmann’s quasi-ethnological work on the Hehe and 
                                                 
125 Photo taken by author of Munyigumba’s tomb at Lungemba, 62 km southeast of Iringa 
Town.  It was constructed and maintained not by the government, but by Mkwawa’s 
descendents in Dar es Salaam.  
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 Heinrich Schnee’s Deutsches Kolonial-Lexicon both discuss the rapid 
progression of the Hehe from a disorganized people armed with throwing 
spears (the predominant weapon before the introduction of the Zulu stabbing 
spear) to a well disciplined, lethally armed force.126  The Hehe Empire came 
to be viewed by the Germans as an “Oriental Despotism,” a form of 
Staatswesen (loosely, “statecraft”) that had reached a higher level of social 
development than the many smaller polities that lay between it and the coast, 
which according to the Germans could not really be depicted as having 
“Staatswesen.”127  In this conceptual era of chronological, Darwinian 
hierarchies, it was self-evident to most European observers that one could 
classify a society along a sliding, evolutionary, and more often than not racial 
scale, and in many cases it was a people’s ability to wage war that determined 
their level of “civilization.”  The Hehe polity’s ability to wage war was such 
that it won both the admiration and the loathing of German observers.128 
Indeed, the art of war brought to the region by the Ngoni reached its 
most deadly culmination under the Hehe, who had been attacked by the Ngoni 
many times (above all 1878 and 1882), who themselves had adopted the 
methods of the Zulu of South Africa.  The world knows the “black Napoleon,” 
                                                 
126 See Nigmann, Die Wahehe, cited above, and Dr. Heinrich Schnee Gouverneur, Deutsches 
Kolonial-Lexicon, 1.Band, 685 and 3.Band, 654.    
 
127 Bernd Arnold, “Die Schlact bei Rugaro (Tansania, Iringa). Verlauf der Kämpfe und 
Ursachen der Niederlage des Expeditionkorps der kaiserlichen Schutztruppe für Deutsch-
Ostafrika,” in Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus in Afrika” Festshrift zum 
60. Geburtstag von Peter Sebald, eds. Peter Heine and Ulrich van der Heyden (Pfaffenweiler: 
Centaurus Verlag, 1995), 97-8.  
 
128 On the pyramidal system of racial classification of African peoples, see Sven Lindqvist, 
Exterminate All the Brutes (New York: The New Press, 1996).    
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 Shaka Zulu, who ended the use of sandals in 1810 in order to harden his feet 
for marching across terrain, which would also allow better tactical maneuver.  
He also ordered the crafting of the original stabbing spear (iklwa in isiZulu, 
which is an onomatopoeia referring to the sound the spear makes when it is 
removed from a victim’s torso, generally referred to as assegai by European 
observers) because the original throwing spear was not appropriate for close 
combat against humans.  The stabbing spear considerably increased the 
striking power of his units.  While the iklwa may not look impressive to those 
acquainted with modern firearms, their undeniable effect on the British at 
Isandhlwana or the Germans at Rugaro (discussed below) tells a very different 
story.  At close range, a Hehe warrior with proper training and a stabbing 
spear was highly lethal and more than a match for most opponents, including 
Europeans with pistols and bayonets.129  In battle the enemy was destroyed by 
130 
                                                 
129 The author was given a frightening demonstration of an iklwa at the Ncome (Blood River) 
 Image of Hehe issala taken from Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 82.  
Museum in KwaZulu-Natal in October of 2005—it easily pierced the thickest part of a cow 
skull like a can opener.  
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 the “horn formation” (flank attacks from left and right) which annihilated 
opponents.  Flanking attacks were also typical among the Hehe, and the 
stabbing spear (known as issala in Kihehe) was used in close combat after the 
initial use of the migoha, or throwing spear (unlike the Zulu).131  In the end it 
was the stabbing spear that also decided the Battle of Rugaro and stole a 
victory from a force equipped with modern firearms.  Hehe military units 
were likewise based on the Zulu Model of regiments (amabutho), though the 
constant attrition brought about by warfare in the southern highlands meant 
that they were not strictly organized by age grades, young replacements being 
constantly incorporated into existing regiments.132   Hehe regiments, known 
as wapuka (singular, kipuka), were smaller than the Zulu amabutho and 
usually numbered between 80 and 500 men.  The Hehes’ core army consisted 
of 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers, usually supplemented by thousands of auxiliaries 
drawn from the Hehes’ allies and vassals such as the Bena and the Gogo.   
                                                
Because the Hehe state was wedged between two deadly enemies, the 
Sangu (who were the first people to adopt Ngoni techniques of attack and 
intimidation) and the Ngoni, it had to be prepared to wage warfare nearly 
continuously, potentially on two fronts simultaneously, forcing the Hehe to 
develop a logistical system that far surpassed that of their rivals, or even 
 
131 Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 88-95 and Mann, 134-5.  The Hehe (and the Ngoni) use of the 
“cattle horns formation,” an innovation of Zulu warfare, is an additional piece of evidence for 
the transmission of Zulu techniques during the Mfecane to the peoples of southern Tanzania. 
 
132 Alison Redmayne, “The Hehe,” in Tanzania before 1900, ed. Andrew Roberts (Nairobi: 
East African Publishing House, 1968), 44-5.  
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 indeed of the Zulu themselves.133  Hehe logistics were in many ways superior 
even to those of the European invaders that arrived in the 1880s, as would be 
made clear in the 1891-98 war druing which the Germans and their Askari 
generally had to recourse to straight-forward, Thirty-Years’-War-style plunder 
and marauding to obtain supplies.  Indeed, Hehe resistance only collapsed 
when German scorched-earth tactics like burning crops and the mass seizure 
of livestock ended Chief Mkwawa’s ability to wage war.  This ability to fight 
a two-front war was unique in the region and indispensable to the survival of 
the Hehe polity, as Uhehe lay in the middle of the advance from not only the 
Ngoni from the south, but also the Maasai from the north.  Indeed, 
Munyigumba’s state was strong enough to simultaneously form the southern 
boundary of the seemingly inexorable Maasai advance from the great Nyika 
plain southwards and the northernmost boundary of the Zulu-initiated 
Mfecane out of South Africa.  Overall, the perfection of Mfecane warfare by 
Munyigumba and his son Mkwawa meant that the invading Germans would 
not face a pristine, innocent, primitive adversary in the southern highlands; 
instead, they would be facing an enemy as ruthless and proficient at both 
killing and collecting supplies as they themselves. 
                                                 
133 Mann, 132.  
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 134 
Using this improved “Zulu system,” the founder of the “Hehe-
Empire,” Munyigumba, created a highly centralized and militarily proficient 
state that was far larger than any of its rivals over the span of a decade and a 
half, covering nearly a fifth of what would become German East Africa (itself 
twice the size of the German Reich in Europe).135  As noted above, Hehe 
ethnicity itself was in fact formed in the context of conquest and resulted from 
Munyigumba’s highly effective drive to centralize political and social control 
in the hands of the state.136  As the Muyinga dynasty conquered new regions 
and acquired new dependents, these were incorporated as “Hehe” provided 
                                                 
134 Image of the Hehes’ intricate, highly-orchestrated marching formation taken from 
Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 87.  
 
135 The Hehe military system is described in great detail by both Redmayne and by Ernst 
Nigmann, a veteran of the Schutztruppe.  See his extensive fourth chapter, “Kriegsgebräuche” 
in Die Wahehe. 
 
136 Nigmann, Die Wahehe , 2. 
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 they adopt the Hehe language and accept the state as supreme.  Recently 
conquered areas were policed by garrisons of 50-300 soldiers under a royally 
appointed administrator known as wazagila, and these garrisons were further 
reinforced with Hehe settlers that were sent to strategic areas.137   These 
garrisons also served as granaries, part of the Hehes’ elaborate logistical 
system, which allowed them to continue fighting in a disputed region even 
after suffering a defeat in sharp contrast to most of the African enemies the 
Schutztruppe encountered.  It was this state that was inherited in 1879 by the 
man who would become the Germans’ arch-nemesis and a Tanzanian national 
hero, Chief Mkwawa (usually rendered as “Sultan Quawa” in German 
documents), second son of Munyigumba, born around 1855.138 
 Today, Mkwawa is widely viewed as a proto-nationalist hero throughout 
Tanzania and particularly by the Hehe.139  At the time he also enjoyed a 
practically legendary reputation.  The missionary Alfons Adams described the 
“Mkwawa myth” among his people thusly: 
[Mkwawa], though his superior glance and his energetic orders, ruled 
over the disposition of his underlings to an unusual degree.  He was 
known as a strong, courageous warrior, as a good shot with the rifle, 
and an unsurpassed spear thrower… A nimbus of the supernatural 
surrounded him, that is to say as Sultan he drew on supernatural 
                                                 
137 Alfred Pawlikowski-Cholewa, Heeresgeschichte der Völker Afrikas und Amerikas (Berlin: 
Junker und Dünhaupt Verlag, 1943), 54-9. 
 
138 Mkwawa has acquired near mythic status in Tanzania.  The local army barracks in Dar es 
Salaam is called Lugalo, and Iringa is full of Mkwawa related sites and monuments (which I 
will be visiting in August).  See, for example, Michael Musso, Mukwava na kabila lake 
(Arusha, Tanzania: East African Publications Limited, 1968) and Fulgens F. A. Malangalia, 
Mwamuyinga; Mtawala wa Wahehe (Peramiho, Tanzania: Benedictine Publications Ndanda, 
1987).  See also Giblin’s excellent discussion of the divergent views of Mkwawa in A History 
of the Excluded, Chapter 1. 
 
139 Ranger, 442-4. 
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 powers according to the conception of the Hehe… Mkwawa had 
“mugoda,” meaning “medicine,” which supposedly had the effect of 
making him intangible, impervious, and invisible in battle; beyond 
this, his bullets always hit their intended opponent and the spears he 
threw would simultaneously bore through four to five warriors. 140 
 
Although he was unquestionably respected, even revered by the Hehe and 
those people incorporated directly into Hehe lineages, at the time both his 
internal enemies and his neighbors had a very different view of his rule.  One 
of his praise names was Lukwale-lwa-mwaka, “the madness of the year.”141  
Neighboring Africans knew him as Muhinja, “the butcher.”142   Mkwawa was 
renowned for his ruthlessness and dictatorial behavior, one of his most 
frequent orders in dealing with internal rivals being Mukasipele—“give him to 
the vultures.”143  Hehe campaigns continued in the 1880s as Mkwawa 
successfully defeated both the hitherto much respected Ngoni and groups of 
Nyamwezi (who themselves under the famous warlords Mirambo and 
Nyungu-Ya-Mawe underwent an impressive and violent process of “Big 
Man” state formation from the 1860s to the 1880s).144  It was precisely 
Mkwawa’s stunning successes against his neighbors that fostered a vast well 
                                                 
140 Adams, 45.  
 
141 Redmayne, “Mkwawa…”, 433. 
 
142 Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 15. 
 
143 Francis Kitime, a local teacher and folksinger in Iringa, has collected oral material from 
people in the surrounding areas on Mkwawa and the war with the Germans.  One song lists 
Mkwawa’s various favorite commands, heard all too often at his court at Kuirenga: 
Mukasipele—give him to the vultures; Mukadumule—remove his head; Mukatite—suffocate 
him.  CD in author’s possession. 
 
144 Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 12-3 and Redmayne, “Mkwawa…”, 414.  On the Nyamwezi, see 
Aylward Shorter, “Nyungu-Ya-Mawe and the ‘Empire of the Ruga-Rugas’,” Journal of 
African History, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1968): 235-59 and Norman Robert Bennet, Mirambo of 
Tanzania ca. 1840-1884 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
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 of resentment among them, and it was this resentment that motivated their 
behavior during the German-Hehe conflict of the 1890s in a manner that 
would be all too familiar to Hernán Cortéz, Frederick Lugard, and other 
infamous empire-builders who made “divide and rule” the cornerstone of their 
conquest policies. 
 The intricate, highly fluid political balance in the southern highlands was 
further complicated by the role of the so-called “Arabs” (Muslimized, 
Kiswahili-speaking Africans) from the coast, who brought to the interior 
firearms in return for ivory and the slaves captured in the course of the 
constant warfare in the area.145  In some cases these wars were waged 
specifically for the purpose of obtaining captives for sale, though the majority 
of those taken were incorporated into Hehe society as agricultural laborers in 
order to free up nearly all males for military service.146  The Sangu in 
particular were 
147 
                                                 
145 On the prolific and highly destabilizing firearms trade in East Africa in this period, see R. 
W. Beachey, “The Arms Trade in East Africa in the Late Nineteenth Century,” Journal of 
African History, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1962): 451-67.  
 
146 For a detailed description of the effects of the coastal trading system on the interior, see 
Glassman, op. cit., and Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), chapter 3. 
 
147 Weule, Zeichnungen, between 96 and 97.  
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 quick to adopt firearms purchased from Swahili traders in an attempt to break 
the supremacy first of the Ngoni and then of the Hehe, but to no avail.148  The 
Hehe had very few firearms, and in fact spent more time raiding caravans 
from the coast than trading with them.149  But their strength of numbers and 
awe-inspiring, machinelike discipline proved more than a match for Sangu 
levies armed with muskets.   
150 
The region could only be further disrupted by the arrival of the 
European Wazungu—literally “those who wander aimlessly”—in the mid-
1880s.  Mkwawa’s exceptional intelligence network kept him well informed 
about the grim events occurring 300 kilometers away on the coast, and he 
proved far more prescient than his rivals in anticipating the implications of the 
AvaDaliki (German) invasion of Swahili city-states and their hinterland.  
Indeed, there is some evidence that he even provided limited material support 
to members of the “Arab Revolt” of 1889 to 1891, which led some German 
observers to consider the struggle against the Hehe as an extension of the 
                                                 
148 Redmayne, “Mkwawa…”, 414-5 and 426-7.  The Hehe similarly defeated the well-armed 
Nyamwezi on multiple occasions. 
  
149 Those firearms that the Hehe did have only arrived in the late nineteenth century, and these 
were only distributed among Mkwawa’s royal guard and his elite elephant hunters.   
Pawlikowski-Cholewa, 68. 
 
150 Weule, Zeichnungen, between 120 and 121.  
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 Coastal Revolt.  Nigmann claims that Mkwawa actively assisted the initial 
attacks on the DOAG (German East Africa Company) stations at Bagamoyo, 
Dar es Salaam, and Kilwa.  He also asserts that small armed detachments of 
Hehe assisted the “Mafiti” (more on this below) in their resistance against 
Wissmann’s advance from Bagamoyo to Mpwapwa in 1889.151  In 1890 he 
also attempted to conclude a pact of friendship with his erstwhile enemies the 
Ngoni under Chief Jabruma, an act that was, according to Nigmann, 
“unprecedented” for the Hehe, or indeed for any polity in the region.152  Here 
Nigmann, generally a compassionate and perceptive observer, is incorrect.  
There existed a long, complex history of short-term alliances and counter-
alliances as the Ngoni, Bena, Sangu, and Hehe each attempted to establish and 
protect their territorial holdings in the 1860s and 1870s.153  Indeed, it was the 
Germans’ success at tapping into this system of alliances that eventually led to 
their victory.  Be that as it may, Nigmann accurately pointed out that the 
“monstrously farsighted” Mkwawa correctly assessed German intentions 
immediately, if not for the Hehe specifically, certainly overall.   The Ngoni, 
however, hesitated in what Nigmann describes as the “typical Neger fashion,” 
                                                 
151 Ernst Nigmann, Geschichte der Kaiserlichen Schutztruppe für Deutsch-Ostafrika (Berlin: 
Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1911), 81.   Wissmann, founder of the Schutztruppe, was 
sent to Tanganyika in 1889 to put down the “Arab Revolt,” which he did with the utmost 
thoroughness and brutality.  Thereafter, the Schutztruppe were sometimes referred to as the 
“Wismannische Truppe.” 
 
152 Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 15.  Even Prince, who has little positive to say about “the madness 
of the year,” credits Mkwawa with an astounding degree of farsightedness regarding German 
intentions and the implications of colonial rule.  152 Quoted in Tom von Prince, Gegen Araber 
und Wahehe: Erinnerungen aus meiner ostafrikanischen Leutnantszeit 1890-1895 (Berlin: 
Ernst Sigfried Mittler und Sohn, 1914), 107.  
 
153 Jamie Monson, Agricultural Transformation, 106-35 and “Relocating Maji Maji: The 
Politics of Alliance and Authority in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. 1870-1918,” 
Journal of African History, 39 (1998): 101.  
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 which proved disastrous for both peoples: “these courageous tribes as a 
consequence of their disunity in the face of the German advance could be 
subjugated piecemeal.”154  The traditional enmity between the Ngoni and the 
Hehe paralyzed all attempts at reconciliation.  Indeed, it would have been 
surprising had they been able to overcome their differences after decades of 
sanguinary conflict in the highlands, and at first the Germans simply seemed 
like the latest in a long series of interlopers in East Africa (the Portuguese, 
Ngoni, Arabs).  It is in fact true that German columns in this period were 
scarcely distinguishable from “Arab” caravans traveling inland from the 
coast—they were similarly equipped, used the same system of human 
porterage, used the same Kiswahili-speaking interpreters, built explicitly 
“Arab-styled” defensive structures, and even dressed similarly.  As with the 
                    
155 
earlier arrival of the Omani Arabs on the island of Zanzibar, for some their 
arrival represented an opening of opportunities as much as a closing of them.  
                                                 
154 Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 107.  Statements like this one along with similar comments from 
Governors Schele and Liebert indicate that the German policy of divide et impera was 
anything but sub-conscious or unintentional. 
 
155 Photos taken by author of the first German Boma (fortress) at their original capital at 
Bagamoyo on the Indian Ocean Coast.  This structure would have been difficult to distinguish 
from Omani buildings on the coast and in Zanzibar.  
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 It was precisely the balance between outright terror and providing an 
“opportunity structure” that over time would bring Tanganyika, and indeed 
nearly all of Africa, under Wazungu control. 
In contrast to the Ngoni, the Sangu, with whom Mkwawa did not even 
try to conclude any sort of agreement, were anything buy paralyzed—they 
quickly
                                                
 realized the great possibility of turning the German invasion to their 
own advantage.156  As pointed out by Jamie Monson, “[t]he Germans were 
seen as potentially powerful allies and protectors by many societies of the 
southern region.  They established alliance relationships using local idioms of 
affiliation and diplomacy.”157  The Germans were highly successful in 
concluding agreements with several of the Hehes’ rivals, particularly the 
Sangu and the Bena.  In these cases it is difficult to discern exactly who was 
being used by whom.  As one German administrator complained after 
concluding a treaty with another Hehe rival, Henge chief Nalioto: “With 
cunning tactics (schlaue Politik) he thought to use me, and through me to 
make the superiority of the whites serve his own purposes.”158  Chiefs Merere 
III and IV of the Sangu were particularly adept at involving the Germans in 
their struggles with Mkwawa on their own terms, a fact that did not escape 
administrators like Tom von Prince, who found both Mereres to be useful but 
 
156 Redmayne, “Mkwawa…”, 414. 
 
157 Monson, 103.  
 
158 Quoted in Monson, 104. 
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extremely unscrupulous and at times duplicitous.159 Ironically enough, it was 
the German attempt to establish “indirect rule” over the Hehe via political 
agreement that finally convinced Mkwawa that they could only be a grave 
threat to his power; after all, he did not really need allies anymore to dominate 
his local adversaries.160  Julius Freiherr von Soden, the colony’s first official 
governor (1891-1893), demanded in 1891 that they cease “terrorizing” their 
neighbors and raiding the crucial caravan route between the coast and Lake 
Tanganyika, and the Hehe insisted on the preservation of their complete 
autonomy and authority in the region.  The result was war, a war which both 
firmly installed the Germans as masters of the south and forever shattered 
Hehe power, leaving Mkwawa’s state in ashes.  The next chapter will focus on 
the developments that unfolded before the ambush at Rugaro and then 
examine what lead to such a crushing German defeat after years of military 
success against other indigenous armies in East Africa.   
 
 
159 For an extended discussion of Merere’s foreign policy, see Marcia Wright, “Chief Merere 
and the Germans,” Tanzania Notes and Record, No. 69 (1968): 41-49.  
 
160 Redmayne, “Mkwawa…”, 417-8. 
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Chapter III: 
The Road to Rugaro and the “Zelewski Catastrophe” 
 
Dear Prince, [our expedition] will be done with these fellows all alone…The 
fellows haven’t even got guns, just shields and spears. 
     -Commander Emil von Zelewski, 1891162 
 
From this moment onwards, particularly as a member of the old expedition, my 
uninterrupted striving was directed at avenging the annihilation of this corps, and 
henceforth I established no station, led no expedition, engaged in no battle, did 
nothing official that would not somehow be connected with this goal. 
                      -Captain Tom von Prince, 1914163 
 
The Causes and Beginning of the German-Hehe War of 1891-1898 
The events that inexorably led to the clash between the Germans and the Hehe are 
only clear in retrospect, and indeed, even now there is a debate in the 
historiography about why Zelewski and his expedition were deployed at all in the 
summer of 1891.  The first governor, von Soden, only began his tenure on 1 April 
1891, and neither he nor the administration knew very much about “the interior” 
                                                 
161 Karl Weule, “Ostafrikanische Eingeborenen-Zeichnungen: Psychologische Einblicke in die 
Künstlerseele des Negers,” in Ipek: Jahrbuch für Prähistorische und Ethnographische Kunst 2 
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162 Quoted in Tom von Prince, Gegen Araber und Wahehe: Erinnerungen aus meiner 
ostafrikanischen Leutnantszeit 1890-1895 (Berlin: Ernst Sigfried Mittler und Sohn, 1914), 88.  All 
translations mine unless otherwise specified. 
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 when the Zelewski expedition was deployed on 22 June 1891. In the first half of 
1891, the government apparently knew nothing specific about Mkwawa, his 
brother Mpangile, or the Hehe Empire.  African authors, who view the conflict 
from the Hehe perspective, view the Zelewski campaign as a concerted and 
premeditated attempt to subdue the Hehe Empire. Michael Musso argues that the 
Germans felt uneasy about Mkwawa because he ruled such a large empire and 
was renowned for his proficiency at war. The attacks of the Gogo and Dongwe on 
the caravan route to Tabora were attributed to the Hehe, and for this reason 
Zelewski was sent to conquer Mkwawa’s fortified city at Kalenga.  The column 
intended to subdue and occupy the entirety of the Hehe Empire.164  Western 
scholars such as Erick J. Mann, John Iliffe, Olaf Schröter, and Martin Baer 
concur, viewing Zelewski’s campaign as a clear, deliberate attempt to crush 
Mkwawa’s state and subdue the Hehe. 
We do know from Nigmann, who spoke to “his Hehe” after the events of 
the 1890s (he was their commander in Maji Maji—1905-07—and thereafter), that 
Mkwawa indeed feared precisely this and felt threatened by the Zelewski 
expedition. He learned of its approach when they were only four days march from 
Kalenga at Mage: “when the news reached him, the Zelewski expedition had 
already reached Mage, which lies only four days march northeast of the residence 
[of Mkwawa].  Quawa [sic] sounded the alarm and moved immediately with the 
                                                 
164 Michael Musso, Mukwava na kabila lake (Arusha, Tanzania: East African Publications 
Limited, 1968), 54-5. 
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 approximately 2000 Warriors from Iringa and the surrounding area that this 
gathered to the ambush at Rugaro, into which the expedition stumbled.”165 
Bernd Arnold offers a different and intriguing interpretation of the events 
of summer 1891: “Unbelievable as it sounds, the defeat and subjugation of the 
Hehe Empire was not Zelewski’s goal when he set out in June 1891, and he 
likewise did not intend to capture Kalenga.  He himself did not even know against 
whom he was supposed to be waging war.”166 Indeed, the documents available 
offer several potential opponents.  On 8 June 1891, Zelewski wrote German 
Chancellor von Caprivi that he intended to “undertake a campaign in order to 
throw back the Mafiti that have broken into the hinterland of Kiloa [meaning 
Kilwa on the coast] and to chastise the marauding and uncompromising 
Wahehe… From there [Usagara] I will turn to Mpapua [Mpwapwa in Ugogo] and 
then attack the Wagogo and the Wahehe.”167  Logical as this plan may sound, it is 
an itinerary that involves huge distances—the distance from Kilwa to Mpwapwa 
alone is approximately 350 kilometers, a distance that had to be covered on foot 
and with mules!  In his subsequent report from Matumbi, dated 29 June 1891, he 
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 informs Governor von Soden that he was “still without news about the 
whereabouts of the Mafiti.”168 This was the last anyone heard from him, as no 
further letters reached the government in Dar es Salaam. 
Arnold further argues that this means that the Hehe capital, Kalenga, was 
not in fact threatened, as the column was headed towards Nguruhe, ancestral 
homeland of the Hehe, not Kalenga.  Why Zelewski intended to do this is not 
stated anywhere.  It is also true that the name of the leader of Hehe Empire, 
Mkwawa (Quawa in most German documents) first appears as “Kuawa” in a 
report from Lieutenant von Tettenborn, a participant and one of the only survivors 
of the expedition, from 30 August 1891, in which he states the apparent death of 
“Kuawa” as the reason for the Hehes’ “leaderlessness.”169 The name of the 
capital, stated variously in later sources as “Kwirenga,” “Iringa,” or “Kuirenga,” 
is not mentioned anywhere, and it is unclear if the Germans even knew of its 
existence at this point in time.  Equally confusing is the identity of the so-called 
“Mafiti” against whom Zelewski was putatively campaigning.  If one asks 
Tanzanians today, scholars and average people alike, about the “Mafiti,” they will 
tell you they have never heard of them in sharp contrast to the Hehe or Gogo or 
the peoples that lie between them and the southeastern coast where the Mafiti 
supposedly resided.  Kompanieführer Rochus Schmidt later explained this to the 
Governor in the following way: 
I noticed in this case that, taken precisely, instead of Mafiti the name 
Mahenge should be used, though I always use the name Mafiti because on 
the coast around Usamaro it is applied especially to the Mahenge.  In 
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 general, the name Mafiti includes the Mahenge, the Wahehe, and the 
Magwangwara, which are all related Zulu-tribes…170 
 
The “Magwangwara” is the name of a tributary of the Ruwuma River, by which 
part of the Ngoni were known by their neighbors.171 “Mafiti,” as “explorer” and 
anthropologist Friedrich Füllerborn credibly reports, is a collective term in East 
Bantu languages for “enemy” deriving from the word “Mazitu.” “Mafiti” was 
both a designation applied to warlike neighbors as well as a term sometimes used 
as a term for one’s own fighting unit when one wanted to extort “Hongo” from 
neighbors or caravans.  The scholar L. E. Larson offers yet another interpretation: 
he claims that the Mafiti were, in fact, the unrecognized fifth polity of southern 
Tanzania, the Mbunga Confederacy.172  If Füllerborn and, to a lesser extent, 
Schmidt are to be believed, “Mafiti” was not an ethnonym at all, and it probably 
is for this reason that the Zelewski expedition could not find them.  Even if he 
really meant the Mbunga as Larson suggests, he was headed in entirely the wrong 
direction.  Indeed, who would have dared identify themselves as “the enemy” 
when asked by a force as imposing and dangerous as the German column of 
                                                 
170 Kompanieführer Schmidt an Gouverneur von Soden, 12 September 1891, BAB, R1001/279, 
138.  Many authors discuss Schutztruppe campaigns against the “Mafiti” without any sense that 
the label might be problematic.  See Paul Reichard, Deutsch-Ostafrika. Das Land und seine 
Bewöhner. Seine politische und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung (Leipzig: Otto Spamer, 1891), 202-
11; Heinrich Fonck, Deutsch-Ost-Afrika: Eine Schilderung deutscher Tropen nach 10 
Wanderungen (Berlin: Vossische Buchhandlung, 1910), 22-3; and H. F. von Behr, Kriegsbilder 
aus dem Araberaufstand in Deutsch-Ostafrika (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1891), 259-90.  In all 
three cases, they seem to use “Mafiti” as a generic label for the “Bantu peoples” that lay between 
Kilwa and the southern highlands. 
 
171 Friedrich Füllerborn, Das Deutsche Njassa- und Ruwuma-Gebiet, Land un Leute (Berlin: Ernst 
Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1906), 140 and 408. 
 
172 L. E. Larson, “A History of the Mbunga Confederacy ca. 1860-1907,” Tanzania Notes and 
Records, No. 81 & 82 (June 1978): 36.  
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 nearly a thousand men (with porters), particularly after their well-known record of 
destroying villages en route! 
Governor von Soden would have probably denied authorization for the 
haphazard expedition had he known more about the “Prussia of East Africa,” as 
the Hehe state was later known.  To be sure, two years later acting Governor 
Friedrich von Schele (who himself was far more of a hawk than von Soden), 
being more familiar with the Hehe, forced “Reichskommisar H. Wissmann” to 
desist in any attempt to go after the Hehe while the latter was on the so-called 
“Steamer Expedition” (the Dampfer-Expedition, during which Germany’s 
“greatest African,” as he was known by the 1930s, brought a steamship in pieces 
to Lake Nyassa in order to explore the region and in theory fight the slave trade).  
When seeking to discover why Governor von Soden authorized such a large 
expedition whose goals and putative targets were both so unclear, one is led to a 
letter written by von Soden to Chancellor Caprivi, dated 15 June 1891, which 
offers a justification that is as cynical as it is pragmatic: 
The most serious thing about the entire campaign, which look like it will 
run harmlessly, is: that it will cost about 40,000 Marks… Nonetheless, I 
have some doubts whether the expedition is unconditionally necessary at 
all, and still more doubts whether it is necessary to the size and extent in 
which it is being undertaken, but still the following considerations are 
holding me back from laying down a veto: 1) Disturbing reports and also 
refugees from these areas have in fact come in… 2)…in view of the 
peaceful conditions here, the soldiers there and on the coast are militarily 
and for other reasons not utilizable otherwise.  It is therefore, even 
admitting the superfluousness of the expedition, still more practical to at 
least deploy the soldiers where their appearance is not necessarily needed 
but is at least of some use, while 3) the lack of activity here on the coast 
could directly lead to a danger.”173 
                                                 
173 Gouverneur von Soden an Reichskanzler von Caprivi, 15 June 1891, BAB, R1001/279, 7f.  The 
German public and officer corps were furious when this letter became public in the wake of the 
destruction of the Zelewski expedition. 
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Von Soden was most likely correct in seeing the large number of Sudanese and 
Shangani Askari on the coast as potentially dangerous were they not given 
anything to do for long periods, although in retrospect this appears as a 
questionable justification for sending out several hundred of them to wreck havoc 
on the “interior” and, ultimately, to their deaths at the hands of the “Mafiti.” 
The available documents leave one uncertain as to what Zelewski thought 
he was doing when he marched eastward with his column.  It would seem he did 
not have the clear goals ascribed to him by scholars like Musso and Mann, but he 
did clearly know that a collection of “marauding tribesmen” of uncertain quantity 
and location were subverting German attempts to control “the interior” of the 
colony, their authority hitherto being restricted almost entirely to the coast.  
Indeed, the manner in which the Schutztruppe column indiscriminately destroyed 
villages along their path implies that Zelewski did not particularly care.  On his 
way, he engaged in a campaign of destruction against villages, crops, and people 
of the sort that had on the coast earned him the Swahili name, Nyundo—“the 
hammer.”174  The accounts of the participants, cited below, abound with terse 
accounts of the shelling of villages, shooting of “bandits,” and the burning of 
fields with a seeming disregard for the people to whom they belonged.  While this 
destructive strategy seems to the contemporary observer as counterproductive in 
light of the myriad experiences with “counterinsurgency” in the twentieth century, 
as both the “Arab Revolt” and subsequent events in Uhehe made clear, it was par 
for the course in German East Africa.  These tactics would reach their culmination 
                                                 
174 Alison Redmayne, “Mkwawa and the Hehe Wars,” Journal of African History, IX, 3 (1968): 
418. 
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 in the brutal suppression of the Maji Maji Revolt of 1905-1907, which, while 
often readily acknowledged, is generally discussed in isolation of the campaigns 
of the 1890s.  German-led forces treated most of East Africa as enemy territory, 
as indeed it was, full of “hostile natives” and potential enemies in all directions.  
While the savvier members of the Schutztruppe proved masters at the sly 
diplomacy of divide and rule, many—Zelewski included—responded to 
conditions with the utmost ruthlessness.175 
176 
However ambiguous the specific purpose and opponent of the Zelewski 
expedition, the fact remains that by 1891 the Hehe were the undisputed masters of 
the southern highlands, a fact that stood in the way of both the pretensions of their 
competitors and the hopes of many of their vassals.  Equally, Hehe power also 
                                                 
175 One is reminded of the behavior of the Schutztruppe’s successors in a later attempt at empire 
building, the Wehrmacht’s “war of destruction” on the Eastern Front from 1941 to 1944.  More on 
this comparison will be offered in chapter five.  As to “divide and rule” diplomacy, the annals of 
German colonial history offer many inveterate masters.  Governor Theodor Leutwein of German 
Southwest Africa was quite candid regarding his policy of divide and rule.  “It is obviously more 
convenient to deal with a politically divided (zerrissen) Herero nation, than with a closed and 
unified one.”  Leutwein in Windhoek to the Colonial Department, 17 June 1894, BAB 2100.  For 
more on Leutwein’s view that a divided society would be more beneficial to the regime, see 
Theodor Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika (Berlin: Mittler Verlag, 
1908), 77. 
 
176 Askari from German East Africa, http://www.deutsche-schutzgebiete.de/ostafrika-english.htm  
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 stood as the primary obstacle to German designs in the entire southern half of 
their East African colony.  Neither the southern highlands nor the all-important 
caravan route from the coast to Lake Tanganyika could be brought under German 
sovereignty as long as “marauding bands,” be they “Mafiti” or organized raids 
launched by the Hehe polity, refused to submit to German authority. As implied 
in von Soden’s comment about refugees, the Hehe indeed continued to attack 
their neighbors as they always had, neighbors that were potential German allies.  
That these attacks were not only on caravan traffic, but also on Africans affiliated 
with mission stations made Beruhigung (pacification) seem all the more 
imperative, even if it was unclear which group was causing the disruptions.177  
The Gogo people, considered by the Germans to be one of their “Hilfsvölker” 
(“helpers”), were particularly avid about halting the predations of the Hehe, and 
800 of their warriors assisted in an expedition in the summer of 1890 that 
attempted to resoundingly “punish” the “Mafiti” as part of the ongoing 
pacification of the coastal regions afflicted by the “Arab Revolt.”178  This initial 
“punitive actions” (Vergeltungsaktion), resulting in the destruction of numerous 
villages and the seizure of 1,600 cattle, did little to stop the Hehe, who launched a 
campaign of their own against Usagara on the main caravan route linking Tabora 
with the coast.179   It seemed clear that German control over the highlands and the 
adjacent lanes of commerce could only be established by a successfully waged 
                                                 
177 Prince, 116-9. 
 
178 Von Behr, 259-90.  
 
179 Deutsches Kolonialblatt (DKB) 1 (1890): 275. 
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 war of punishment, a war intended to be a strong statement about the realities of 
the colonial “new era.”180 
 It soon became apparent that Mkwawa and the Hehe, or rather the 
“Mafiti
                                                
,” would neither submit to German authority nor cease their raiding on 
caravan traffic, an “impudence of the Hehe” (Frechheit der Hehe) that, according 
to the Stationsleiter at Bagamoyo, “had to be punished, in order to restore order 
on the caravan route.”181  Whatever his specific goals, Emil von Zelewski 
marched forth in June 1891 with a column of nearly 1,000 men including porters 
and auxiliaries.  Even after sending the 3rd Company under Lieutenant Tom von 
Prince back towards the coast to alleviate supply difficulties, Zelewski was left 
with a still formidable force of 13 European officers, 362 Askari, and 200 porters 
which headed into Uhehe.182  As indicated in the document above, Soden had 
opposed the campaign on account of its cost and murky objectives, but Zelewski 
and his colleagues had browbeaten the governor until he acquiesced, no doubt due 
to his aforementioned concerns about the dangers of leaving the idle Askari on the 
coast.  As noted above, Nyundo “the hammer” engaged in a scorched earth 
campaign from the hinterland of Kilwa and Dar es Salaam inwards, burning 
villages and setting fire to crops.183  One officer described the “successes” of the 
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 expedition as it wandered towards the Hehe capital succinctly enough: “on the 
29th of July a fortified settlement bombarded with 20 Shells and 850 Maxim 
cartridges.”184  A second report from the same Lieutenant went on: “On the 5th 
and 6th of August 25 farmsteads burned to the ground and three Hehe killed, on 
the 15th and 16th near Mage a further 50 farmsteads set ablaze.”185      
186 
The Battle of Rugaro—17 August 1891 
Mkwawa’s intelligence services quickly reported on Zelewski’s advance, and he 
had sufficient time to assemble nearly 3,000 warriors for an attack on the column 
at Rugaro.  The Hehe reconnaissance network, developed over decades of warfare 
across thousands of square miles, proved decisive, and the superior intelligence 
enjoyed by the Hehe force at Rugaro was perhaps their most decisive advantage.  
Mkwawa’s Watandisi (scouts) provided detailed information about Nyundo’s 
movements and whereabouts, and their intelligence was so accurate that the Hehe 
commanders at Rugaro knew not only the size of the German column, but also its 
composition and the position of the Germans machine guns and artillery.  The 
                                                 
184 Privatbrief des Oberleutnants von Tettenborn, 29 July 1891, DKB 2 (1891): 393. 
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 Hehe field commanders wondered about the tactical behavior of the Zelewski 
Expedition, especially the fact that they were marching single file.  Using their 
constant procedure of gathering intelligence with scouts and their carefully 
maintained “cow horns” marching formation, a Hehe force would not have been 
annihilated in such a trap.  The Hehe made use of two types of reconnaissance, 
the Watandisi, who operated two to four days march in front of the army, and the 
Wadagandaga, who reconnoitered the field only a few hours in front of the main 
army.  The main army itself marched in an open formation which allowed a 
constant battle-readiness, and they could face and respond to an attack from any 
direction. 
 After the defeat at Rugaro, there would be an acrimonious discussion as to 
what went wrong, and many commentators focused on the fact that, in contrast to 
nonetheless the nature of the battlefield, the manner in which the enemy 
e’s own troops impose a special 
character [on warfare in East Africa].  This character finds its expression 
the formations employed by the Hehe, Zelewski’s column marched in single file.  
But this was standard practice in German operations in East Africa, largely due to 
the constraints of terrain and communications.  Shortly before his death, 
Commander Zelewski himself had discussed the issue of “Truppenführung in 
Ostafrika” (commanding troops in East Africa) in a letter to the government in 
Dar es Salaam.  It is worth quoting at length: 
Even if the fundamental rules of waging war remain the same anywhere, 
fights, and the characteristics of on
in marching, in battle, and in the provision of troops.  I. Marching.  The 
formation of the marching column is first and foremost determined by the 
terrain.  In East Africa we find a land almost entirely covered by man-high 
grass in which individual trees are scattered about.  The native… for this 
reason usually chooses wild paths [created by animals and livestock] for 
marching.  These footpaths impose marching single-file on infantry and 
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 cavalry… Because of this… the column ends up being quite long and 
small fluctuations in the marching speed make themselves felt to a great 
degree.  The march to battle takes quite long…  In the marching order the 
artillery must be near the front, if possible right behind the first group, so 
that they determine the speed of march and can be quickly brought into 
use, because the artillery must not only be brought forward, but also 
assembled [which the Germans were unable to achieve at Rugaro].  The 
securing of the path of advance and proper reconnaissance as we know it 
is not possible due to the lack of cavalry [tsetse fly made much of East 
Africa deadly to horses].  The securing of the path of advance comes little 
into consideration due to the minimal initiative of the opponent here and 
the invulnerability of the long column to an attack from the side.  If the 
front of the column suddenly encounters the enemy, then the other 
companies march up right behind, attack the enemy’s flank, and the 
column it folds in on itself in order to be battle ready.  If the column is 
attacked from the side, then the portion of the column under attack turns to 
the direction from which they are being assaulted and the line of fire is 
already formed.  The other portions of the column form themselves to the 
sides of the enemy’s line of attack and go forth to attack the enemy’s 
flank.  It is only for smaller detachments that there exists a danger of 
surprise attack, because their consciousness of their weakness makes it 
easy for them to panic.  A surprise attack by cavalry or unexpected, 
annihilating gunfire do not happen here because the former does not exist 
and the latter is not an issue, as the enemy is such a bad shot.  II. Battle.  
Battles of encounter [as in two forces unexpectedly running into one 
another] are the great exception in East Africa.  Both Arabs and Negroes 
love waiting for any attack from behind fortifications or features of the 
terrain; they themselves only advance when they enjoy clear superiority, 
and even then they fear storming [positions] with mere hand-to-hand 
weapons.187 
eemed to be sound logic to Zelewski, an officer experienced at warfare in 
 
What s
East Africa, proved to be his column’s undoing on 17 August 1891.  Many of his 
                                                
assumptions proved utterly false: his large column did stumble into an ambush, 
the enemy showed tremendous initiative, and the German column was anything 
but invulnerable to attack from the side, as this is precisely how the Hehe 
annihilated them.  Zelewski’s arrogance about the minimal capabilities of his foe 
is reminiscent to the derisive opinion of the Zulus held by Lord Chelmsford in the 
 
187 Von Zelewski an Gouverneur von Soden, 29 June 1891, BAB, R1001/279, 128.  
 88
 lead up to the crushing British defeat at Isandhlwana.  Indeed, Zelewski 
considered an attack with stabbing spears completely impossible.  For this reason, 
he sent the 3rd Company under Lieutenant von Prince back from the Rufiji River.  
It was in this context that the following dialogue between Zelewski and Prince 
took place: “But the 3rd company is the strongest, you may yet need them, Herr 
Commander!” Zelewski replied, “Nonsense, these people don’t even have rifles, 
just shields and spears!”188  This complacency spared von Prince, but it cost the 
life of nearly everyone else in the column. 
 Having been to the battlefield at Rugaro, I can concur that the terrain 
made marching single file almost the only option, though this in no way meant 
that the e
                                                
 G rmans could not have sent scouts ahead of their advance.  I suspect the 
German commanders did not trust their troops enough to allow them to operate so 
independently—they would not even let the Askari march with their weapons 
loaded, and they trusted their auxiliaries even less.  The terrain at Rugaro was 
tailor-made for an ambush; visibility is almost zero in any direction, as shown 
below in a picture taken by the author of the area where the German column was 
ambushed (the column would have been marching towards the viewer).  As noted 
above, the Hehe knew the position and composition of Nyundo’s column, and—
having heard about events on the coast—they were well aware of the futility in 
attacking well-armed detachments of Askari.  In order to defeat the Schutztruppe, 
the Hehe would have to prevent them from forming their infamous 
Rundumverteidigung (circular defensive firing formation, the Schutztruppe 
equivalent of the British square formation).  This meant that an ambush was the 
 
188 Prince, 88.  
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 logical choice; the question remained, however, as to where should Hehe forces 
position themselves to attack the Germans.  Generally the decision to attack 
Zelewski at Rugaro and the specifics of the Hehes’ plan of attack are attributed to 
 
*view from the spot at which the Zelewski was ambushed, facing back towards the rest of what 
would have been the column (photo by author) 
 
Mkwawa (no doubt part of the aforementioned “Mkwawa myth”).  According to 
our informant at the site, and confirmed by local historian and folksinger Francis 
Kitime, it was actually one of Mkwawa’s cousins that made the decision to attack 
where they did.  Hehe commanders were originally intending to ambush the 
column earlier at Ruaha Mbuyuni (one of the crossings of the Ruaha River), but 
Alfred Stefan Myota Kwaganise claims that Mkwawa’s cousin and “minister of 
information and intelligence,” Kilonge, had a dream indicating that this plan 
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 would fail.  It was he that advised the commanders to instead ambush Zelewski’s 
troops near the village of Lula-Rugaro, next to the Mgella River.189 
 In any case, Mkwawa personally commanded the column, joined by 
many o hi
                                                
f s greatest generals and by both “mayors” of Kalenga, Ngosi Ngosi and 
Mtemiuma.190  The most powerful of his brothers, Mpangile, was also present, 
and some even attribute the plan of attack to him.191  As will be discussed in 
chapter six, Mpangile would later be installed as the Sultan of Uhehe by the 
German administration in Iringa on 24 December 1896, only to be executed 
thereafter in February 1897 allegedly for “conspiring” with his brother.192  Or did 
someone perhaps betray Mpangile, as Bernd Arnold argues, to his worst enemy, 
Lieutenant von Prince, who therefore executed him for his role as the commander 
at Rugaro?  Whoever’s plan it was, upon receiving word of Zelewski’s approach, 
Mkwawa quickly assembled approximately 2,000 (Prince claims it was anywhere 
from three to five thousand) Hehe warriors and moved to the location near Rugaro 
with at least as many Bena auxiliaries held in reserve.  The latter were engaged 
protecting the actual village of Lula-Rugaro in the event that Nyundo’s column 
was able to fight its way through the ambush.  It was agreed that a signal in the 
 
189 Author’s interview with Alfred Stefan Myota Kwaganise, 17 August 2005.  I was assisted by 
Francis Kitime’s son, Richard Kitime of Iringa. 
 
190 Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 16f.  It is difficult to say with any certainty which of Mkwawa’s 
generals were present, but his most important commanders were: Ngosi Ngosi Mwa Mugumba, 
Mpangile (his brother), Muhamike Mwamuyinga, Mbwanale Mwa Lalika, Sakaligida Mwautenga, 
Kongoke Mabohola Mwamuyinga, Malimbila Mwauyinga, and Kaleka Nagana.  Private Papers of 
Francis Kitime.   
 
191  Bernd Arnold’s informant, Charles Mwabulambo, told him that the ambush was devised by 
Mpangile. 
 
192 Alfons Adams, Im Dienste des Kreuzes.  Erinnerungen an mein Missionsleben in Deutsch-
Osafrika (St. Ottilien, Oberbayern: St. Ottilien, 1899), 53-61.  
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 form of a gunshot would the unleash the Hehe hiding along either side of the path 
towards Kalenga in an area where it was well nigh impossible to see, much less 
form a firing circle. European block formation and fire discipline en masse, often 
so decisive in engagements with indigenous peoples, could actually be 
transformed into a disadvantage in East Africa.  The self-styled “conquistador” 
and founder of German East Africa, Carl Peters, would later note in a letter of 23 
November 1891 to Governor von Soden that it was actually only through pure 
luck that a disaster like that at Rugaro had not befallen German forces earlier, as 
their training was entirely oriented towards fighting in tight, orderly formations.  
But for the reasons already outlined by Zelewski himself, they generally marched 
single file, meaning that their combat training was worse than useless, as they 
were in no way used to taking their own initiative and fighting as individuals.193  
The Askari, while undoubtedly proficient at killing as indicated by their 
                                                 
193 BAB, R1001/279, 45f.  “Ich habe mich gewundert, daβ bei der öffentlichen Diskussion der 
Uhehe-Katastrophe von keiner Seite hingewiesen worden ist, daβ in derselben dich vernehmlich 
eine Kritik des Wiβmann’schen Schutztruppen-Systems geliefert ist.  Zelewski war, vom 
preuβischen Standpunkte aus gesehen, sicherlich ein reichlich so gutter Offizer als Wiβmann; hier 
in Afrika, aber, in Bezug auf die Schutztruppe ein gröβerer Wiβmanner als dieser selbst.  Er ging 
in der eingeschlagenen Richtung eben noch einen Schritt weiter.  Aber auch Wiβmann wird doch 
nicht bestreiten wollen, daβ Zelewski’s Vorgehen genau seinen Prinzipien entsprach.  Als 
Wiβmann die zweite Matachembe-Expedition ausschikte, lieβ er sein Leute im Kompagnie-
Exerziren drillen, obwohl sie in ein Terrain kamen, wo alles Andere, nur kein kompagniemäβiges 
Operiren möglich war, auf ein Terrain nämlich, won Einer hinter dem Anderen zu marschieren 
hat, im Gänsemarsch, wo demnach die Gewöhnung an Kompagnie-Exerziren nicht nur nichts 
nützen konnte, sondern schaden muβte, weil es die Leute noch mehr des individuellen Vorgehen 
entwöhnte.  Auch hat keine der Wiβmann’schen Expeditionen gegen Binnenafrikaner (von Simra, 
woe in klares Angriffsobjekt gegeben war, abgesehen) ein klareres Resultat gehabt als die 
Zelewski’sche.  An allen Punkten haben sie zurückkehren müssen, und wenn eine Katastrophe 
erspart blieb, so war dies wirklich bloβer Zufall!  Die Herren glauben eben immer daβ die 
Sicherheit des Erfolges hier in den Waffen und ihrem reglementsmäβigen Drill liegt [indeed, often 
this was true], während derselbe doch nur durch ein Eingehen auf die individuellen örtlichen 
Umstände und ein Reagiren gegen dieselben zu erzielen ist.” 
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 performance against the so-called Arabs the year before, were quite simply not 
trained to respond to an attack of the sort that occurred at Rugaro.194 
And so it was that at about 7am on 17 August 1891, the Hehe ambushed 
the German expedition, nearly annihilating the entire force.  The deadly 
breechloaders (Mauser M71s), machine guns, and artillery of the German column, 
so often the decisive factor in warfare between Europeans and Africans, proved 
on this occasion to be almost useless.195  As noted, Zelewski in his arrogance had 
ignored the advice of his guides about Hehe envelopment tactics, and he had 
neglected to send patrols along the column’s line of advance, which at Rugaro 
was so narrow that they could only march single-file, their view on both sides 
obscured by bushes and boulders.196  The Hehe troops rushed the column from 
cover only thirty paces away: “The enemy was so quickly in our ranks that the 
soldiers could only fire once or twice.”197  Only four Germans, fifty Askari, and 
                                                 
194 See also Ernst Nigmann, Felddienstübungen für farbige (ostafrikanische) Truppen (Dar es 
Salaam: Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung Verlag, 1910).  To be fair to Zelewski, most 
contemporary observers shared his smug opinion about warfare against Africans.  “In the 
Wissmann-led engagements, the Arabs were estimated as worthy opponents and…more often than 
not the natives of the interior fled the field of battle…Zelewski, like many others, thought it 
impossible that even the Hehe would dare risk attacking a large column on the march.”  Ernst 
Nigmann, Geschichte, 112. 
 
195 The imperial historian V.G. Kiernan offered a succinct analysis of this disparity in reference to 
the British conquest of northern Nigeria in 1900: “Lugard sent a strong detachment to educate 
them with a rocket tube and five machine-guns, the equivalent for such a people of an atomic raid 
on a modern country.”  Such overwhelming displays of force became so common that in 1906 the 
Colonial Office forbade expeditions merely for the purpose of “teaching the natives the efficacy of 
the maxim.”  V. G. Kiernan, Colonial Empires and Armies 1815-1960 (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1998), 100.  
 
196 Hugold Felix von Behr, “Der Kampf gegen die Wahehe,“ Militär-Wochenblatt 77 (1892): 422-
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197 Bericht des Leutnants Tettenborn an Gouverver v. Soden,  Deutscher Reichs-Anzeiger, 9 
Oktober 1891.  
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 thirty porters made it back to the coast alive on 20 September.198 One of the only 
survivors, von Heydebreck, depicted the engagement as follows in his written 
report on the disaster: 
On the 17th of August the expedition set out at about 6am in the usual 
marching order… At the front marched the lead squad of about 6 Zulus 
[meaning Shangaani recruited from Portuguese East Africa], then came 
the commander [Zelewski], [the doctor] Dr. Buschow and Lieutenant von 
Pirch, then came the 7th Zulu Company, at the end of which marched NCO 
Schmidt and Hengelhaupt the gunsmith, and then came the artillery: 
cannon, Sergeant Tiedemann, artillery officer Herrlich and artillery NCO 
Wutzer, and then me [von Heydebreck].  Behind me came Lieutenant von 
Zitewitz, the 5th Sudanese Company and Sergeant von Tiedewitz, then the 
medical helper Hemprich and the porters, in which were scattered about 
60 men of the 6th Company, then a contiguous portion of the 6th Company 
with Lieutenant von Tettenborn and sergeant Kay along with 20 heads of 
cattle and 60 goats under the cover of 12 men of the 6th Company… 
 
This was the usual “geese formation” described by Zelewski and later derided by 
Carl Peters.  At Around 7am the column arrived at what would become the 
battlefield of Rugaro: 
Just as the column had marched far enough for the artillery to be 
surrounded by the bush on both sides, Lieutenant Zitewitz shot at an eagle.  
This shot had the effect of a signal, immediately after it 5-10 shots from 
so-called Shenzi Rifles fired 199, and suddenly the war cry of the Wahehe 
resounded, who we saw at a distance of about 30 paces running at a dash 
down from the outcropping to the left.  Their number was monstrous; as 
far as one could see the entire ridge was covered by them.  Lieutenant von 
Zitewitz and I immediately took our rifles from the boys and fired.  
Simultaneously the column began to fire, but the attack happened so 
quickly and unexpectedly that the thick heaped salvoes fired at point blank 
range had so little an effect on the fury of the attack that the Sudanese of 
the 5th Company were hurled back into the bush, from which they 
individually fired shots backwards.  The confusion of the 5th Company 
was considerably worsened by the fact that the donkeys of the artillery 
                                                 
198 Prince, 307. 
 
199 These were muzzle loaders of indigenous production.  The shots were fired by Mkwawa’s elite 
troops, his elephant hunters. 
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 together with their loads of cannon and munitions broke into flight back 
down the path.200 
 
At this point von Heydebreck was wounded and fell into unconsciousness, but his 
report continues: 
The entire sequence of events up to this moment had played itself out in 
two to three minutes.  I know that before I was wounded, the Sudanese 
had already fled at breakneck speed into the bush after having fired off 
maybe two shots… For Lieutenant, me, and the 5th company the matter 
was decided in our favor at the first moment of the attack since we saw the 
enemy coming at us, even if only at 30 paces, and we therefore were able 
to return fire.  All those that found themselves among the bushes were 
completely surprised.  If I am not mistaken, I heard Sergeant Tiedemann 
say he had been wounded before he had the chance to fire. 201  In any case, 
it was not possible to see further than five paces into the bush from the 
path.  Also no one could have escaped in the direction of our march 
because it was precisely there that the main force of the Hehe must have 
been.  It is apparent that their intention was to attack us only once the 
entire column had disappeared into the bush.  They therefore definitely 
had occupied a stretch of the path in front of us that was the same length 
as our column.  They knew the entire length of the column precisely after 
days of observation.  The thwarting of their plan and thereby the survival 
of a part of our expedition was only caused by the coincidental shot of 
Lieutenant von Zitewitz. 202         
 
 
                                                 
200 Recounting the same sequence of events, NCO Wutzer stated: “… und gleichzeitig sprangen 
links seitwärts aus dem Grase eine groβe Anzahl Wahehe mit Geheul auf nuns los.  Hierdurch 
wurden die Esel scheu gemacht, so daβ sie in wildem Galopp theils nach rechts, theils zurück 
davon liefen, da die zwischen ihnen marschierenden Soldaten zu ihrer Selbstvertheidigung zum 
Gewehr griffen und sich um die Esel nicht mehr kümmerten.”  Unteroffizier Wutzer, BAB, 
R1001/279, 160.  See also Adams, 28. 
 
201 “I saw Sergeant Tiedemann wounded with by the stab of a spear to his abdomen while he was 
trying to unfasten a Maxim Gun from a donkey.”  Ombascha Tscheka. BAB, R1001/279, 162.  
 
202 Report on the destruction of the Zelewski-Expedition, BAB, R1001/279, 154-6.  
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*View of the ridge to the left of the column from which the Hehe attacked (photo by author) 
 
As to the death of Commander Zelewski, Tom von Prince later wrote, “As was 
depicted to me later…by Wahehe eyewitnesses, he defended himself with his 
revolver and shot down three men, when a Mhehe stabbed him in the back.  This 
Mhehe was approximately 16 years old and received from Quawa three cattle as a 
decoration.”203  Thus ended the life and career of Nyundo, stabbed in the back 
while riding on a donkey by one of the Hehes’ “mere spears.”  The commander of 
the Schutztruppe for East Africa did not survive beyond the first two minutes of 
the engagement.  
 
                                                 
203 Prince, 306.  The Mhehe’s name was Muvangulumemile mwa Mpunza.  Redmayne, “The 
Hehe,” 51. 
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*The spot where Zelewski was killed as shown to us by Alfred Stefan Myota Kawaganise (photo 
by author) 
 
But the battle dragged on longer than the two or three minutes von 
Heydebreck witnessed before he fell unconscious.  “According to the testimony of 
Wahehe that participated in the struggle, the battle did not end as quickly as the 
Europeans in the rear of the column assumed, instead the broken line continued to 
defend itself in small groups until 10:30am and killed many enemies 
[Wahehe].”204  Worse still for the Hehe, the rear of the column did not fall into 
the trap and was able to form a defensive position in an abandoned tembe (hut) on 
a hill just east of where the main detachment of the column was destroyed.  In 
1894 Prince could still see the tembe in which a portion of the Expeditionkorps 
                                                 
204 Wilhelm Arning, “Die Wahehe (Schluβ),” in Mittheilungen von Forschungsreisenden und 
Gelehrten aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten, ed. Dr. Freiherr von Danckelmann, Vol. 10 (1897): 
54. 
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 hid itself.  Firing their M71s from behind cover, the Askari inflicted horrific 
casualties on the Hehe, who made repeated attempts to storm the hill and take the 
tembe.  After regaining consciousness, von Heydebreck observed: 
                                                
It was Murgan Effendi [Effendi was a rank for indigenous officers], the 
black officer of the Sudanese, who along with about 10 men managed to 
make his way back along our original path of march… The Sudanese 
discovered a single small house built out of lime with a flat roof near 
where I lay.  I moved into this [tembe] and ordered shooting holes to be 
broken in the walls… I was attacked several times by Wahehe 
detachments, but the Sudanese continued to fire with great calm and 
thereby inflicted numerous losses on the enemy.205 
 
It seems likely that the vast majority of the Hehes’ casualties were suffered in this 
attempt to dislodge and kill Heydebreck and the other members of the rear of the 
column who had escaped the ambush.  He, three other Germans, 50 Askari, and 
30 porters were the only survivors out of the column; 10 Europeans, 290 Askari, 
200 porters, 2 machine guns, and 300 small-arms were lost.  As for the Hehes’ 
losses, it is difficult to tell with any precision how many Hehe died that day.  We 
do know that these losses were indeed severe, so severe in fact that Mkwawa 
forbade the traditional period and ceremonies of mourning, most likely afraid of 
the effect this would have on the morale of his subjects and vassals.206  As 
Redmayne also notes, most Hehe that know anything about what happened at 
Rugaro state that Mkwawa forbade mourning until two years later, when he 
finally ordered the brewing of beer and the slaughter of cattle for a mourning 
feast.207  One contemporary German observer claimed that “[t]he losses of the 
 
205 BAB, R1001/279, 155f. 
 
206 Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 17.  
 
207 Redmayne, “Mkwawa…,” 420.  
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 Hehe were such, as they themselves say, that their wives did not sing victory 
songs in spite of the great victory, but instead had let loose cries of anguish.”208  
The local missionary, Alfons Adams, concurred: “[t]he loud cries of the grieving 
wives supposedly were not dampened for an entire month.”209  Contemporary 
estimates of Hehe losses suggest that they suffered approximately 700 casualties, 
while many modern scholars like Bernd Arnold and Erick Mann claim that the 
number was closer to two or three hundred (which would still be over a tenth of 
Mkwawa’s core forces).     
In his Mukwava na kabila lake, Michael Musso offers several reasons why 
the losses were so severe.  The “trap” closed far too soon due to the coincidental 
shot of Lieutenant von Zitewitz, and Musso argues that this gave the Askari time 
and opportunity to deploy machine guns, but this was not the case, even during 
the struggle at the tembe.  The fact remains, however, that when used in tight 
formations and particularly from behind cover the breechloader Jägerbüchse M 
71 was a deadly weapon.  It fired an 11mm, 390 grain soft lead bullet at over 
1,400 feet per second, which was large and powerful enough to remove limbs or 
heads and inflicted massive wounds to the torso.210  When fitted with the eight-
round tubular magazine below the barrel, as later models were, it represented the 
cutting edge of firearms technology at that time.211  More often than not, the 
                                                 
208 Arning, “Die Wahehe (Schluβ),” 54. 
 
209 Adams, 46f.  
 
210 By way of comparison, modern rifle bullets, such as the M16’s 5.56mm round, tend to weigh 
only about 60 grains and are about half the diameter of the 11mm Mauser round.   
 
211 For a more detailed discussion of firearms in the German colonies, see Reinhard Klein-Arendt, 
“’Bautz! Schuß durch den Ast und durch den Kerl…’ Der Einsatz moderner Infantriewaffen gegen 
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 Germans in East Africa and their African mercenaries also tended to use dumdum 
bullets which while specifically illegal for use against fellow Europeans, were the 
norm for use against “savage” opponents.212  Dumdum rounds, whose name 
originally derives from the Dum Dum factory outside of Calcutta in British India, 
were either hollow-points or had a soft lead core designed to expand dramatically 
upon impact, thereby creating far more vicious wound channels that—if the 
victim was lucky enough to survive in the first instance—did not heal well and 
created an even higher risk of infection.  From the reports of surviving Germans, 
one can discern several reasons why they were able to escape and thereby inflict 
high losses on the Hehe.  Lieutenant Tettenborn claimed: “[t]heir chief Kuawa 
and their leader Mrawatu had fallen.  It is only to this situation of leaderlessness 
that I attribute our lucky escape.”213  While the notion that Mkwawa died at 
Rugaro is patently false, it is true that both “mayors” of the city Kalenga, Ngosi 
Ngosi and Mtemiuma, were among the dead.214 Alfred Stefan Myota Kawaganise, 
again seconded by Francis Kitime, claims that one of the most important of 
                                                                                                                                                 
afrikanische Widerstandsbewegungen in Deutsch Ostafrika,” in Die (koloniale) Begegnung: 
AfrikanerInnen in Deutschland 1880-1945, Deutsche in Afrika 1880-1918, eds. Marianne 
Bechhaus-Gerst and Reinhard Klein-Arendt (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2003), 171-91.  See 
also Ernst Nigmann’s manual of the training and effective use of Askari in combat with 
indigenous opponents, Felddienstübungen für farbige (ostafrkanische) Truppen (Dar es Salaam: 
Verlag von der Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, 1910). 
 
212 See Lindqvist, 52 and Trutz von Trotha, “’The Fellows Can just Starve’, On Wars of 
‘Pacification’ in the African Colonies of Imperial Germany and the Concept of ‘Total War’,” in 
Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914, eds. Manfred F. 
Boemke, Roger Chickering, and Stig Förster (Washington: the German Historical Institute, 199), 
433.  
 
213 BAB, R1001/279, 96.  
 
214 Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 16f.  Mrawatu was most likely a Swahili rendering of Malavanu, the 
subordinate ruler of Image, who in actuality died a few years before the Battle of Rugaro.  
Redmayne, “Mkwawa…,” 420   
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 Mkwawa’s generals died.  This was most likely Ngosi Ngosi Mwa Mugumba, an 
important subordinate ruler of Kalenga and a key member of Mkwawa’s 
command staff.215  According to Kawaganise, who lives in the nearby village of 
Lugalo (the modern name of Lula-Rugaro), people still come to the place where 
Ngosi Ngosi died as if it were a site of pilgrimage.  The loss of Ngosi Ngosi was a 
grave one for the Hehe, and those who had to inform Mkwawa of his death were 
so ashamed and afraid of his potential reaction that they lied and said he had died 
en route, killed by wild animals.216   
 
* Alfred Stefan Myota Kawaganise in front of the place where General Ngosi Ngosi supposedly 
was dragged to die (photo by author) 
 
 
                                                 
215 Ngosi Ngosi’s death is also noted by Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 16-17.  
 
216 Author’s interview with Alfred Stefan Myota Kwaganise, 17 August 2005. 
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 Further complicating the Hehes’ ability to pursue and wipe out the last 
remnant of the column was the fact that the fleeing baggage mules and porters 
were a great temptation to the Hehe warriors, and the opportunity for plunder 
made the discipline of many evaporate.217 Nigmann noted that between this 
looting and the need to care for a large number of their own wounded, it was 
difficult for the Hehe to engage in a protracted, relentless pursuit in the manner 
experienced by British Redcoats in 1879 as they fled the hill at Isandhlwana and 
were methodically cut down.  “A close, energetic pursuit of the retreating debris 
of the Zelewski expedition was not possible since the Wahehe were fully 
occupied with their own heavy losses and were quite despondent in spite of their 
great success… Their scouts observed, that is to say reported, the marching off of 
the troop, otherwise nothing happened.”218  Whatever the reason for their escape, 
the remaining “debris” of the column reached the coast over a month later on 20 
September 1891, a mere shattered remnant of what had been the most powerful 
column of the dreaded, hitherto undefeated Schutztruppe. 
For the once unbeatable AvaDaliki, this was to be the only defeat ever 
suffered by the Germans in East Africa, and every officer in the colony vowed 
thereafter to wage a campaign of vengeance against the Hehe.  The annihilation of 
the Zelewski column likewise caused an uproar in the metropolis and an 
                                                 
217 “Auf der Höhe angekommen hatte ich etwa folgendes Bild vor Augen: nach rechts 
davonlaufende Soldaten, die nach rückwarts Schüsse abgaben, entlaufende Träger, die ihre Lasten 
weggeworfen hatten, viele Wahehe, damit beschäftigt, unsere Lasten mit ihren Speeren 
aufzuschneiden und damit das Weite suchend.”  Von Tettenborn, BAB, R1001/279, 157. 
 
218 Nigmann, Die Wahehe, 17. 
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 acrimonious debate in the Reichstag.219  The official newspaper of the Deutsche 
Kolonialgesellschaft (German Colonial Society), the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, 
acknowledged the defeat as nothing less than a catastrophe for the East African 
colony: “The 17th of August 1891 will always count as one of the most 
unfortunate days in the history of our colonial wars, because since the beginning 
of our colonial policy no day has cost as many sacrifices as this one, upon which 
the Expedition Corps of the German Schutztruppe, which made up a fifth of our 
entire military strength in East Africa, was rubbed out.”220   Governor von Soden, 
however, was under extreme pressure from Berlin to keep costs in bounds, and he 
vetoed any campaigns of revenge, a position he maintained until his departure 18 
months later.221  This order was ignored by officers in the field and by his 
successor for reasons that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The next chapter will discuss the period between the Battle of Rugaro and 
the siege of Kalenga by Governor von Schele (August 1891-September 1894), a 
time of indecisive skirmishing and confusing, erratic diplomacy on all sides.  Both 
the Germans and the Hehe sought to draw other societies and other regions into 
the war, a situation that potentially threatened German control of not only the 
southern highlands but of the colony as a whole.  Indeed, the Germans would 
have to deal with the Hehes’ neighbors one by one, either by winning them over 
                                                 
219 See Stenogaphische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages, Bd. 120, 
1892.  
 
220 “Ein Unglückstag für die deutsch-ostafrikanische Schutztruppe,” Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, 19 
September 1891.  
 
221 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages 1895 Bd. 120, 
4578. 
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  104
to the emerging colonial project or by ending their independence with the ruthless 
application of armed force. 
  
222 
                                                 
222 Map of Iringa district (Uhehe) and surrounding areas.  Nigmann, Die Wahehe, pullout at end of 
text.  
223 
 
Chapter IV: 
Stalemate and the Logic of Conquest: From Rugaro to Kalenga (1892-1894) 
 
As soon as their goods were taken out of their houses, they began making noise.  
They ran along side and said: if anyone enters our house, we will strike him down 
with our spear.  To this Bwana Bumiller responded: I demand 
that…someone…come here and bring me a small gift.  If you all do not do this, I 
will lay waste to your entire country with fire because I do not fear your spears...  
Just my two rifles would suffice to conquer an entire country for myself.     
        - Selim bin Abakar 224 
 
When we depict Wahehe, Mafiti, and others with moral indignation as murderers, 
cattle thieves, and highwaymen, it becomes difficult for them to see the difference 
between us and themselves other than the color of [our] skin, better weapons, and 
high-sounding phrases.   -Governor Freiherr von Soden, 1891225 
 
The destruction of the Zelewski contingent was the worst—and some would say 
only—defeat ever suffered by the Germans in East Africa, and every officer in the 
colony vowed thereafter to wage a campaign of vengeance against the Hehe.  The 
annihilation of the Zelewski column was greeted with horror and astonishment in 
                                                 
223 Karl Weule, “Ostafrikanische Eingeborenen-Zeichnungen: Psychologische Einblicke in die 
Künstlerseele des Negers,” in Ipek: Jahrbuch für Prähistorische und Ethnographische Kunst 2 
(1926): between 96 and 97. 
   
224 Selim bin Abakar, “Meine Reise nach Nyassa,” in Schilderungen der Suaheli 
von Expeditionen v. Wissmanns, Dr. Bumillers, Graf v. Götzens, und Anderer (Göttingern: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1901), 95-6.  
 
225 Von Soden an Reichskanzler von Caprivi, 19 October 1891, Bundesarchiv Berlin (hereafter 
BAB), R1001/280, 14. 
 the metropolis, and bitter debate followed in the Reichstag.226  As quoted in the 
previous chapter, the official newspaper of the German Colonial Society 
expressed its shock and disgust that “mere tribesman” could wipe out a fifth of the 
colony’s entire military in a single morning.227  This loss should be seen as 
particularly severe when one remembers not only the small numbers of 
Schutztruppler on the ground in East Africa, but also the scant financial resources 
made available to them from the parliament and government in Berlin.  As much 
as metropolitan authorities and officers on the ground wanted to punish the Hehe 
as soon as possible, however, it would in fact take over three years for the 
Germans to decisively strike against Mkwawa’s empire.  It would take a change 
in leadership, the rebuilding of the Schutztruppe with new recruits from outside 
and inside the colony, and the pacification of other opponents to colonial rule 
elsewhere in German East Africa before “punitive devastation” could be inflicted 
on Uhehe.  This chapter focuses on events after Rugaro, when the struggle 
between the Hehe and the Germans shifted to a creeping war of position as the 
Germans methodically created boma “garrison oases” along the edges of Uhehe.  
The period culminates in the governorship of von Schele and his systematic 
campaign to defeat all the states bordering Uhehe, thereby encircling it and 
preparing it for invasion.  This “final,” massive campaign against the Hehe was 
intended to storm and destroy the Kalenga (also referred to as Kuirenga and 
Kuiringa) fortress near the present-day town of Iringa, an operation that was 
                                                 
226 See Stenogaphische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages (hereafter 
Stenogaphische Berichte), Bd. 120, 1892.    
 
227 “Ein Unglückstag für die deutsch-ostafrikanische Schutztruppe,” Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, 19 
September 1891.  
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 supposed to serve as an overwhelming display of German power that would end 
Hehe resistance once and for all, and it is the subject of the next chapter.   
 The three years after Rugaro and before the siege of Kalenga can be 
characterized as an uneasy and at times bloody strategic stalemate between two 
rival conquest states—the Germans and the Hehe—during which neither side was 
able to gain decisive advantage over the other.  The events of this confusing, 
violent period between August 1891 and September 1894 highlight several of the 
aspects emphasized in chapters through three: the competitive world of “big men” 
in East Africa; the fluid, unstable matrix of intra-African politics in the southern 
highlands; the German desire to concentrate the means of violence in the hands of 
the emerging and at this point still fragile colonial state; and the multiple, 
overlapping circuits of violence that created an environment in which brutality 
and atrocity by the colonizers was not only not punished, but was in fact rewarded 
and justified by those in authority.  This chapter will first examine the overall 
strategic and political situation in the colony in the wake of the Battle of Rugaro, 
then will move on to discuss the goals and priorities of the Germans and the Hehe 
respectively, as well as highlighting the context that defined their policies.  From 
there the narrative will move to the engagements and campaigns of the period 
between the Battles of Rugaro and Kalenga, particularly after the beginning of the 
tenure of the hawkish new governor, Friedrich Radbod Freiherr von Schele, in 
September 1893. 
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 Strategic and Administrative Situation after the “Zelewski catastrophe”: 
German Priorities, Policies, and Constraints 
 
As discussed in chapter one, German authority in East Africa was always tenuous 
at best.  They had only a handful of personnel to “control” a million square 
kilometers of hostile territory.  Before the battle of Rugaro, the Schutztruppe had 
had only approximately 1,200 men at their disposal, and that engagement had 
wiped out about a fourth of that number.228  Many of the Askari who fell at 
Rugaro were members of the original Wissmanntruppe that had pacified the 
coast—these Sudanese and “Zulu” (actually Shangaani mercenaries from 
Portuguese East Africa) troops formed the core of German forces and were 
difficult to replace.229   This lack of forces had always made the Germans 
dependent on the staged, theatrical display of violence as a form of deterrent.  As 
the scholar Michael Pesek has convincingly argued, their administrative and 
military policy was one of impressing and awing through violence, which yielded 
both physical and symbolic effects.230  Trutz von Trotha likewise argues that, 
contrary to theories which state that colonial violence is somehow uneconomical 
                                                 
228 Before Rugaro the Schutztruppe consisted of 10 officers, 32 NCOs, and 1,200 African 
mercenaries, the majority of whom Reichskommissar Wissman had recruited in Cairo.  Friedrich 
von Schele, Über die Organisation der Kaiserlichen Schutztruppe in Deutsch-Ostafrika und die 
kriegerischen Operationen daselbst während der Jahre 1893/94, supplement to the Militär-
Wochenblatt, vol. 9, 1896, ed. Generalmajor von Estorff (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 
1896), 442.  The Schutztruppe never had more than 160 German officers and NCOs and 1,600 
Askari during the conquest phase of the 1890 to control an area twice the size of Imperial 
Germany.  
 
229 Tanzania National Archive, Dar es Salaam (hereafter TNA), G/2/2 and G/2/3 on German 
recruitment efforts outside the colony.  Even two years later, the new governor, von Schele, was 
unable to get sufficient recruits from Sudan by way of Egypt (the primary source for Wissmann’s 
original ‘Wissmanntruppe’ in 1889-90).  Von Schele an Reichskanzler von Caprivi, 25 September 
1893, Bundesarchiv Berlin (hereafter BAB), Reichskolonialamt (R)1001/283, 145. 
 
230  Michael Pesek, Koloniale Herrschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika: Expeditionen, Militär und 
Verwaltung seit 1880 (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. 2005), 195. 
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 or “inefficient” or a sign of some sort of German propensity to tend towards 
excess, violence and massacre are both inherent to the colonial project and an 
economical way of establishing authority in contexts like that of the southern 
highlands: 
Violence is an extremely economical means of rule in the face of scant 
resources.  Violence is very convincing.  It is simple and obvious.  There 
are no communication problems.  The “language of violence” needs no 
translation—and this applies particularly to a world in which the colonial 
conquerors could make themselves understood in meetings with Africans 
only when they were accompanied and assisted by interpreters.  In the 
language of violence, conquerors can express themselves directly and may 
also know that they have been understood.231 
 
 This had been Carl Peter’s doctrine in the 1880s and again when he was the 
district officer at Kilimanjaro, and it would be the policy of Governor Friedrich 
von Schele in 1893 and 1894.  It is precisely the centrality of this policy of 
intimidation that made the disaster at Rugaro so dangerous for the Germans, as it 
fatally undermined their credibility throughout the colony and in the southern 
highlands in particular.  Indeed, von Prince and others blamed Mkwawa’s success 
for the intransigence of Isike at Tabora (to whom we will return in this chapter), 
“Sultan” of the powerful Nyamwezi polity of Unyanyembe.  Ernst Nigmann, the 
semi-official chronicler of the Schutztruppe in East Africa and longtime head of 
what would become the Iringa garrison, noted that the Hehe victory had 
dramatically increased their already formidable reputation, while at the same time 
                                                 
231 Trutz von Trotha, “’The Fellows Can just Starve’, On Wars of ‘Pacification’ in the African 
Colonies of Imperial Germany and the Concept of ‘Total War’,” in Anticipating Total War: The 
German and American Experiences, 1871-1914 (Washington: the German Historical Institute, 
199), 422.   ee also Trotha’s discussion of massacre as administrative policy in Togo in Koloniale 
Herrschaft: Zur soziologischen Theorie der Staatsentstehung am Beispiel “Schutzgebietes Togo” 
(Tübingen: J. C. B Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1994), 37-43. 
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 severely damaging the prestige of the Germans.232  It was imperative that the 
Germans avenge this defeat as soon as possible in order to restore their “martial 
honor” (Waffenehre)233 and thereby restore the aura of invincibility that the 
Europeans supposedly enjoyed before Rugaro.   
234 
 This need to display German “martial prowess”—meaning the colonial 
state’s willingness and ability to wield tremendous violence against local leaders 
and populations that did not comply with its wishes—was made all the more 
imperative by the nature of politics in the southern highlands (and of East Africa 
more generally).  The realities of German manpower, resources, and local 
knowledge being what they were made the colonizers incredibly dependent on 
                                                 
232 Ernst Nigmann, Geschichte der Kaiserlichen Schutztruppe für Deutsch-Ostafrika (Berlin: Ernst 
Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1911), 34.  
 
233 Nigmann, Geschichte, 46.  
 
234 Map from Jamie Monson, “Relocating Maji Maji: The Politics of Alliance and Authority in the 
Southern Highlands of Tanzania. 1870-1918,” Journal of African History, 39 (1998): 100.    
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 alliances with local “Big Men” like Merere III of the Sangu or the “Arab” slave-
owning class of the Swahili coast.235 Until they could prove otherwise, the 
Germans remained simply the latest in a series of interlopers that had violently 
inserted themselves into the political and economic landscape of Tanganyika.  
Like the Arabs and their Swahili allies in the 1830s-1870s and the Ngoni in the 
1840s-1880s, they found that it was imperative that they make use of and 
incorporate local political structures.  Where persuasion and/or offers of material 
gain were not sufficient, force would in theory accomplish the task.  Indeed, 
Ngoni conquest and state-building in East Africa had been incredibly violent, but 
it had eventually created a tributary structure that was both stable and acceptable 
to local elites that before annexation had not considered themselves “Ngoni.”  The 
Hehe conquest state worked in the same manner, annihilating those who would or 
could not be amalgamated into the emerging tributary pyramid and rewarding and 
creating ever-denser kinship relationships with those who would.  The difference 
between the Germans and their predecessors—the Mfecane states and the Arab-
Swahili alliance—was that the Germans were even more likely to recourse to 
violence and massacre.  They were far less deft at understanding, much less 
utilizing, local political structures.  Indeed, they often argued that the “natives” 
did not have any meaningful political organization at all.236  Furthermore, it was 
far more difficult for them to integrate with local elites, particularly because what 
                                                 
235 Merere will be discussed below.  For a discussion of the Germans complex relationship with 
the coastal Swahili elite, see See Jan Georg Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition in German 
East Africa c. 1884-1914 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2006). 
 
236 The Kolonial-Lexicon compiled by East African governor Heinrich Schnee does not even have 
an entry for indigenous politics, and the individual entries for specific African politics are, to put it 
mildly, highly contemptuous and saturated with evolutionary notions of African inferiority.  See 
Heinrich Schnee, Deutsches Kolonial-Lexicon (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1921).  
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 had been a standard practice in the region—intermarriage and the incorporation of 
conquered elites into new “chiefly” lineages—was a practice that racial theorists 
were busy labeling as “race treason” or “race defilement” both in the colony and 
back in Germany.237  The Germans’ near total ignorance of local languages, 
practices, and history (versus the Ngoni, who spoke a language rather similar to 
the Bena, Sangu, and Hehe) made them even more likely to recourse to 
sanguinary violence, and their (at least theoretical) formidable superiority in the 
technological means of violence meant that it was all too appealing to 
communicate their intentions through property destruction and demonstrative 
slaughter. 
Much as many Germans wanted to engage in precisely this sort of a 
demonstration vis-à-vis the “impudent Hehe,” Governor Julius Freiherr von 
Soden, was under extreme pressure from Berlin to keep costs in bounds, and he 
vetoed any campaigns of revenge, a position he maintained until his departure two 
years later.238  The Hehe state was to be contained and, if possible, neutralized 
through negotiation rather than war.  Von Soden’s unwillingness to engage in 
costly military expeditions made him a rarity among the governors of German 
East Africa and had much to do with his background.  He was the only civil 
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 servant to serve as governor of the colony during the struggle with the Hehe—
indeed, his predecessor von Wissmann and most his successors were officers 
drawn from the metropolitan military.239  In contrast to the military careers of von 
Schele, von Wissmann, or von Liebert (his successors during the Hehe War), he 
                                                 
239 Kirsten Zirkel, “Military power in German colonial policy: the Schutztruppen and their leaders 
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Die Reichskommissare und Gouverneure des Schutzgebietes Deutsch-Ostafrika  
Amtszeit Name Lebensdaten 
27.05.1885 
- 
08.02.1888 
Dr. Carl Peters, Reichskommissar  1856 - 1918 
08.02.1888 
- 
21.02.1891 
Herrmann von Wissmann, 
Reichskommissar 1853 - 1905 
14.02.1891 
- 1891 
Julius Freiherr von Soden, Gouverneur (1. 
Amtszeit) 1846 - 1921 
1891 Rüdiger (provisorisch) ? 
1891 - 
15.09.1893 
Julius Freiherr von Soden, Gouverneur (2. 
Amtszeit) s.o. 
15.09.1893 
- 
26.04.1895 
Friedrich Radbod Freiherr von Scheele, 
Gouverneur  1847 - 1904 
26.04.1895 
-  
03.12.1896 
Herrmann von Wissmann, Gouverneur  s.o. 
 03.12.1896 
- 
12.03.1901 
Eduard von Liebert, Gouverneur   1850 - 1934 
12.03.1901 
- 
15.04.1906 
Gustav Adolf Graf von Götzen, 
Gouverneur  1866 - 1910 
15.04.1906 
- 
22.04.1912 
Georg Albrecht Freiherr von Rechenberg, 
Gouverneur  1861 - 1935 
22.04.1912 
- 
14.11.1918 
Dr. Albert Heinrich Schnee, Gouverneur   1871 - 1949239 
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 had begun his career in the justice system of Württemberg, then served in the 
imperial consulates in Bucharest, Algiers, Canton, Havana, and St. Petersburg.  
Thereafter he served simultaneously in 1885 as the first governor of German 
Cameroon and the Oberkommissar of Togo.240  He was also the only governor 
who was not Prussian and was therefore not inculcated in the Prussian military or 
administrative tradition.  His only military service—a brief stint as a volunteer 
with the 4th Württemberg cavalry regiment during the Franco-Prussian War—had 
not been with the Prussian military.  His career in the foreign service and 
extensive experience abroad meant that during his time in East Africa he always 
emphasized political and diplomatic solutions whenever possible.  He had 
effectively been railroaded into authorizing the ill-fated Zelewski expedition in 
the summer of 1891, and thereafter until his departure in September 1893 he 
refused to let Tom von Prince and other officers engage in operations against the 
Hehe (orders which von Prince ignored, as will be discussed below).  Shortly after 
the Rugaro debacle he told the Chancellor that he doubted whether “punitive 
expeditions” (Stafexpeditionen) were an effective way to create stable conditions 
in the colony, and that they would rather antagonize the indigenous population 
and provoke—rather than prevent—further resistance, an opinion that stood in 
stark contrast to the received wisdom among Schutztruppe officers that Africans 
only respected armed force and would never cease resistance until they felt 
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 German authority “physically.”241  Shortly after the battle of Rugaro, he ordered 
all station heads to proceed in a “diplomatic” rather than a “military-dictatorial” 
manner in relations with Africans and to engage in negotiations whenever 
possible.242  He even noted in another dispatch to Chancellor von Caprivi that 
Schutztruppe expeditions were often scarcely distinguishable from the “plunder 
expeditions” (Raubzüge) of the Hehe—for which the latter were putatively being 
punished—at least from the perspective of Africans: “When we depict Wahehe, 
Mafiti, and others with moral indignation as murderers, cattle thieves, and 
highwaymen, it becomes difficult for them to see the difference between us and 
themselves other than the color of [our] skin, better weapons, and high-sounding 
phrases.”243  Such sentiments were a rarity not only in German East Africa, but in 
colonial Africa in general.244 
All claims of officers like von Prince or von Schele aside, the potential for 
a negotiated solution between the Hehe Empire and the German colonial state did 
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 exist.  The Germans quickly reached local arrangements with the “Arabs” 
(meaning Muslim, Swahili speaking Africans) of the Tanganyikan coast in the 
wake of the so-called “Arab Revolt,” and much of the salaried German 
administration—the Akidas and Jumbes—was made up of Swahili elites that had 
reached an accommodation with the new German rulers.  Often this was 
preferable to facing the increasing demands of their own enslaved populations.245  
Likewise, pragmatism dictated that the Germans reach a political accommodation 
with the sophisticated, highly centralized kingdoms of the Great Lakes region—
Rwanda, Burundi, and Bukoba—which were incorporated with their territory and 
much of their authority intact into the colonial system as a German equivalent of 
“indirect rule.”246  Such a solution could have been sought with the Mkwawa’s 
Hehe.  Indeed, Mkwawa made repeated attempts to negotiate with the German 
administration rather than pressing the advantage his forces theoretically 
possessed in the wake of the destruction of the Zelewski column (for reasons 
discussed below).  These negotiations went on for several months through various 
intermediaries sent by Mkwawa to the German stations on the coast and to the 
new capital at Dar es Salaam, but ultimately these discussions came to nothing in 
                                                 
245 See Jan Georg Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition in German East Africa c. 1884-1914 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2006), 151-4 and Jonathan Glassman, Feasts and Riot: 
Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856-1888 (Portsmouth, 
NH: Heinemann, 1995), epilogue. 
 
246 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History (New York: 
Zone Books, 2003), 251-7.   This form of governance would have fateful consequences in the 
decades after the German conquest, as the “Hamitic hypothesis” about a Tutsi “master race” began 
as an intellectual exercise to justify and solidify the authority of the Germans’ elite African allies 
in Rwanda and Burundi.  See also René Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide 
(Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996) and Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims 
Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001). 
 
 116
 large part because German officials doubted the sincerity of the Hehe “sultan” and 
because of the aforementioned general contempt and disregard Germans felt vis-
à-vis African political structures.247  This pattern of Hehe attempts at conciliation 
answered with German skepticism and refusal to negotiate in good faith would 
repeat itself in the period after the destruction of Kalenga.  Whatever Governor 
von Soden might have wanted, most German officers were of the opinion that 
there could be no diplomatic solution with an African state that had inflicted such 
a humiliating defeat on a Schutztruppe column, and they acted accordingly.  
Lieutenant (and after the siege of Kalenga captain) Tom von Prince, who was the 
most important officer “on the ground” in the southwest portion of the colony, 
was explicit on this point: “From [the destruction of the Zelewski column] 
onwards, particularly as a member of the old expedition, my uninterrupted 
striving was directed at avenging the annihilation of this corps, and henceforth I 
established no station, led no expedition, engaged in no battle, did nothing official 
that would not somehow be connected with this goal.”248 
The widespread desire among Schutztruppe officers aside for vengeance 
aside, Governor von Soden and the administrators and officers on the grounds had 
to contend with conflicting imperatives: on the one hand the fiscally bounded 
nature of German colonialism (in which the budgets of each individual colony 
were debated and approved by the Reichstag), especially before the colonial 
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 economy was up and running, meant that von Soden and even von Schele had few 
resources with which to undertake an expedition.  The acrimonious debates 
unleashed by the annihilation of the Zelewski column made clear how unwilling 
German parliamentarians were to contribute unlimited amounts of treasure to the 
pacification of East Africa.249  On the other hand, the prestige of the Schutztruppe 
had been seriously tarnished, and their defeat by the Hehe meant that African 
political leaders were beginning to turn to open resistance elsewhere, particularly 
Isike’s Nyamwezi at Tabora and the Mbunga Confederacy, which bordered 
Uhehe on the east and southeast.  Terror and intimidation, so crucial as 
administrative tools in the early stages of colonialism, do not work when the “vast 
sea of Neger” is not intimidated.  As one chief of the Sagara (who themselves had 
long been targets of Hehe raiding and intimidation) put it, “These people [the 
Hehe] were the only ones able to bathe the sand with the blood of the feared white 
foreigners whose far-reaching and deadly ‘pipes of fire’ no one was able to 
resist.”250  Von Prince likewise reports that due to the fact that the shattered 
remnant of the Zelewski expedition under Lt. Tettenborn passed through Usagara, 
the hitherto “harmless” Sagara “no longer held European superiority in high 
esteem.”251  Indeed, many villages adjacent to German boma continued to send 
Mkwawa and the Hehe Empire tribute up to the destruction of Kalenga, a direct 
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 affront to the Germans prestige, legitimacy, and—importantly—their ability to 
collect revenue.252 
 
 
Strategic and Administrative Situation after the “Zelewski Catastrophe”: 
Hehe Priorities, Policies, and Constraints 
 
Many wonder why Mkwawa did not push his advantage after the battle at Lula-
Rugaro—Erick Mann, Alison Redmayne, and other authors claim that Hehe 
casualties were too severe to do anything but go on the defensive.  Indeed, Hehe 
forces did not attack the coast and did not mount any major operations against the 
Germans along their frontier (which the Germans were methodically encircling).  
Certainly, severe Hehe losses were one factor—Ernst Nigmann’s informants in 
the years immediately after the defeat of Mkwawa, as well as Redmayne’s 
informants and those consulted by the author state that losses at Rugaro were so 
severe that Mkwawa forbade the traditional mourning ceremonies out of a fear of 
demoralizing the survivors and his people as a whole.253  The exact number of 
Hehe losses is disputed.  Was it 300, 700, or 1,500?  Lt. Tettenborn (one of the 
only survivors of the Rugaro disaster) claimed that the Hehe suffered over 3,000 
casualties of which 700 were killed, but this estimate seems rather high 
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 considering the total number of Hehe participants at Rugaro.254  The scholar 
Bernd Arnold estimates that it was closer to 200-300.255  Whatever the number, it 
included many of Mkwawa’s best troops, including general Ngosi Ngosi Mwa 
Mugumba, an important subordinate ruler of Kalenga and a key member of 
Mkwawa’s command staff.256 
It also seems likely that Mkwawa hoped his diplomatic overtures (which 
will be discussed in more detail below) to Isike’s Nyamwezi, the Songea Ngoni, 
the Mbunga Confederacy, and others would help him forge an effective “anti-
Wazungu” alliance.  In this respect, there is a grain of truth to the Tanzanian 
nationalist accounts that portray Mkwawa as a “proto-national hero” who foresaw 
the need for regional unity against German encroachment years before others in 
the area would come to the same conclusion and join the Maji Maji Uprising of 
1905.  Had these efforts succeeded, the Germans would have conceivably faced a 
front stretching from Tabora in the west to Songea in the southeast, which would 
have effectively cut the colony in half.  But it was not to be—the campaigns of 
the new governor, von Schele, in 1893 and 1894 made clear in a “language that 
needs no translation” the cost of collaborating with Mkwawa or resisting German 
authority, and the complex, fluid nature of politics in the southern highlands—so 
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 well described by Jamie Monson—did not lend itself to sweeping, permanent 
alliances.257  This African political reality, one of temporary alliance by 
expediency and constant struggle for supremacy, was far more complicated and 
flexible than German observers gave credit, but the latter would over time be able 
to exploit these divisions to deadly effect. 
Beyond these issues of grand strategy, the Hehe polity had to confront 
growing German encroachment from the north and east: this creeping Avadaliki 
(German in Kihehe) advance meant that the Hehe could potentially be cut off 
from the caravan route extending from Bagamoyo to Tabora.  In order to maintain 
access to this lifeline of commerce, and therefore royal prestige, the Hehe 
continued raiding caravan traffic.  Their push northward decades earlier had been 
motivated in large by the desire to tap into the coast-interior trade network as a 
source of slaves, money, weapons, and prestige.  Indeed, the “strongman states” 
of the region had made raiding a fundamental economic activity upon which the 
emerging monarchies were dependent.  Mkwawa also had to worry about the 
defection of his erstwhile “vassals” to the Germans.  While the Battle of Rugaro 
had certainly driven home to the Kinga, Sagara, Bena and other “subject peoples” 
that Hehe hegemony was here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future, the 
growing number of German fortress strong-points along what the latter perceived 
to be the Hehe frontier offered these peoples new room to maneuver, if not totally 
out from under Hehe suzerainty at least in a manner that gave them more leverage 
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 against the Mkwawa “the butcher.”258  The Germans were, after all, just the latest 
in a series of interlopers, and the Sagara and other historic victims of Hehe 
depredations saw in them the chance to restore their autonomy (in stark contrast 
to how the Germans viewed the situation: Africans accepting “protection” from 
the Germans were supposedly ceding, not restoring, their sovereignty).  Both the 
Germans and the Hehe were locked in a deadly contest of power displays, 
competitive acquisition of “vassals,” and reciprocal massacre.  The Hehe Mfecane 
state and the emerging German colonial conquest state would grind indecisively 
against one another for the next three years. 
259 
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Between Rugaro and Kalenga: The Conflict up to 1894 in Uhehe and Beyond 
 
Since they could not directly confront the Hehe state, the German colonial 
authorities began a steady process of encirclement.  Governor von Soden sent Lt. 
Tom von Prince to the region to establish a series of new garrisons along the Hehe 
border, nominally to protect the caravan route and the Hehes' “harmless” 
neighbors such as the Gogo and the Sagara from Hehe “plunder expeditions.”260 
In October of 1891, Prince established Militärstation Kilossa near Kondoa along 
the central caravan route.  From here he hoped to prevent Hehe raiding into 
Usagara, which threatened both the all-important caravan trade towards the Great 
Lakes and the already severely tarnished reputation of the Germans among the 
Sagara, who were supposedly German allies.261  Prince was adamant that the 
Germans had to behave as if the losses suffered at Rugaro were easy to replace in 
order to restore their aura of invincibility.  Prince also informed the government in 
Dar that the Kilossa station would cut off the Hehes’ access to the important trade 
goods that came in from the Swahili coast: gunpowder, cloth, raw iron, and 
wire.262  As Glassman explains in Feast and Riot, these trade goods were the 
lifeblood of chiefly authority in this period, providing local elites and aspiring 
“Big Men” with the opportunities to demonstrate their power and to win new 
followers.263  In reference to the Hehe and Mkwawa specifically, Edgar Winans 
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 claims that the economy that Mkwawa inherited from his father Munyigumba was 
both highly predatory (like that of the neighboring Ngoni and Sangu) and highly 
dependent on access to the caravan trade, through the trade of slaves and ivory, 
the purchase of commodities, the charging of “tolls,” and—most infuriating to the 
Germans—through the raiding of caravan traffic by bands of Hehe “ruga-rugas” 
(armed robber bands).264 Cutting the Hehe off from interaction with the caravan 
trade was tantamount to downgrading their status from “Empire” to just another 
community concentrated around a has-been Big Man, dozens of whom had risen 
and fallen in the decades before the 1890s. 
While Prince’s men were building the Kilossa Station, a delegation from 
Mkwawa sought to begin negotiations, or at least a dialogue with them to see 
what their intentions were.265  Prince felt that it was imperative to show the 
Sagara that the Germans considered it impertinent for the Hehe to even attempt to 
speak to them, and he claimed that it was against his convictions to negotiate with 
them at all.266  Not only were they responsible for the humiliating destruction of 
the Zelewski column (of which Prince was supposed to be a part—Zelewski had 
sent him back to the coast with the 3rd company just before Rugaro), but 
according to him, “The negro lies far more than average; it cannot be doubted that 
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 a lie comes more easily from [their] lips than the truth…. In Schauri [the local 
Swahili word for negotiation] it is a given that he lies.”267   
 During this dialogue, which closely resembled all previous and 
subsequent attempts at negotiation between the Hehe and the Germans, Prince 
demanded that the Hehe renounce any further operations outside what he and the 
government in Dar deemed to be the Hehe border before any other points could 
even be considered.  They expected the Germans to negotiate with them as equals, 
a position that is not all that surprising considering the events of the previous 
August, when Mkwawa’s forces had decisively demonstrated their power in the 
region.268  But Prince, like Zelewski, Schele, and most other officers of the 
Schutztruppe considered the Hehe to be “Räuber” (bandits) rather than 
representatives of a legitimate state or political authority.  This criminalization of 
African opponents, which only served to exacerbate the general European 
contempt for African political structures, was the norm in dealing with “savages,” 
and it made serious discussions between the governments in Dar and Kalenga all 
but impossible.269  This inability of the “man on the scene,” von Prince, to engage 
in any meaningful dialogue with Hehe representatives is made all the more tragic 
by the fact that Governor von Soden was simultaneously attempting to initiate 
talks with Mkwawa through Monseigneur de Courmont of the Holy Ghost 
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 Missions (located near Ilonga and Morogoro).  One of their priests, Father 
Toussaint did indeed travel into Uhehe several times in an attempt to bring the 
Hehe to the peace table.270  He did his best to convince Mkwawa’s subordinates 
that the Germans only wanted peace, but the actual behavior of the units stationed 
along the Hehe frontier made it manifestly obvious that they had other things in 
mind.  And just as the Germans “reputation” (Ansehen)271 had been severely 
damaged by the battle at Rugaro, Mkwawa stood to lose political credibility in the 
event that the Germans were allowed to deny the Hehe access to the central 
caravan route and—more threatening still—if they were able to station garrisons 
among people that were once vassals, tributaries, or targets of Hehe 
“requisitioning operations.”  
 The Hehe therefore responded in late October with a series of raids 
that extended up to the Kilossa station itself, destroying Sagara villages and 
killing those Sagara unable to flee for their “collaboration” with the German 
invaders.  Raids against the Wasagara, recounted with grisly detail by Prince, 
were probably motivated by the desire to punish them for working with the 
Germans, thereby offering a harsh example to anyone who dared do the same.272   
Prince was ordered to both protect the Sagara as much as possible from Hehe 
retribution and to further extend German power by building another garrison.273  
German punitive raids struck Hehe villages and those of their vassals (it was often 
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 impossible to tell which was which) southwest of Kilossa.  As per usual in East 
Africa’s nineteenth century, third parties like the Sagara (or the Bena on the 
Sangu-Hehe frontier) suffered most in these contests, which is why the era from 
arrival of the Ngoni to the end of the First World War is known to local Africans 
as one of continual slaughter and dislocation, even if the identity of the 
perpetrators continually revolved from Ngoni, to Arabs, to Hehe, to Germans, 
to—finally—the British.274  In this case, the Hehe and the Germans were engaged 
in a tit-for-tat contest of massacre and village destruction intended to demonstrate 
which polity would have the right to gather tribute from the Sagara and from the 
caravans that passed through their territory.  As Soden had warned shortly after 
Rugaro (see above), it must have been difficult for the Sagara, the Kinga, the 
Gogo, and other “neutral peoples” to differentiate between Hehe “plunder 
expeditions” (as the Germans always referred to them) and German ones.  Indeed, 
one German directive to garrison heads notes that “because it is difficult at this 
early stage [before the official establishment of taxes] to buy the supplies we need 
from the surrounding peoples, it may be necessary to charge protection money 
[Schutzgeld] to secure necessary supplies.”275  Many people were indeed 
evacuating areas where the Germans set up garrisons, as they had a voracious 
appetite for supplies for which they often could not pay due to the 
parsimoniousness of the government in Dar es Salaam.  The term “protection 
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 money” makes clear how fuzzy the line was between criminality, illegal (Hehe) 
violence, and legitimate (German) violence for all involved. 
   In the midst of this indecisive period of raiding and counter raiding, 
Prince managed to establish a second garrison in May of 1892 about 100 km 
southeast of Kilossa at Kisaki, which was explicitly designed as a launch-point for 
operations into Uhehe.  Prince hoped to “drive back Hehe power” from Usagara 
for good, and he hoped the chain of forts from Mpwapwa (in German “Mpapua”) 
to Kilossa to Kisaki would suffice to contain any further Hehe expansion.276  
Prince intended to use the Kisaki garrison in conjunction with the units stationed 
at Kilossa to attack the Hehe and thereby make permanent their eviction from 
Usagara and impress on the Sagara, the Mbunga, and others that German power 
was not only here to stay, but it was on the march.277  After quickly building the 
boma at Kisaki, Prince prepared for a “demonstration of power” 
(Machtdemonstration) against the Hehe, an operation that—as was so often the 
case in German East Africa and in colonial Africa generally—he decided to 
undertake on his own authority with the resources he had on hand.278  The 
description of this summer 1892 operation (“Streifzug”: punitive expedition) 
focuses mostly on the trials and tribulations of his Askari as they roamed through 
the northern areas of Uhehe—they continually ran short on food, could find no 
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 “friendlies” that would provide them with provisions, and suffered from frequent 
desertion.279  His report to his superiors in Dar focused instead on the extreme 
destruction his units wrought upon northern Uhehe.  Dividing his men into four 
patrols of thirty-five Askari each, he ordered his men to march in a line parallel to 
one another “sweeping the countryside,” burning down every village they came 
across and shooting down any Hehe that “dared to show his face.”280  This 
operation was a preview of the more systematic “war of destruction” that would 
be waged by the Germans in Uhehe in 1896 and 1897 after the fall of Kalenga: 
Hehe “impudence” would be answered with terrorism, property destruction, and a 
policy of food denial through the burning of crops and shooting down of animals.  
The only reason the operation was called off was the outbreak of a revolt near 
Kilimanjaro which required the rushing of Prince’s units to the northeast.  His 
replacement, Lieutenant Heinrich Brüning (who was the son of the mayor of the 
German town of Gotha), was left at Kilossa to deal with the consequences of von 
Prince’s bloody summer “sweep and clear” operation.  
 At this point it was obvious that further negotiation with the Germans would 
be fruitless, and Mkwawa ordered a massive retaliatory strike on both Kondoa (a 
caravan town full of “Arabs,” Sagara, and Gogo) and the adjacent Kilossa 
station.281  Hehe forces annihilated a large caravan moving through the 
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 Mukondoa Valley on 6 October 1892 in a direct and flagrant refutation of German 
claims to sovereignty in the region.  Hehe units plundered and destroyed Kondoa 
village, killed the German-installed Wali (warrant chief), and slaughtered many 
Africans who had accepted German protection.  A detachment of two German 
officers and thirty-five Askari from the Kilossa Station under Lt. Brüning came 
out to meet the “plunder horde” of the Hehe destroying Kondoa, and the latter 
were driven away by several salvoes from the Askaris’ breechloaders.282  As the 
other German present, Sgt Köhler, reports, the Askari had only been issued fifteen 
or twenty cartridges apiece, so part of the patrol was sent back to get more 
ammunition.  Köhler climbed a tree to get a better view of the scene and to his 
horror witnessed a “swarm” of Hehe rushing Brüning and his men.  Several salvos 
were insufficient to halt their “inexorable advance,” and they quickly surrounded 
and fell upon the Schutztruppe patrol.  Most of the “Zulu” (Shangaani 
mercenaries) then fled for their lives, leaving the Lieutenant and four of his men 
to their fate.  Having left the safety of the fort with its high walls, rifle ports, and 
machine guns, the Schutztrupplers’ technological advantage, as at Rugaro, 
quickly turned against them: “A lack of cartridges allowed the attack of the 
overwhelming mass of Hehe to succeed, Brüning was encircled, and he died a 
hero’s death with four Zulu-Askari that held out beside him.”283  Köhler pulled 
his men back to the fort and waited for the inevitable follow-up attack.  The 
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 survivor’s barely managed to return to the Kilossa Station, and the Hehe had 
succeeded in claiming the life of another of the Schutztruppe’s German officers. 
                                                
The Hehe continued destroying “German-friendly” villages for the next 
two months until they had nearly reached the Kilossa boma itself.284  On 7 
December 1892, Köhler’s replacement, Lt. Fließbach, marched east towards 
Kondoa to investigate a report of further Hehe attacks.  The next day, an Msagara 
ran to the fort and informed Dr. Wilhelm Arning, the temporary commander, that 
200 Hehe warriors had attacked the nearby village of Munisagara.  Arning 
quickly took half the Kilossa garrison out to find the Hehe and, if possible, to 
“throw them back.”285  The Schutztruppe column soon found the Hehe in the 
Mukondogwa Valley near Munisagara.  Nearly all the villages in the valley had 
already been destroyed by Hehe raiding and “punitive expeditions” designed to 
deny the Germans allies and supplies.286  By his estimate, Arning saw between 
600 and 800 Hehe massed in the center of one of these destroyed villages, as well 
as an untold number moving above the tall grass in the valley (he saw the “glints 
of their spears everywhere”).287  The unit quickly took a position on a hill, formed 
a circle, and waited for the inevitable attack, which was not long in coming.  The 
Hehe massed and charged, staying low to the ground and using the man-high 
grass as cover.  Arning, who had about forty Askari under his command, 
estimated that about 1,500 Hehe were involved in this attack, the largest force the 
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 Germans had seen since the ill-fated battle at Rugaro.  The doctor waited until 
they Hehe were about 150 meters away before ordering the Askari to let loose 
nine salvos in a row, then gave the order to fire at will.  The charging Hehe made 
it to within fifteen paces of the Schutztruppe line, and “their throwing spears flew 
past our heads and into the middle of our circle.”288  But the wall of Mauser fire 
was enough to break the Hehe charge, and as soon as they began to route Arning 
ordered the Askari to advance and shoot them down.  The Hehe massed in an area 
of tall grass a kilometer away and began a rapid retreat with the Askari continuing 
to fire upon them.  The German detachment then attempted a pursuit, but after six 
hours Arning gave up, as the Hehe column—even while dragging their numerous 
wounded—moved far faster than the Askari with their heavy packs, rifles, and 
thick boots.  Arning was unable to estimate how many Hehe died in this 
engagement, as many of the wounded were dragged away by their comrades.  The 
tall grass made an exact count impossible, and many of the corpses were quickly 
dragged away by wild animals.  Lt. Fließbach, who rushed with all haste to the 
Munisagara to reinforce Arning’s detachment, counted dozes of corpses strewn 
about the battlefield and noted with satisfaction that there were clearly far more 
obscured by the large number of vultures swarming over the bodies.289   
The Battle of Munisagara, while it did not end Hehe raiding in the region 
and certainly did not end their ability to wage war, was in fact the Germans first 
decisive victory since the beginning of hostilities two and a half years earlier.  
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 Indeed, in the manner typical for colonial warfare, the German patrol had 
managed to drive back an opponent that outnumbered them (if Arning is to be 
believed) almost 40 to 1 without taking a single casualty of their own.290   While 
the Hehe remained the biggest threat to German power in the region (according to 
Fließbach, Prince, and Arning), after Munisagara they restricted their operations 
to attacks on the Germans allies and to small-scale raiding.  Contrary to 
contemporary and indeed current stereotypes about pre-colonial and colonial 
African warfare being static or slow to evolve, all Africans had a steep learning 
curve when it came to the devastating power of modern weapons in the hands of 
well trained troops, be they indigenous or European.  Just as the Ndebele of what 
would become Southern Rhodesia had charged machine guns and breechloaders 
in 1893 but three years later instead resorted to “cowardly” guerrilla tactics like 
slitting the throats of whites in their sleep, the Hehe never again attacked a fort or 
large German detachment head on.291  Prince lamented this situation, as it denied 
the Germans the ability to make use of their Maxim guns.  “No uncultivated (nor 
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 even a cultivated) race can withstand sustained fire by a tight column from a few 
hundred meters for long.”  The capability to “hurl 500 shots per minute” at 
oncoming, spear-equipped enemies was indeed the only way to stop far more 
numerous African attackers, even “fanatics” like the Sudanese Mahdists, as Prince 
reports having seen charging Hehe troops close a 500 meter gap in not much 
longer than a minute!292  Since the Hehe would no longer show themselves in set-
piece battles, the Germans continued their methodical encirclement of Hehe, 
building a chain of smaller, temporary forts between Kisaki, Kilossa, and Mpapua 
along the Hehe frontier, and the indecisive “dirty war” of raid and counter-raid, 
massacre and counter-massacre continued for the next twenty months.  The 
colonial state thus followed a policy of containment while the bulk of 
Schutztruppe forces focused on crushing Mkwawa’s potential and actual allies.   
 
 
Highland Politics: The Hehe Polity under Stress, the Rise of Rivals, and the 
Destruction of Potential Allies 
 
The Hehes’ crushing victory over the Germans in August 1891 was well known 
across East Africa—Africans talked about it in Usagara, Songea (the Ngoni 
capital), Bagamoyo, Tabora, and Usafwa (the Sangu capital), much to the 
consternation of European witnesses like Nigmann and Prince.   But by late 1892 
and certainly  by 1893, it was becoming obvious to all that not only were the 
Germans here to stay, their power along the Hehe frontier was growing, as was 
their presence further and further inland from the coast.  Many of the Hehes’ 
erstwhile vassals (and even more of their enemies) began to contemplate 
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 switching sides.  The Sagara, who had once lived in fear of Mkwawa and sent him 
a steady stream of tribute, now settled near the German stations and openly 
flouted the Hehe monarch’s authority.  The Sangu, who had one been the terror of 
the Hehe, Bena, and others in the 1850s and 60s, suffered greatly under both 
Munyigumba and Mkwawa after the Hehe consolidated their power and turned 
the tables in the 1870s and 80s.293  With the creeping encroachment of the 
Germans all along the north and east of Uhehe, Merere Towelamahamba (also 
known as Merere III) and his Sangu subordinates saw an unprecedented 
opportunity to turn the tables once again.  Soon the Sangu would not only be one 
of the Germans’ most important allies in the southern region of the colony, they 
would actually draw the Germans into action against the Hehe at times and places 
of their choosing.294  Even the once placid Bena and Kinga began to resist Hehe 
exactions and demands in the hope that the Germans and the Hehe would grind 
one another down.295  At the battle of Rugaro the Bena had provided over 1,000 
auxiliaries; now two years later they were beginning to refuse to even send food 
or other material tribute.296  Just as Rugaro had dramatically undermined the 
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 Germans’ ability to persuade and win local compliance, be it symbolically or 
literally by force of arms, the indecisive and bloody skirmishes of 1892 and 1893 
and the establishment of Kilossa and Kisaki were now undermining the once 
dreaded reputation of the Hehe and their leader, “the Madness of the Year.” 
 Even worse for Mkwawa, a “peace faction” emerged within the Hehe 
court under his brother Mpangile (who would indeed later replace Mkwawa as 
“Sultan of the Hehe”).297  Historically Mkwawa had handled such dissent with 
total ruthlessness (hence his praise names such as “the Butcher,” “Madness of the 
Year,” and so on), having given countless of his political adversaries—to use his 
favorite formulation—“to the vultures.”298  Now he had fewer options: his “Big 
Man” status, contingent as it was on his ability to distribute wealth and goods to 
his subordinates, was imperiled by the decline of trade goods like guns and cloth 
as the control of the colonial state over the caravan routes gradually tightened.299  
Furthermore, the vigorous German suppression of Hehe raiding and “slaving” 
among the Sagara, the Fipa, the Gogo, and others meant a sharp reduction in the 
number slaves and particularly women flowing into Uhehe.  Jan-Georg Deutsch’s 
recent work on slavery in German East Africa notes, “[The] colonial 
administration rigorously suppressed the outbreak of armed disputes between 
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 neighbouring villages and polities.  Previously these conflicts had been a major 
source of supply for slaves.”300  In some cases the Hehe had waged wars 
specifically for the purpose of obtaining captives for sale, but the vast majority of 
those taken were incorporated into Hehe society as agricultural laborers in order 
to free up nearly all males for military service.301  These captive women (most 
men were killed outright, similar to Ngoni practice) had formed the backbone of 
the Hehe agricultural labor force and had allowed social, political, and biological 
reproduction.  Indeed, when Kalenga finally did fall, one of the German 
participants reported:  
The number of prisoners of war, mostly women, is enormous.  For years a 
constant flow of these arrived from the plunder expeditions of this 
warrior-people.  Among these women one finds Mahenges, Mafitis 
[Mbunga?], Wassangus, Wassagaras, Waniamwesis, Wewembas [Bemba], 
Massais, and many others.  This explains the overwhelming amount of 
foreign blood in this people that migrated from the south…302 
 
The obvious, if slow, decline of Mkwawa’s wealth and ability to project Hehe 
power, which had seemed so inexorable to all observers in and beyond Uhehe just 
three years before, fed the flames of dissent and encouraged Mpangile and others 
to assert their authority and impose some sort of political solution with the 
Germans on Mkwawa. 
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 303 
 
While the events of 1892 and 1893 were slowly turning against Mkwawa, 
Merere Towelamahamba of the Sangu, on the other hand, saw a real opportunity 
in the arrival of the Germans and their war with the Hehe Empire.  The Sangu, 
with whom Mkwawa did not even try to conclude any sort of agreement, were 
anything but paralyzed—they quickly realized the great possibility of turning the 
German invasion to their own advantage.304  As pointed out by Jamie Monson, 
“[t]he Germans were seen as potentially powerful allies and protectors by many 
societies of the southern region.  They established alliance relationships using 
local idioms of affiliation and diplomacy.”   Merere was one of the shrewdest, 
and ultimately exasperating, of the Germans’ “allies.”  Prince met with him on 
more than one occasion under orders from the government in Dar to conclude 
some sort of agreement with the Sangu, who seemed like ideal allies due their 
location on the far western side of Uhehe and their decades-old animosity towards 
Mkwawa and his people.   Governor von Soden also made use of the recently 
arrived missionaries in the area, the Berlin Evangelical Mission Society, to open 
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 negotiations with Merere and maintain a “government-friendly” relationship with 
him.307  The relationship between the missionaries and Merere was a highly 
ambivalent one.  The chief missionary, Merensky, found the Hehe to be appalling 
and barbaric, but he likewise saw Merere as “a heathen despot” was who 
extremely cruel to his people and a ferocious slaver in his own right.308  But most 
of the Berlin missionaries argued that Merere was a useful ally, a strong “African 
Prince” who could not wait for the chance to make war on the Hehe.309  Merere 
himself wrote Soden indicating that he was eager to join in an alliance to crush 
the “Wahingi of Mkwawa,” but only if the Germans would quickly and 
substantially come to his aid.310  As is so often the case in the volatile, fluid world 
of southern highlands politics of this period, it is unclear who is using whom.  The 
Germans certainly benefited from their relationship with Merere and subsequently 
his son, both of whom provided auxiliaries and guides right up until the end of the 
German-Hehe War, but the Sangu-German alliance was probably more Merere’s 
creation than a German one.  Merere had wisely sought out the Berlin 
Missionaries as intermediaries with the governor in Dar es Salaam, knowing full 
well that the neighboring Moravians and Scottish missionaries viewed him as 
being as bad if not worse than Mkwawa.311  Merere Towelamahamba and his 
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 successor, Merere Mugandilwa (Merere IV), both continually pushed the 
Germans to formalize their alliance and wage a two-front war on the Hehe.  This 
alliance would not come to fruition until a subsequent trip by von Prince as part of 
the infamous Wissmann Anti-Slavery Expedition in 1893 and 1894.   
312 
Led by Germany’s “greatest African” and founder of the Schutztruppe, 
Hermann von Wissmann, the Anti-Slavery Expedition was funded by the Anti-
Slavery Lottery in Berlin (which in turn was funded by sizable contributions 
gathered at churches and fundraises across Germany).  Nominally, its intent was 
to explore the southwestern portion of the East African colony and to contribute 
to “the fight against the slave trade,” “the advancement of culture,” and “the 
development of the colonies.”   Noble as all of this sounded, as was so often 
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 the case in the history of the European crusade against slavery in Africa (Leopold 
II’s philanthropy in the Congo being only the most notorious case), the actual 
behavior of the expedition did little to “advance culture” and much to spread 
terror in the area around and between Lakes Nyasa and Victoria.  The expedition 
became infamous for its brutal and destructive operations around the lakes.  One 
of Wissmann’s favorite exercises was to offer recalcitrant Africans a 
demonstration of the Germans overwhelming firepower—he would assemble 
them and cut down trees with one of the expedition’s Maxim guns and warn all 
present that they could either submit to German authority or be “punished.”314  In 
one typical episode, Askari under the command of Lt. Bumiller forcibly seized 
supplies from inside the homes of local villagers: 
As soon as their goods [Lebensmittel] were taken out of their houses, they 
began making noise.  They ran along side and said: if anyone enters our 
house, we will strike him down with our spear.  To this Bwana Bumiller 
responded: I demand that…someone…come here and bring me a small 
gift.  If you all do not do this, I will lay waste to your entire country with 
fire because I do not fear your spears..  Just my two rifles would suffice to 
conquer an entire country for myself.315 
 
This same officer was the man whom von Wissmann entrusted to establish 
relations with Merere and the Sangu.  Wissmann hoped not only to enlist 
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 nominal purpose) but also to join in the grand struggle against Mkwawa and the 
Hehe Empire.  While this was in direct contravention of Governor von Soden’s 
orders not to get entangled with the Hehe as part of his general strategy of 
avoiding unnecessary military entanglements (meaning expenditures), Wissmann 
and Bumiller nonetheless encouraged Merere to dispatch messengers to the 
Songea Ngoni in an attempt to revive their old anti-Hehe alliance.  These 
messengers were, however, attacked and forced back en route by Hehe units, 
which convinced Wissmann that the Hehe intelligence network and force 
projection capabilities were too formidable to be challenged directly by the small 
German force, even with Sangu assistance.  Instead he decided to send them to 
Lake Rukwa to force the submission of Kimaraunga, a task with which Merere 
was all too happy to help the Germans, as the Rukwa warlord was a Sangu leader 
who had slipped from his control.316 
 Unfortunately for both Merere and the Germans, the Rukwa expedition 
was a fiasco.  The Sangu sent a massive force with the Germans: Selim bin 
Abakar (one of the guides) puts the number at 4,000, whereas the Germans claim 
it was os
                                                
cl er to 500.317  Either way, Bumiller’s force had so many Sangu in full 
war-regalia accompanying it that Kimaraunga and his Nyiha subjects refused to 
believe that it represented German and not Sangu interests.  The first few villages 
surrendered without a fight, but one village under chief Nzunda refused to 
capitulate.  When Bumiller seized Nzunda and several of his men in the middle of 
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 negotiations and informed the village that their headmen would be executed if 
they did not surrender, they once again refused to yield and began a vigorous 
defense against the combined Sangu-German force.318  Bumiller laid siege to the 
village and waited five days for additional Askari to arrive from Wissmann’s main 
force.  Their attempt to storm Nzunda’s village failed due to the tenacity of the 
gun- and spear-armed defenders and the formidable fortifications surrounding 
their community (featuring palisades and a massive thorn-filled ditch).  Wissmann 
then sent additional troops a cannon and a Maxim gun, but even these 
reinforcements were not enough to overwhelm the Nyiha.  Finally, Wissmann 
himself arrived and decided—making good on Bumiller’s earlier promise—that 
only fire could conquer the village.  His Askari succeeded on their second 
attempt, setting the closely-packed huts ablaze.  The Nyiha scattered and were cut 
down in large numbers by the Sangu, and Wissmann took possession of the 
charred remnants of the village that had resisted their demands and superior 
firepower for almost two weeks.  While this meant victory for the Wissmann 
expedition and his Sangu allies, it had come at such a cost that the entire operation 
was abandoned, and the Germans would not make use of Sangu troops until the 
end of 1894, and then only indirectly (more on this below).  The Sangu monarch 
died shortly after the ill-fated Rukwa campaign in late 1893, thereby ending the 
first phase of the German-Sangu relationship.  But the Sangu under Merere 
Towelamahamba’s son, Merere Mugandilwa, would come to play a crucial part in 
the German-Hehe War’s most brutal phase in 1896-98. 
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 319 
Merere and his son may have been Mkwawa’s most determined African 
foes, but another (in)famous East African “Big Man” came very close to joining 
forces with the besieged Hehe monarch: Isike of the Nyamwezi (usually rendered 
as “Siki” in German documents).  In my interview with then Education Minister 
Joseph J. Mungai, he discussed the close ties between Isike’s Nyamwezi and 
Mkwawa, including a marriage treaty cemented through the latter’s marriage to 
Isike’s sister Ilagila (who Mkwawa had heard about through the Nyamwezi who 
traded along the caravan route).  Whether the Germans knew this or not, they 
soon moved on Isike.320  They had plenty of reasons to want to cut Unyamwezi’s 
most powerful warlord down to size beyond any potential pact between Isike and 
Mkwawa.  Isike was the inheritor of a decades-long legacy of “Big Man politics” 
in west central Tanzania, the rise of the Nyamwezi, the commercial revolution of 
the 19  century, and fierce competition with the Tabora Arabs.  The Germans, 
however, believed him to be a “puppet of the Arabs” on the coast and deeply 
resented the fact that he had sent almost 500 men to the coast to assist the towns 
                                                
th
 
 319 This is a contemporary African drawing of the primary caravan routes in Tanganyika.  Tabora 
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 revolting against the Germans in 1889-90.321  Isike’s fortress town at Quikuru-
kwa-Siki (near modern Tabora) sat astride the important caravan routes to Uganda 
and to Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika, which made him, like Mkwawa, a serious 
obstacle to the “material progress of the colony.”  The fact that Isike could 
mobilize between 7,000 and 11,000 ruga-rugas made him one of the most 
dangerous Big Men in the entire colony, and any alliance with Mkwawa or any 
other African power held the potential to seriously undermine the process of 
conquest.  A period of indecisive raiding and skirmishing not unlike events along 
the Uhehe frontier, including several unsuccessful attacks on Isike’s territory as 
part of the Anti-Slavery Expedition, drove the warlord at Quikuru to seek to forge 
a pan-Nyamwezi alliance, as well as an alliance with Mkwawa by the summer of 
1892.  The attacks of the Anti-Slavery Expedition, as well as his earlier 
experience with the Emin Pascha Expedition, convinced both Isike and the 
Germans that war was inevitable.322  Isike attempted to make the first move and 
sent his son with a sizeable force of heavily armed ruga-rugas to storm the 
German garrison at Tabora.  While this was not successful, the Schutztruppe 
counter-assault on Quikuru was likewise unsuccessful.  These engagements 
convinced the Germans that they needed to both bring in more auxiliaries from 
other areas—in this case Ngoni, Tutsi, Nyamwezi from Urambo—and to strike 
alliances with local Nyamwezi chieftains opposed to Isike’s power, particularly 
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 Isike’s rival Nyaso (one of the only “Big Women” of this period).  Nyaso, like 
Merere in Usangu, saw the Germans as an opportunity to assert her authority vis-
à-vis the otherwise stronger Isike.323  A joint attack by Nyaso’s men, the Askari, 
and the auxiliaries from Urambo in August also failed to break Quikuru.  Finally a 
highly experienced detachment under Lt. von Prince was sent on December 1892 
to Tabora to recruit more Arab troops (the local Arabs also saw the Germans as 
the best way to end Isike’s dominance in the region, which had displaced their 
own in the 1880s) and to prepare to storm Quikuru once and for all. 
It was precisely at this moment that Mkwawa’s delegation to Isike showed 
up, sent by the Hehe monarch to conclude a treaty of friendship with the 
Nyamwezi that was explicitly directed against the growing power of the 
German
                                                
s.324  Isike offered Mkwawa’s representatives his sister, Ilagila (or 
“Iragila” in Prince’s rendering), in marriage and agreed to the alliance which 
could have proved so dangerous to German interests.  He simultaneously 
negotiated with Prince in order to buy time for the alliance to come to fruition.325  
It was not to be—Prince began his siege on 10 January 1893 with 66 regular 
Askari, 80 recruits from Tabora, a force of Ngoni auxiliaries from Urambo, a 
large force of Nyaso’s warriors armed with 200 rifles Prince seized from an 
incoming caravan, and a number of her men who served as porters that kept the 
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 Germans’ mortar and quick-firing gun operating.326  Isike’s fortress held over one 
thousand men, most armed with muskets (there were also about twenty modern 
breechloaders), and they held out for three days before Prince’s men—in a 
preview of events to come at Kalenga—successfully stormed the walls of 
Quikuru.  The Nyamwezi defenders had already taken heavy casualties from the 
Schutztruppe’s mortar and cannon, and their muskets were severely outclassed by 
Askari Mauser breechloaders.  Soon the German force reached the inner sanctum, 
but rather than be captured, Isike locked himself in the powder room and blew 
himself up.327  Thus ended the power of the region’s greatest warlord, and here 
Prince’s account terminates: “Whatever one thinks of Isike, he died a hero’s 
death.  If his timing had been more exact a great deal of his conqueror would have 
also gone up in the air.”328   But “family historian” Joseph Mungai and the 
historian Norman Robert Bennett claim that the display of German ruthlessness 
did not end there.  They both claim that Isike, while badly wounded, did not 
actually die in the explosion, and Prince—not content to let Isike deny him the 
satisfaction of imposing German justice upon him—had his Askari drag the 
“sultan” out to the square and hung him, half-alive, until he expired.329  Grisly or 
not, this calculated demonstration of the severe and summary justice of “Bwana 
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 Sakkarani” (Prince’s African name) and the German colonial state had the desired 
effect:  
Those who had begun fighting oppose each other, and some of them began 
spying on their brothers, revealing their secrets to their enemies.  For this 
 
Coloni f savage “frontier justice,” was 
 hold significance for the course of the 
German
                                                
reason, fighting [against the Germans] could not succeed.  For a short 
time, they fought obstinately, but then stopped after suffering great losses, 
without making any of the gains to be expected from fighting.  Many 
realized that it was better to surrender than to keep up continual opposition 
which offered no hope of success.  They realized that the Europeans had 
more powerful weapons of many kinds.330 
al state terrorism, in this case in the form o
indeed as effective as it was expedient.331 
The events near Tabora in late 1892
-Hehe War for several reasons.  Isike’s death effectively ended the 
possibility of a Nyamwezi-Hehe alliance, which would have posed a grave danger 
to German efforts across almost the entire middle of the colony, and it left 
Mkwawa almost totally isolated.  But like the German “victories” in and around 
Uhehe, the margin of success for the colonizers was a narrow one; had they failed 
to storm Quikuru yet again, or had Prince and his officers been killed in the 
explosion unleashed by Isike from the powder store, German power and prestige 
throughout the region would have been fatally compromised.  Also significant is 
that in Unyamwezi as in Uhehe, German victory only came through the colonial 
state’s interface, however lopsided, with the local political system.  Had Nyaso 
and other lesser, aspiring Nyamwezi “Big Men” (and Women) not aligned with 
the Germans for their own reasons, and had the large force of Ngoni and others 
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 from Urambo not been present, the victory at Quikuru would have not been 
possible.  State terrorism was, therefore, a policy designed to work hand in glove 
with, rather than against, a policy of collaboration with local elites and the steady 
recruitment of indigenous personnel.  After the victory of Isike, the Nyamwezi 
would come to be the one of the primary sources for new Askari and porter 
recruitment.332  In this early period of colonization, with its scant resources, lack 
of supervision, and propensity to use the Schutztruppe to solve local political 
problems, German administrative methods of necessity resembled those of the 
famous “Big Man” Mirambo.  Andrew Roberts’s statement about the nature of 
Mirambo’s authority applies to the authority of the new German “Big Men” as 
well: 
His methods were military rather than political: whereas his great 
contemporary Nyungu ya Mawe created a new class of territorial 
governors, Mirambo’s agents were essentially border guards.  Political 
authority was retained by the local chiefly families.  They might live in 
 
                                                
terror of Mirambo’s ruga-ruga; but Mirambo himself could only be sure 
of the ruga-ruga’s loyalty as long as he could provide them with cattle, 
slaves, ivory and cloth.  And once he was dead, they were no more likely 
to support his successor than any other chief who could support them.  
Mirambo had indeed realised this: he confessed to [the French missionary] 
Becker that “My headmen obey me only out of fear… as for my captains, 
they are good for nothing but fighting.”333 
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 With time, the colonial state would come to more closely resemble the 
sophisticated political and administrative system of Nyungu ya Mawe with its 
rotating, centrally-nominated governors and professional standing army.334 
Prince’s destruction of Isike’s Nyamwezi state ended once and for all the 
possibility of an alliance between the Nyamwezi and the Hehe while at the same 
time consolidating the Germans position along the northwestern flank of Uhehe.  
The southeastern flank, however, took longer to pacify and bring under German 
military control.  There the Mbunga—the seldom recognized fifth polity of the 
southern highlands region—intensified their resistance to the Germans, partially 
emboldened by the German humiliation at Rugaro.  The Mbunga “Confederacy” 
(as L. E. Larson referred to the Wambunga polity) had coalesced from the 1850s 
to the 1860s in the area between Uhehe and Songea (home of the Ngoni).335  
Originally descended from the Ndendeuli, an Ngindo-speaking group of 
acephalous peoples from southwestern Tanzania, they were driven out and then 
conquered by the invading waves of Maseko Ngoni and then the Mshope-Njelu 
Ngoni and subsequently absorbed into the Maseko Ngoni military system.336  
They were, like the Bena, Sangu, Ngoni, and Hehe, a product of the Mfecane in 
southern Africa, more specifically the Ngoni invasions from the southwest, and 
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 like their more well-known neighbors they created a political and military 
structure to provide protection during this time of profound insecurity and 
violence based on the adoption of the regiment system, the stabbing spear, and 
other Zulu innovations.  By the time of the German arrival in the late 1880s, the 
Mbunga—like the Bena, Sangu, Sagara, and others—had suffered greatly under 
Hehe expansion, raiding, and depredations.  Many Mbunga communities actually 
derived from refugee communities driven from the Mofu Sultanate.337  The 
German explorer Graf Joachim von Pfeil found many of the Mbunga leaders 
eager and willing to strike some sort of agreement with the newly arrived 
Germans in 1886: “Having arrived again in the lowlands, I found an open 
welcome among all the tribes that I know visited.  This was because people saw 
us as enemies of the Wahehe and therefore as natural allies against them.”338 
Mbunga chief Nalioto was particularly enthusiastic, even assigning a detachment 
of warriors to von Pfeil for his protection.  This delegation of Mbunga troops to 
the expedition gave Pfeil a glimpse of the potential advantages and opportunities 
to use indigenous manpower: “Here among the Mahenge [Mbunga] it seemed to 
me that a hint was given as to how we could create an armed force whose regular 
upkeep would not be our burden, but whose deployment would rest with us.”339  
Even at the time, however, Pfeil complained (as would be the case later with 
Merere and Mpangile) that he was unsure whose purposes were being served: 
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 “With cunning tactics [schlaue Politik] he [Nalioto] thought to use me, and 
through me to make the superiority of the whites serve his own purposes.”340 
Unfortunately for the colonial authorities, the Mbunga subsequently came 
to a more substantial agreement with Mkwawa and the Hehe, the latter agreeing to 
delineated “spheres of influence” and withdrawing the pressure on Mbunga 
territory.341  In 1889 the Mbunga near Kisaki supported the Abuschiri Rebellion 
on the coast, and by 1891, the Mbunga saw the German drive into the interior as a 
bigger threat to their autonomy than the Hehe, and they resisted them accordingly.  
First to be “punished” were the Kisaki Mbuga who had helped Abuschiri: in early 
1892 the Schutztruppe force establishing the Kisaki Station (see above) was 
repeatedly harassed by Mbunga raiding parties.  The response of the station chief, 
Lt. Johannes, was to have his men set all the Mbunga villages in the area to the 
torch and to drive the Africans across the Great Ruaha River into the core of the 
Mbunga confederacy.342  Von Prince departed the Kilossa Station and arrived at 
Kisaki shortly afterwards; upon his arrival he demanded that all Mbunga leaders 
report to the Kisaki station.  His letters were disdainfully ignored, and no one 
responded.343  Instead, the Mbunga massed a sizeable force in July and August 
1892 for a concerted assault into the Uluguru Mountains deep in German 
territory.  The army contained troops from all of the members of the confederacy 
and even some Ngoni, indicating that this was no mere raiding party but was 
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 rather a concerted attempt to strike decisively at German hegemony in the region.  
The German detachment at Kisaki under Lt. Johannes quickly rushed to intercept 
them and fought three ferocious and bloody battles against them, the last of which 
on 27 August is recounted in detail by Johannes in his report to his superiors.344  
The Schutztruppe force managed to inflict a decisive defeat on the much larger 
Mbunga force, killing at least 200 of them in the process (Johannes reports that 
the banana groves were littered with a countless number of bodies), and then 
drove all the Mbunga out of the Kisaki region, who numbered between 3,000 and 
8,000 before the campaign.345  He hoped that this battle and the subsequent (to 
use modern terminology) ethnic cleansing of the Mbunga from the area around 
Kisaki had “taught them a lesson that this region is no longer suitable for their 
marauding.”346  Prince, however, lamented that as with the Hehe in his district 
further to the west, “raiding can be made ineffective, but it cannot be made 
impossible.”347 
Following the battle of 27 August, some Mbunga finally sought relations 
with the Germans.  Several Mbunga chiefs, who enjoyed far more autonomy than 
their Sangu or Hehe equivalents due to the loose nature of Mbunga political 
structures, sent a letter seeking an alliance to Governor von Soden.  It is probably 
not a coincidence that the Mbunga elites that sought relations with the Germans 
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 were those who bordered Uhehe, whereas those south of the Kilombero River 
were more remote from Hehe actions and were coming under the increasing 
influence of the Mpepo Ngoni.348  The northern Mbunga hoped, therefore, to use 
German power to counteract the presence of both the Hehe and the Ngoni.  The 
leadership of the confederacy thus divided, the Germans now had their 
opportunity to strike at the heart of Mbunga power.  The new governor, Freiherr 
von Schele personally led a large Schutztruppe expedition over the Rufiji River 
from the east in late 1893.349  The German detachment achieved near total 
surprise and encountered far less resistance than expected, allowing von Schele’s 
force to quickly “restore order in the area of the Mafiti.”350  Schele’s men carried 
out a series of punitive actions and destroyed dozens of villages as they marched 
towards the center of the confederacy, and on 20 December 1893 von Schele 
forced the leaders of the Mbunga to assemble before him.  At this meeting, he 
prohibited any further “marauding, plundering, or slaving” by the Mbunga, and he 
declared them to all be “subjects [Unterthan] of the German Kaiser.”  In order to 
drive home his point, the Governor had Lubiki-w-mtu, nkosi of the Ifakara 
Sultanate and by Schele’s estimation one of the most intractable of the Germans’ 
enemies among the confederacy’s leaders, hanged in front of those assembled.  
Once again, law-giving and a demonstrative act of violence and summary justice 
were intertwined, putting German intentions and the limits of their patience in 
                                                 
348 Prince an den Gouverneur, 2 October 1892, BAB, R1001/281, 11-14. 
 
349 Bericht über die Expedition des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Ostafrika in das Gebiet des Rufiji 
und Ulanga, am Nyassasee und in das Hinterland von Kilwa, 27 March 1894, BAB, R1001/284, 
56-87.  
 
350 Schele, 459. 
 154
  155
                                                
blatant, bloody terms that needed no further translation.  The 1893 invasion of the 
Mbunga confederacy ended their resistance to the Germans after four years of 
struggle, pacifying the hinterland of Kilwa and allowing the Schutztruppe to 
further encircle the domain of Mkwawa.  Indeed, Mbunga territory would 
henceforth be the staging ground and the launch point for all further major 
operations against the Hehe.  Their defeat in conjunction with the ever cozier 
relationship between the Germans and Merere IV’s Sangu put the Hehe in a 
precarious position and would culminate in the storming and destruction Kalenga 
itself. 
 351 
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Chapter V: 
Shock and Awe—the Siege of Kalenga and the Battle of Mage (1894) 
 
…I admit in all honesty that if I had known the conditions before hand, I would 
not have undertaken the expedition with the forces I had available.  Now that we 
had come this far turning back was impossible; we could only hope that by means 
of our superior weapons and discipline we would succeed in defeating our 
opponent. 
-Governor Friedrich Freiherr von Schele, 1894353 
 
The Wahehe suddenly attacked the column as we were passing through a lightly 
forested area and…ignoring [my] 4th company passed directly in front of the 
company’s field of fire…sustaining enough casualties to force their withdrawal 
just before reaching the position occupied by Governor von Schele, the 
expeditionary staff, and a few Askari…Thank God…that we did not lose another 
commander of the Schutztruppe 
      -Lt. Tom von Prince, 1895354 
 
The Era of Schele and the Siege of Kalenga, Late 1894 
 
 Governor von Soden, the first official and the only civilian governor in German 
East Africa’s history, finally left office in 1893 after years of fighting with both 
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 his military subordinates in East Africa and his superiors in Berlin, many of 
whom felt he lacked the “martial sprit” to successfully come to terms with the 
colony’s problems.  His replacement, Friedrich Radbod Freiherr von Schele was a 
very different man and more to the Schutztruppe officers’ liking: he was a 
Prussian aristocrat with a background in both the Brandenburg and the Imperial 
German military, had been Lt. Governor in Dar es Salaam since 1891, and by 
1892 his promotion to colonel already made him the commander of the 
Schutztruppe in East Africa.355  This change in leadership was important and 
reminiscent of the significance of Governor Theodor Leutwein’s replacement by 
Lothar von Trotha ten years later in German Southwest Africa—in both cases a 
praetorian, militarily-focused commander had replaced a technocrat/legalist.  
Kirsten Zirkel’s “civil-military dualism” (the constant feuding between military 
and civilian officials in the colony) had been replaced by a new consensus that 
Mkwawa had to be humiliated and the Wahehe put in their place as soon as 
possible.  Like most officers, he considered the duty of avenging the destruction 
of the Zelewski a personal as well as a professional duty, and he methodically 
worked towards that goal from the moment he came to office in September of 
1893.  Colonel von Schele was a hawk to the core, and he and his fellow 
administrators discounted the seriousness of Mkwawa’s attempts to negotiate a 
permanent settlement in mid-1892 and 1893.  The governor reported to his 
superiors that a “punishment expedition” against Mkwawa and the Hehe should 
be launched with all due haste, as they had laid waste to and depopulated large 
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 swathes of “fertile land” (which indeed they had in their attempt to punish anyone 
working with the Germans and to deny them access to food or other supplies).  He 
furthermore argued that “all natives have an unending fear of [the Hehe]; the 
Wahehe-Question is gradually becoming a great danger for the entire colony, and 
the necessity of subjugating this tribe as quickly as possible is becoming ever 
more pressing.”356  Schele and the other officers of the Schutztruppe were not, 
however, in a position to launch a “Rachezug” or “Strafexpedition” against the 
Hehe for a further two years due to budget constraints (the colony was always 
ruled on a shoestring), the need to rebuild German forces in the region, the poor 
moral of the Askari resulting from the rout at Rugaro, and the almost continual 
state of unrest that prevailed in the colony that required the Schutztruppe’s 
constant attention.357   
 Schele considered the first order of business to rebuild and expand the 
Schutztruppe’s ranks from whatever source available.  German agents began 
moving away from their original base of recruitment in the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium (Sudan) and Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique), as both of 
these sources were drying up due to events in the colonies in question and due to 
souring relations with both Britain and Portugal in the era of Wilhelm II’s 
                                                 
356 Schele an Gouvernement, Bericht über die Expedition des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Ostafrika 
in das Gebiet des Rufiji und Ulanga, am Nyassasee und in das Hinterland von Kilwa, 27 March 
1894, Bundesarchiv Berlin (hereafter BAB), R1001/284, 86. 
 
 357 Even during the “Rachefeldzug” of 1894, Schele depicted the moral of the Sudanese and 
Shangaani Askari (imported from neighboring colonies of other European powers) as extremely 
low: “denn selbst die Sudanesen, so tapfer sie an sich sind, hatten ein gewisses Grauen vor ihren 
Gegnern, weil die Erfahrung, welche sie gemacht und die Verluste, welche sie im Kampf erlitten 
haben, doch zu Ernst gewesen waren.”  Schele, 465. 
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 aggressive new “World Policy.”358   Schele and others regretted this tapering off 
of recruitment possibilities, especially with regards to the Sudanese, who Schele, 
Nigmann, Prince, and others all regarded as the best “soldier material” and the 
most proficient killers the Schutztruppe possessed.359  To replace the losses of 
August 1891 and the campaigns that followed, the German government in Dar es 
Salaam sent recruiters to Aden, Cairo, Massawa, and Zanzibar, and they 
communicated with their consuls in Portuguese East Africa, British Egypt, and in 
the Ottoman Empire seeking to replace their losses.360  After long negotiations, 
the British grudgingly allowed another recruitment drive in Egypt to replace the 
Sudanese that fell at Rugaro and elsewhere, and the Italians allowed the Germans 
to recruit mercenaries in Massawa, the major port city of Italian East Africa (now 
Eritrea).361  But soon they shifted for practical reasons to coastal peoples who 
lived in areas of German East Africa that had been pacified the longest.  Most of 
these recruits were Muslim, which caused a good deal of missionary resentment 
over the use of Kiswahili as the language of the military and instruction, as they 
saw it as a vehicle of “Islamicization.”362 As mentioned above, the Germans also 
turned towards and to specific groups in East Africa, such as the Nyamwezi of the 
                                                 
358 See Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 (London: The 
Ashfield Press, 1980), Chapter 12, “The ‘New Course’ and Colonial Rivalries (1890-6)” and Gerd 
Fesser, Der Traum vom Platz an der Sonne: deutsche Weltpolitik 1897-1914 (Bremen: Donat, 
1996).  
 
359 See, for example, Schele 446 and 450.  
 
360 TNA G2/3 Anwerbung von Söldner für die Schutztruppe (29 March 1892 – 26 July 1894); and 
TNA G2/4 Anwerbung von Söldner für die Schutztruppe (1894-1908). 
 
361 Schele, 444.  
 
362 Marcia Wright, “Local Roots of Policy in German East Africa,” Journal of African History, IX, 
4 (1968): 621-630. 
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 Tabora region, who they viewed as good “soldier material” (the German analogue 
to the British notion of “martial races”).363  While at first very few locals would 
join the Schutztruppe, the more established it became, the more appealing it 
became for those who would rather pacify than be pacified.  For some it was a 
way out of slavery, for others it was a question of money, and for some it was a 
way to keep and enhance one’s “martial honor” in a context in which war between 
local peoples was now prohibited.364   
For the Nyamwezi, who came to compose one of the largest contingents of 
local soldier sin the Scutztruppe, service as Askari was in part a continuation of 
their previous role as the dominant porters on the caravan route, in both cases 
working for wages and asserting their autonomy vis-à-vis other African groups.  
Particularly once the railroad began replacing porter-bound caravan traffic (after 
1910), Nyamwezi men joined the German colonial military in ever growing 
numbers.  Ernst Nigmann and other Schutztruppe instructors drilled these new 
recruits incessantly until they were able to stand fast in the face of shrieking 
attackers who outnumbered them ten or more to one.365  By early 1894, the 
Schutztruppe numbered nearly 2,000, having more than replaced the catastrophic 
                                                 
363 See the entries in the Kolonial-Lexicon on Nyamwezi, Ngoni, Hehe for a discussion of the 
suitability of “certain races” for military service. See also Das Deusche Kolonialreich: Eine 
Länderkunde der deutschen Schutzgebieten, ed. Dr. Hans Meyer, (Leipzig: Verlag des 
Bibliographischen Instituts, 1909), vol. 1 Ostafrika und Kamerun, 71-81 on the “peoples of East 
Africa.” 
 
364 See Deutsch, Chapter 7: “Negotiating Social Marginality”; Mann, 229-41; and John Iliffe, 
Honour in African History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapter 13: “The 
Honour of the Mercenary.”     
 
365 See Ernst Nigmann’s manual of the training and effective use of Askari in combat with 
indigenous opponents, Felddienstübungen für farbige (ostafrkanische) Truppen (Dar es Salaam: 
Verlag von der Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, 1910).  See also Schele an Caprivi, 25 
September 1893, BAB, R1001/283, 145. 
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 losses suffered at Rugaro, and Schele felt confident that he had sufficient forces to 
crush the Hehe once and for all.  
 366  
 
 
Schele first had to crush the recalcitrant Mbunga in the campaign 
described above—this operation not only allowed him to further encircle Uhehe 
but also gave him a base from which he could launch his assault and—most 
importantly—requisition and stockpile provisions.  The Schutztruppe garrisons in 
                                                 
366 Weule, Negerleber, 467 and Uwe Timm, Deutsche Kolonien (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch 
Verlag, 1986), 58.   The top image is of Sudanese recruits awaiting “processing” in Dar es Salaam; 
the one on the bottom is of Askari engaged in rifle training in full uniform. 
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 the Mahenge (Mbunga) district and all along the Uhehe frontier began doing 
exactly that, seizing food supplies in such large quantities that many Mbunga in 
the area actually starved to death, food security having always been an issue in the 
extreme political and ecological environment of the 1890s.367  Across East Africa 
in this period a series of environmental catastrophes—locusts, cattle-killing 
Rinderpest, sand fleas, and severe drought—both enabled and were made worse 
by the arrival of the European colonial invaders.368  This was in part related to 
global developments, namely the major shift of ocean currents that occurred 
several times in the late nineteenth century that unleashed famine and death across 
much of what would become the “Third World.”369  There were also causes of 
this major demographic upheaval more local to East Africa, namely the severe 
disruption by colonial conquest of indigenous methods of ecological control such 
as irrigation, the burning back of bush, and the culling of disease transmitting 
wild animals.370   Helge Kjekshus argues that German “pacification operations” 
pushed many communities over the edge, even beyond those killed by actual 
                                                 
367 The missionary Basilus Ferstl claims that the Mbunga were exaggerating the extent of their 
hunger, though he admits that they were “very inhospitable and did not want to give us a thing.  
They claimed to have nothing but hunger.”   Basilus Ferstl, “Ein Spaziergang nach Uhehe, 
“Missionsblätter von St. Ottielien (Ottilien, Oberbayern, 1897): 137-8. 
 
368 The Germans themselves reported widespread famine and misery throughout 1894 and 1895 
wrought by a vast swarm of locusts.  “Linderung der Hungersnoth,” DKB 5 (1894): 481.  
 
369 See Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third 
World (London: Verso, 2001).  
 
370 See James L. Giblin, The politics of environmental control in Northeastern Tanzania, 1840-
1940 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); Custodians of the Land: Ecology & 
Culture in the History of Tanzania (London: James Currey, 1996); 370 Thaddeus Sunseri “Famine 
and Wild Pigs: Gender Struggles and the Outbreak of the Maji Maji War in Uzaramo (Tanzania),” 
Journal of African History, 38 (1997): 235-59; and Helge Kjekshus, Ecology Control and 
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 371 
combat or execution, leading to the starvation of untold thousands of Africans.372  
This inadvertent famine policy was furthermore in many cases augmented by a 
deliberate famine policy (which will be discussed much more in the next chapter), 
meaning a systematic policy of food denial and scorched earth.  This was how 
Prince and Schele fought the Mbunga and likewise how they would wage war in 
Uhehe after 1894.  Despite the hardship it caused, the Germans also stockpiled 
food all along the Hehe frontier, filling their stores in Ulanga, Kisaki, Kilossa, and 
elsewhere.  As discussed in chapter two, in 1891 it had been the Hehe who 
enjoyed logistical superiority over Zelewski’s ill-fated expedition; by 1894 a 
combination of logistical support from the metropolis (case after case of brass 
cartridges and artillery shells supplied by the world’s fastest growing industrial 
power) and provisions “requisitioned” locally closed the gap between the Hehe 
with their elaborate garrison and stockpiling system and the Schutztruppe. 
The Germans also sought to address what was perceived by many as the 
second major failing of the 1891 campaign, i.e., poor intelligence.  Several 
additional years of military operations in East Africa along with the ever-growing 
                                                 
371 Weule, Negerleben, 307.  Image of a villager’s mangled feet caused by sand fleas (known in 
the U.S. as “chiggers”).  
 
372 Kjekshus, 137-51 
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 missionary presence meant that the Schutztruppe enjoyed far better access to 
information about local conditions and politics than three years prior.  Also 
helpful was the ever-denser local political network built up by the Germans: their 
alliances with Merere IV, the northern Mbunga chiefs, and others provided them 
with knowledgeable indigenous guides and auxiliaries, which had been distinctly 
lacking when Zelewski had set out from Bagamoyo in June of 1891 looking for 
“Mafiti, Wahehe, and other plunderers.”  Also in the Germans’ favor was the fact 
that some Hehe actually helped the Germans (as, most notoriously among the 
Hehe, Mkwawa’s brother Mpangile would after the fall of Kalenga).  Joseph 
Mungai tells the story of a Mhehe named Mtaki.  He might be a metaphor for any 
of a number of perceived “collaborators” with the invading Avadaliki, but he is 
also mentioned by the local Iringa historian Richard Kitime.  Mungai claims that 
Mtaki had been crucial in the initial forging of a relationship between the “Arabs” 
and the Hehe in the late 1880s, and that he had been made a sub-chief as a 
reward.373  Thereafter he was one of the supervisors of the construction of the 
lipuli (fortress) around Kalenga.  He was also (again supposedly) the one who 
brokered the marriage between Isike’s sister Ilangila and Mkwawa.  Mungai 
claims that in mid-1893 in the wake of the Hehe attacks on Kilossa, Kisaki, and 
Kilimatinde, Mtaki was sent by Mkwawa and his ministers to Dar es Salaam to 
negotiate with the Germans.  There, the Germans as per usual demanded 
Mkwawa’s unconditional surrender.  It was at this point that Mtaki allegedly 
proposed assisting the Germans and himself ruling Uhehe after Mkwawa’s defeat.  
It was Mtaki who would then show the Germans an alternate route for attacking 
                                                 
373 Interview with Minister Mungai, 25 August 2005. 
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 Kalenga, one that Mkwawa’s troops would suspect far less than the direct route 
taken by Zelewski in 1891.  The Germans were also assisted by several other 
local “scouts” (Mungai says there were four, one of whom was Mtaki) on their 
march towards the Hehe capital in October 1894.  Whatever the specific details of 
these “collaborators,” it is clear from the oral evidence and the account of Prince 
and his wife after the fall of Kalenga that an ever-growing number of Hehe saw a 
chance to better their situation through accommodation to the harsh but 
sometimes lucrative realities of German rule.   
374 
 
After Rugaro, Mkwawa massively reinforced Kalenga with “Arab” 
assistan
                                                
ce: he ordered that the walls be extended, the ramparts and palisades be 
further built up, and new defenses such as a double ring of deep trenches filled 
 
374 Redmayne, 421.  
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 with thorn bushes be dug all around Kalenga.    By late 1894 the Hehe occupied 
the most formidable stone structure in the southern highlands and probably in all 
of German East Africa.  The walls were five kilometers around and four meters 
thick with a bastion every 100 meters.  The foundations are still visible at the 
Kalenga village today (see photographs below).  Mkwawa believed that the Hehe 
army could fight from behind cover with long-range weapons like the Arabs on 
the coast (who had maintained forts there since the seventeenth century after 
forcibly evicting the Portuguese), or indeed like the Germans in their bomas.375  
The Kalenga lipuli was certainly formidable enough to withstand any attack by an 
African opponent, and as events would soon show, it was even difficult to take by 
a force armed with the latest weapons from Europe.  Overall and with the benefit 
of hindsight, however, remaining in the fort was probably a major mistake—had  
376 
Mkwawa evacuated the city and forced the Germans to pursue him even deeper 
into Uhehe, it is likely that Schele’s column would have run out of supplies and 
would have had to return to German territory without the satisfaction of 
                                                 
375 Interview with Minister Mungai, 25 August 2005,  
 
376 Foundation of the east wall of the Kalenga lipuli in the contemporary town of Kalenga, Iringa 
District, taken by author, 15 August 2005.  
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 “punishing” the Hehe.  Remaining in Kalenga also negated the Hehe army’s two 
greatest advantages over the Schutztruppe with its long supply chains and heavy 
equipment: surprise and mobility.  Redmayne, Kitime, and Mungai believe that 
Mkwawa simply could not imagine the sort of intense bombardment made 
possible by quick-firing artillery when properly positioned, as the Hehe had never 
confronted anything like this before. 
377 
 
By late 1894 the Governor felt prepared to finally lead a major expedition 
against
                                                
 the Hehe, and he assembled a column of thirty-three German officers, two 
Maxim machine guns, 609 Askari, four cannons, and 1000 porters.378   This force 
was one of the largest ever assembled in colonial East Africa until the First World 
 
377 Richard Kitime (blue shirt) and our driver standing on what is left of the foundation of the 
 This was large by colonial standards before the turn of the century.  Indeed, it was far larger 
lipuli’s wall at Kalenga town, taken by author 15 August 2005.   
 
837
than the column annihilated three years earlier at Rugalo.  By way of comparison, the Upper Volta 
Region of West Africa—an area significantly larger than metropolitan France—was conquered by 
only a few hundred French troops.  See Mahir Şaul and Patrick Royer, West African Challenge to 
Empire: Culture and History in the Volta-Bani War (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001). 
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 War, and Schele was confident that it would be sufficient to teach the Hehe a 
lesson once and for all.  He claimed that his “shock and awe” campaign would 
quickly drive into Uhehe, reach Kalenga, and force the Hehe to fight a large set-
piece battle that would lead to their annihilation.379  In addition to the 
overwhelming power of the main column under Schele’s command marching into 
Uhehe out of the east from Kisaki and the Ulanga valley (thereby avoiding the 
route taken by Zelewski in 1891), the Governor ordered the garrisons at Tabora, 
Ulanga, Kilossa, Kisaki, Langenburg, and Mpapua to deploy their units—
seventeen Europeans and 517 Askari in total—in a broad arc around Uhehe to 
prevent any escape to the north.  Another company was sent to Lake Nyasa to 
prevent any escape to the southwest, and Merere IV made good on his promises 
of assistance and deployed a large force of Sangu all along the Hehes’ western 
frontier.380  It was a truly monumental operation in terms of logistics, planning, 
and coordination; August 1891 had made it abundantly clear that nothing less 
would suffice. 
From the very beginning, however, almost nothing ran according to plan.  
Schele 
gathering enough food and porters next to impossible.  Locusts and drought had 
                                                
recounts a series of mishaps that occurred both before and after the 
columns departure from the rally point at the Ulanga Station (in what had once 
been the Mbunga confederacy).  The aforementioned climactic calamities—
exacerbated as they were by the presence of such a large, voracious army—made 
 
379 Schele an Reichskanzler, Bericht über den bisherigen Verlauf des Feldzuges gegen die 
Wahehe, 1 December 1894, BAB, R/1001285, 108-10.  
 
380 Auswärtiges Amt an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 10 November 1894, BAB, R1001/285, 76. 
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 destroyed whatever food the Germans could not requisition, and the Schutztruppe 
force could only gather enough food for the trip to Kalenga; there would be 
nothing for the trip home.381  Similar if not quite as extreme scenes of hardship 
awaited them in Uhehe, both due to the presence of locusts and the fact that 
Mkwawa’s forces would inevitably destroy food stores and crops in advance of 
the German army.382  Further worsening the Germans’ supply situation was a fire 
that broke out on 26 September 1894 and destroyed much of the accumulated 
supplies in the Ulanga Station’s storehouse: this fire ruined all the spare cannon 
barrels and sent much of the army’s food up in smoke.  Despite these supply 
problems, Schele’s lumbering column set off from Ulanga on 19 October, and 
they reached the outskirts of the Kalenga fortress nine days later on the 28th.  The 
sight that greeted the Schutztruppe contingent shocked even the most seasoned of 
the “old Africans” (as the more experienced white officers were called).  Kalenga 
was far larger and more sophisticated than anything they could have imagined 
with its four meter thick walls, palisades, and bastions.  Surrounding most of the 
fortress was a deep, broad dry moat filled with thorns which made a direct 
                                                 
381 Schele, 460-2. 
 
382 Schele, 460-2. 
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 383 
approach nearly impossible.  Schele also reports that the city was defended by 
untold thousands of Hehe.  Indeed, between the scale of the fortifications and the 
number of defenders, Schele frankly states:  
…I admit in all honesty that if I had known the conditions before hand, I 
Schele deployed moved his force to about 500 meters of the wall, had his men 
build a temporary palisaded fort out of thorn bushes, and sent his machine 
gunners up into nearby trees so they could rain fire down on the inside of the 
fortress.  Finally, he sent a detachment of men with the 6.7cm artillery piece to the 
hill at Tossamaganga.  This large hill, whose name means “place from which 
stones are thrown” to commemorate the events being described presently, would 
later be the home to the Benedictine Catholic Mission (featured in Alfons 
Adams’s Im Diesnte des Kreuzes).   It is located about 11km (by road) 
                                                
would not have undertaken the expedition with the forces I had available.  
Now that we had come this far turning back was impossible; we could 
only hope that by means of our superior weapons and discipline we would 
succeed in defeating our opponent.”384   
 
385
 
383 Diagram from Schele, Organisation.  Cross-section of one of Kalenga’s bastions. 
4 Schele, 465.  Schele and other observers were astonished at the size and formidability of the 
 Adams, Im Deinste des Kreuzes, op. cit. 
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Kalenga fortifications, which he had “bei den Negern nicht vermutet.” Schele, 472.  
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 southwest of Kalenga, and it gave the Germans a perfect view of Kalenga. With 
Mtaki’s guidance (again according to Mungai), the Germans took up position here 
and prepared their 6.7 cm cannon.  Kilometers away from the Hehe positions, 
they began shelling Kalenga at their leisure, causing much loss of life and 
destruction, as many of the shells landed inside the wall among the densely 
packed tembes (maze-like, clay structures in which the Hehe lived).  Here one 
sees one of the most decisive advantages of European-equipped armies over 
African ones, though all too often (as at Rugaro) they were not in a position to be 
used.  Mkwawa’s seemingly formidable, entrenched position at Kalenga in fact 
made a perfect target, a mistake repeated by others elsewhere.386 
387 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
386 The French conquest of the Western Sudan was characterized by a series of sieges in which the 
armies of African states hid behind massive mud brick walls, which the French proceeded to 
knock down with quick-firing artillery time and time again. 
  
387 Contemporary view of the Benedictine Mission on Tossamaganga hill, taken by author, 15 
August 2005. 
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 388 
 
Contrary to Schele’s hopes and expectations, this intense bombardment by 
artillery and machine-gun fire was not enough to break the Hehes’ “fighting 
spirit”; to his horror, the effect of most of the shells that struck the wall “was 
exactly zero.”389  This fact combined with their dwindling supply of food left the 
German force with no choice—they would have to storm Kalenga directly.  Over 
the next few hours, the Schutztruppe units methodically leap-frogged closer and 
closer to the wall under a hail of musket fire and—once they got closer—
throwing spears.  One unit under Lt. Jany launched a feint attack further south, 
which successfully drew several hundred Hehe out of the fort and away from the 
100 meter section where two detachments, one under Lt. von Prince and one 
under Lt. Elpons, were preparing to make their assault.  Fortunately for the 
attackers, the Hehe had not completed the thorn-trench in one section on the 
                                                 
388 Contemporary from Tossamaganga hill facing to the northeast towards Iringa at the 
approximate place where the Germans positioned their 6.7 cm field-gun, taken by author, 15 
August 2005.  The Kalenga fort would have been visible—and vulnerable to shelling—from this 
position.  
 
389 Schele, 466. 
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 southeast side (see map above), and this allowed them to approach and scale the 
wall.  At 4:30am on 30 October 1894, Schutztruppe units poured over the wall 
into Kalenga with the Maxims providing covering fire and engaged in close-
quarter, house-to-house fighting for several hours.390  By early afternoon the 
Askari had made it to Mkwawa’s citadel in the center of Kalenga, Hehe resistance 
ceased, and victory was declared.   
391 
Upon his return to coast, Schele telegraphed Berlin with the results of the 
expedition: “150 enemies buried, many others burned in the houses, Iringa 
destroyed.”392  Taking Kalenga had cost the Schutztruppe relatively little: one 
European officer (Lt. Maaß) and eight Askari killed, four Europeans and forty-
four Askari wounded.393  After the end of the battle, Schele ordered the entire 
down set to the torch and destroyed.  This burning of Kalenga made determining 
the number of Hehe casualties impossible, as most of the corpses were incinerated 
in the ensuing blaze; Prince was certain that it was in the “many hundred,” and 
                                                 
390 Elpons, 76-7 and Prince, 298-303.  
 
391 Diagram from Schele, Organisation.  This view from the southeast is where von Schele’s 
forces broke through into the fortress. 
 
392 Telegramm Scheles an Reichskanzler, 19 November 1894, BAB, R1001/285, 86. 
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 Schele later calculated that it was no less than 250 and probably many more394  
The punitive expedition also seized a sizeable amount of loot from Kalenga, 
including 2,000 head of cattle, 5,000 goats and sheep, between 15 and 20,000 
pounds of black powder for muskets, 10,000 Marks worth of cloth, and between 
80,000 and 100,000 Marks worth of ivory (most of it from Mkwawa’s personal 
storehouse).395  Indeed, the Germans seized so much ivory at Iringa (and at Isike’s 
boma, discussed in chapter four) that the colony as a whole reported a marked 
upswing in export revenues from the sale of that ivory abroad.396  Schele also 
reported the “liberation” of “1500 women and children, mostly stolen slaves 
(from caravans)…”397        
398  
 
Despite Schele’s enthusiastic reports back to Berlin, what seemed to be a crushing 
victory over the Hehe was, in fact, anything but.  This destruction of Kalenga 
aside, the Schele expedition achieved neither of its primary goals, namely the 
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395 Schele, 469.  
 
396 “Die Entwicklung von Deutsch-Ostafrika während der letzten zehn Jahre,” DKB 11 (1900): 
180.  
 397 Bericht Scheles vom 1. Dezember 1894, DKB 6 (1895): 39-44. 
 
398 Diagram of Mkwawa’s inner sanctum from Schele, Organisation.   
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 capture of Mkwawa or the destruction of his army—the Hehe monarch slipped 
out of the fortifications with the majority of his 3,000 soldiers during the battle.  
There is a debate as to how Mkwawa responded to the storming of his mighty 
fortress.  When Alison Redmayne gathered oral evidence on the fall of Kalenga in 
the 1950s and early 1960s, some claimed he was so despondent that he sought to 
blow himself up (like his brother-in-law Isike the year before).399  He does seem 
to have been paralyzed.  Mungai claims that his generals had to dissuade him 
from suicide and practically drag him out through the wall.400  It is also said that 
his last act in Kalenga was to order the execution of Chanzi, the “soothsayer” who 
had predicted a Hehe victory in the battle.  Whatever his immediate reaction, 
Mkwawa and most of his army melted away into the countryside of Uhehe.  
401                       402 
After Kalenga: The Battle of Mage 
                                                 
399 Alison Redmayne, “The Hehe,” in Tanzania before 1900, op. cit., 53. 
 
400 Interview with Minister Mungai, 25 August 2005.  
 
401 Monument to Schutztruppler Lieutenant Erich Maass who died during the storming of the 
Kalenga lipuli, 30 August 1894.  Taken by author, 15 August 2005. 
 
402 Plaque on the Erich Maas monument.  Taken by author, 15 August 2005. 
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 Governor Friedrich Freiherr von Schele and his commander, Tom von Prince 
                                                
waited several days after their seizure and occupation of Mkwawa’s massive 
walled city at Kalenga on 21 October 1894.  Governor Schele was totally 
convinced that, surely, the Germans overwhelming victory at the battle of 
Kalenga would force Mkwawa and his generals to negotiate a surrender.  Indeed, 
common wisdom about colonial wars said that one had to either destroy the 
Africans’ army or—more likely—seize their ruler’s Residenz as a concrete 
demonstration of the colonizers’ overwhelming ability to project and enforce their 
political will.403  In his attempt to examine and explain the truisms of colonial 
warfare as learned by the Germans in East and Southwest Africa, General H. 
Rohne argues that precisely because Africans seldom posses a “standing army” 
that can be encircled and destroyed in the manner advocated by Clausewitz in On 
War, the most efficacious means of defeating indigenous forces is to capture and 
hold their capital.  “[In colonial warfare Proper armies] do not exist—which is the 
rule—but the people do possess a recognized supreme leadership, therefore the 
conquest of the residence can suffice to break [their] resistance.”404  Only in 
dealing with “uncivilized peoples” and “savages” (Wilden) like the Herero and the 
Maasai, who unlike the Hehe did not possess a clear Oberhaupt, was it necessary 
 
403 Typical in this regard is the treatment of the subject by Colonel C. E. Callwell in his Small 
Wars: Their Principles & Practice, 3rd Ed. (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1906), 97-
107.   
 
404 Generalleutnant H. Rohne, “Über die Führung von Kolonialkriegen,” Vortrag, gehalten in der 
Versammlung der mitarbeiter des Militär-Wochenblattes am 8. Mai 1905, Beihefte zum Militär-
Wochenblatt 1905, ed. V. Frobel, Generalmajor (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1905), 
252. 
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 405 
to engage in widespread property destruction.406  Another preeminent expert on 
and practitioner of colonial warfare, Major Carl Zimmerman (who had extensive 
service experience with the Schutztruppe in Cameroon), likewise noted that the 
bombardment and storming of African cities and residences was generally more 
than sufficient to force them to surrender.407  Africans had supposedly ceased to 
                                                 
405 Schele’s depiction of the battle of Mage.  Schele, appendix.  
 
406 Rohne describes Wissmann’s (Germany’s so-called “First African”) “very reasonable” war of 
destruction against the Maasai in 1890, during which his Sudanese—fresh from their successful 
defeat of the “Arab Revolt” along the coast—collected all the cattle they could and shot the ones 
they could not: “The savages, who felt their property threatened, begged for mercy on their knees 
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 even bother building fortifications since the Germans’ arrival due to the 
“impression made by our superior weapons and methods of waging war.”408 
 Much to Schele and Prince’s consternation and contrary to the 
received wisdom regarding “war against savages,” Mkwawa and the Hehe defied 
German expectations, for reasons discussed below.  The Schutztruppe’s victory 
had indeed been decisive—Schele’s telegram to Berlin claimed that he had 
“buried 250 enemies, burned many houses, and destroyed Iringa,” as well as 
seizing 7,000 animals, and 3,000 kegs of gunpowder.409  Lt. Prince estimated that 
the number of Hehe killed amounted to “several hundred.”410  Perhaps most 
importantly he had taken 1,500 women and children prisoner, many of whom 
were members of Mkwawa’s or other chiefs’ lineages.  These noncombatants 
were held as hostages, in many cases until the cessation of hostilities in 1898, and 
they became the first of thousands of civilians taken into custody and resettled by 
German authorities in and around their stations (which amounted to a late 
nineteenth-century equivalent of “strategic hamlets”).411  By Schele’s own 
admission, Mkwawa and the majority of his 3,000 warriors had escaped the siege 
of Kalenga, but the governor fully expected the loss of property and the 
possession of hostages to be more than enough to bring Mkwawa to beg for terms 
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 of surrender.412  Schele and his massive column waited for days for some sort of 
signal of Mkwawa’s readiness to capitulate to German demands, but, much to the 
Germans frustration and astonishment, “not a single person showed up.”413  After 
almost two weeks of waiting among the smoldering ruins of Kalenga, Governor 
Schele felt he had no choice but to pull out without either defeating Mkwawa or 
establishing a permanent military station in the area.  His supplies were running 
low, as the demands of his column—the largest the Germans had ever assembled 
in East Africa to that date with 33 German officers, 609 Askari, over 1000 porters, 
and now 1,500 hostages—were voracious.  More worrisome, another uprising had 
broken out in the hinterland of the southern coastal city of Kilwa under the 
leadership of the “infamous slave trader” Hassan bin Omar, who had attacked the 
Kilwa station in the governor’s absence and almost succeeded in storming it.414  
Governor Schele ordered his Askari to destroy the city, setting the remaining 
structures to the torch, and on November 3rd the lumbering column set off towards 
the coast, denied the decisive victory that Schele had been predicting since his 
ascension to the governorship the year before and that nearly all Schutztruppe 
officers had called for since the Zelewski disaster of 1891. 
 It was therefore all the more ironic that, much to the horror of the 
leaders of the “victorious” column, they almost suffered a repeat of the August 
1891 ambush of the Zelewski column in almost the exact same location, which 
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 von Schele’s expedition passed on the 5th of November.  On 6 November, east of 
Lula-Rugaro near Mage, Hehe forces attempted to ambush and destroy Schele’s 
column—they had regrouped after evacuating Kalenga and moved swiftly to 
encircle and annihilate the German led column, a tactic they had honed in decades 
of brutal and at times disastrous conflict with the Ngoni across the southern 
highlands.  Mkwawa and his generals hoped to turn what had been an unmitigated 
disaster for the Hehe state into a last minute success, as indeed they had on more 
than one occasion during the Sangu and Ngoni wars.  Several hundred of 
Mkwawa’s best soldiers and officers rushed past the Schutztruppe column 
undetected and prepared an ambush, hoping to achieve another surprise victory 
over the AvaDaliki.  And indeed, on the morning of the 6th they caught the 
lumbering German column, part of which had not even left camp yet, largely by 
surprise.  Schele admits that he failed to send reconnaissance patrols ahead of the 
main column onto the Mage mesa because “half of the column had not left the 
encampment yet.”415  The head of the avant-garde moved into an area of thick 
bush—much as at Rugaro—and was attacked by a detachment of Hehe at close 
range.  Governor Schele, who heard the firing from several hundred meters away, 
was then informed that another force of 500 Hehe was rushing the column from 
the begin the edge of the mesa.  At this point he only had his “boys,” a translator, 
and his standard bearer with him and was largely unguarded: 
The attack happened so surprisingly that, since I had mistakenly sent the 
third group forward [leaving Schele himself unguarded], I had no means 
whatsoever of countering an attack available to me.  There was nothing 
left to do other than to shoot into the thick swarm of the enemy, who did 
not come directly at me, but rather flew past me and pounced on the 
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 porters, supported by my boys who kept handing me new rifles, and my 
translator and flag bearer.416 
 
Ironically enough, perhaps because Schele’s group was so small and unprotected, 
the Hehe did not seem to notice that they had missed their chance to surround and 
slay another commander of the Schutztruppe only kilometers away from the spot 
where Zelewski had been attacked and killed under similar circumstances.   
This time, however, the Schutztruppe force was far larger, more 
experienced, and the Askari were allowed (unlike at Rugaro) to march with their 
Mausers loaded and at the ready.  The Hehe ambush was also far more hastily 
prepared, and they had fewer warriors available with which to execute it.  Tom 
von Prince described the Mage ambush: 
The Wahehe suddenly attacked the column as we were passing through a 
lightly forested area and…ignoring [my] 4th company passed directly in 
front of the company’s field of fire…sustaining enough casualties to force 
their withdrawal just before reaching the position occupied by Governor 
von Schele, the expeditionary staff, and a few Askari…Thank God…that 
we did not lose another commander of the Schutztruppe.417 
 
Several waves of Hehe warriors charged the hastily created German-Askari 
formation at the front of the column, but unlike at Rugaro, the Askari were able to 
methodically launch salvo after salvo of 11mm ammunition into the Hehe ranks. 
During the chaos, several of the women taken from Kalenga managed to escape, 
and several of the porters were wounded or killed.  Another wave attacked the 
right flank of the German force, and it too was answered with several volleys of 
rifle fire.  Once these Hehe flanking detachments had been driven back, the 
colonial troops noticed hundred more waiting in reserve and fired upon them from 
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 1,000 meters away.418  The Hehe withdrew, and the Askari were unable to engage 
in any pursuit without abandoning the governor and the rest of the column.  
Prince notes that while ultimately the Battle of Mage ended in a decisive victory 
for the Germans, the battle could have easily gone the other way had the Hehe 
more completely surprised the Schutztruppe column (the terrain was not as 
favorable as at Lula-Rugaro), had they been able to assemble more men for the 
attack, or merely if the force that attacked from the rear had discerned the identity 
of the lone Mzungu accompanied by a small band of “boys,” a translator, and a 
flag bearer.  Nigmann, Prince, and other German observers claimed that the Hehe 
suffered severe losses at Mage, which only added to the demoralization caused by 
the Battle of Kalenga two weeks before, though this was difficult to prove as the 
Hehe only left behind thirty bodies.419  “Also on this occasion we did not find a 
single wounded [Hehe], further evidence for the fact that the black, even if 
wounded severely, can move long distances with wonderful tenacity.”420  That the 
Hehe did suffer severe losses is confirmed by the oral evidence compiled by 
Alison Redmayne in the 1960s, and Joseph Mungai likewise says that Mage was 
nearly as traumatic for the Hehe military as Kalenga (which they escaped intact if 
not unscathed).  Indeed one of Mungai’s ancestors along with countless other 
Hehe fell at the battle of Mage.  While we do not have even an approximate count 
as to the number of Hehe dead or wounded suffered in the failed ambush, the oral 
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 evidence implies that these may have been nearly as bad as the losses suffered at 
Kalenga itself.421 
While many Schutztruppe officers were pleased that Mkwawa had finally 
been humiliated by the force of German arms, colonial critics back in Berlin in 
the Reichstag sharply condemned the 500,000 Reichsmark budget deficit 
[Etatüberschreitung] caused by the expedition.  Those parliamentarians already 
inclined to criticize the government and its colonial policy were appalled at more 
than just the fiscal excess brought about by Schele’s operation—they attacked the 
inhumanity of the now generalized practice of seizing (“liberating”) female and 
children hostages and transferring them to the coast or to fortified villages near 
German garrisons.422  The Social Democrat August Bebel, always the determined 
opponent of the government’s policies condemned the practice as “a barbarity of 
the first order” [eine Barbarei ersten Ranges] and called for an end to hostage 
taking and forced resettlement.  Both practices would, in fact, soon become 
routine in Uhehe.  In another parallel with the situation in German Southwest 
Africa a decade later, Governor Schele was awarded the Orden pour le Mérite by 
the Kaiser, but he was also recalled to Berlin in an attempt to quiet the storm of 
criticism that his expedition had caused. 
 The destruction of Kalenga was for the Germans ultimately a pyrrhic 
victory: Hehe resistance would continue for another four years.  As the official 
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 history of the Schutztruppe put the matter, because Mkwawa and his followers 
after the Battle of Kalenga began to wage a guerrilla war [Kleinkrieg] against the 
colonial authorities, henceforth the German tactic would have to be “to isolate 
Sultan Quawa to rob him of his followers, to turn these to the side of the 
government, and to wage war against Quawa personally.”423 Thus began the 
move to harsher measures and scorched earth policies, eventually carried to their 
extreme by Governor von Liebert.  As Erick Mann puts it, Schutztruppe officers, 
after Rugaro and even more so after the fall of Kalenga “conducted their military 
operations with even more terror and destruction of civilian centers and 
agricultural areas, so as to re-establish the image of the Schutztruppe’s 
invincibility.  These destructive tactics were played out to the fullest between 
1894 and 1898, during the final phases of the war.”424  Indeed, the growing 
frustration with Mkwawa’s and Hehe resistance leads the Schutztruppe to 
recourse to far more violent and destructive tactics after the fall of Kalenga.  
Likewise, after the fall of Kalenga and particularly after the establishment of the 
German garrison at “New Iringa,” Mkwawa would resort to ever more brutal, 
“irregular” tactics, mostly directed at those Hehe who chose to work with the 
emerging colonial state in Uhehe.  These methods and the Germans’ response 
gave the events of 1896-98 the character of a not only a guerrilla war, but also of 
a civil war in which at least as many Hehe fought on the side of the AvaDaliki as 
on the side of the ruthless, “wonderfully tenacious” Hehe monarch.  This cycle of 
attack and reprisal would leave much of Uhehe in ashes by the end of the 
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German-Hehe war.  This dark and difficult period is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
 
425 
 
Chapter VI: 
Guerrilla War and Scorched Earth in Uhehe (1895-1898) 
 
From this point on a dreary, two-year guerrilla war prevailed, which to be sure 
offered no more large battles, but whose demands still claimed a large number of 
lives of those operating in small groups, on patrol, on transport duty, or serving 
as messengers 
        -Ernst Nigmann, 1911426 
 
The stomach is what affects the negro the most, and this reality would help me 
years later in bringing the harsh mentality of the Hehe under German rule, to 
impose order on them, which allowed neighboring peoples to live in security. 
-Captain Tom von Prince, 1914427   
 
 
The previous chapter ended with the destruction of the Hehe fortress at Kalenga.  
Chapter three dealt with the Germans’ attempt at fighting a war of maneuver; 
chapters four and five examined their war of position and their putatively 
successful siege of the Hehe fortress at Kalenga.  This chapter, on the other hand, 
deals with the German counter-insurgency war against Mkwawa and his allies 
after the fall of Kalenga in October 1894.  This phase of the conflict, which is 
generally the least discussed due to the lack of any large, set-piece battles between 
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 the Hehe and Germans, was in fact the most brutal phase of the war and the time 
during which ordinary Hehe suffered most (a suffering that is still vividly 
recounted today by their descendents).  German anti-guerrilla strategies included 
concentration of the “enemy” population, the execution of “Mkwawa 
sympathizers,” and the destruction of crops, homes, and livestock leading to 
famine and the spread of epidemic disease.  It was also the time when German 
political maneuvering finally brought thousands of Hehe over to the Germans’ 
side.  The chapter ends with the death of Mkwawa and Germans’ final victory 
over the Hehe, which guaranteed them dominance over the southern highlands of 
Tanzania.  The order they imposed on Uhehe, however, could best be described in 
the words of Tacitus in his characterization of the Roman counter-insurgency war 
against the ancient Britons: Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus 
imperium; atque, ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.  “To ravage, to 
slaughter, to usurp under false titles, they call empire; and where they make a 
desert, they call it peace.” 
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 428 
 
The Situation in Uhehe after the Fall of Kalenga 
At the same time that Schele’s enormous column was massing at Ulanga, another 
battle between the Hehe and the Germans took place on the other side of the 
colony.  As was mentioned in chaper four, the garrison at Tabora had been 
mobilized as part of the broader containment operation all along Uhehe’s northern 
frontier.  To this end, the station chief at Tabora, Kompagnieführer Herrmann, set 
forth in September 1894 with five Europeans, 100 Askari, and one cannon to face 
off against the nearly 2,000 Hehe that were at that time laying siege to the 
“government-friendly” village at Usseke.429  Herrmann hoped to drive these Hehe 
back and attack their fortress-garrison (“Quikuru”) at Konko, thereby keeping 
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 them occupied and unable to come to Mkwawa’s aid at Kalenga.  The 
Schutztruppe detachment surprised the Hehe besieging Usseke and drove them 
into “wild flight, some of them even leaving behind their shields—which among 
the Hehe are as decorated as among the ancient Romans.”430  Herrmann’s attack 
on the Quikuru at Konko on 13 October 1894, on the other hand, was a bloody 
and protracted affair.  The Schutztruppe only managed to overwhelm the Hehe 
garrison after ten hours of brutal combat at point blank range, and Lt. von 
Bothmer as well as six Askari “died a heroic death” in the operation.  
Kompagnieführer Herrmann himself, the company doctor (Dr. Preuß), Sgt. 
Richter, and twenty-four Askari were also wounded.431  The Battle of Konko was 
one of the first engagements in which the Germans used Askari entirely 
indigenous to German East Africa, and Hermann reported that the locally born 
Nyamwezi had proven themselves to be every bit as brave and effective as the 
Sudanese, and perhaps even better.432 
The success at Mage and Konko aside, the Schele expedition achieved 
none o
                                                
f its primary goals, namely the capture of Mkwawa, the destruction of his 
army, or the establishment of a permanent military strongpoint in Uhehe, which 
would have to wait another eighteen months.  As if the failure of the colony’s 
hitherto largest expeditionary force to force the “Sultan” of the Hehe into 
submission were not enough, the specifics of the expedition brought a storm of 
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 criticism down upon the colonial government and on Schele specifically.  
Colonial critics in the Reichstag, already highly sensitive to news from the Hehe 
front after the “catastrophe” of August 1891, sharply condemned the 500,000 
Reichsmark Etatüberschreitung caused by the column’s efforts, and others 
attacked the inhumanity of what would soon become the generalized practice of 
seizing (“liberating”) female and children hostages and transferring them to the 
malarial coast or to fortified villages.433  Even parliamentarians generally 
sympathetic to the government’s arguments about the necessity of and difficulties 
associated with the colonial project in Africa were appalled to learn than von 
Schele’s expedition had already spent nearly the entire budget allocated for the 
following year in a matter of a few weeks, a fact made all the worse by the 
ongoing conflict with the Hehe and with Hassan bin Omar’s forces near Kilwa.  
The Social Democrat August Bebel, who had been scathing in his criticisms of the 
mistakes that led up to the destruction of the Zelewski column, went beyond mere 
condemnation of the government in Dar es Salaam’s profligate spending and the 
failure of the Schele column to achieve any meaningful victory.  He now 
condemned the practice of hostage taking and the transfer of prisoners to more 
secure (and generally unhealthy) areas as “a barbaric act of the first order” (eine 
Barbarei ersten Ranges), and he demanded that the Chancellor and Governor von 
Schele explain their actions, as hostage taking and mass deportation were hardly 
policies becoming of the putative “civilizers” of East Africa.434 
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 Although Governor von Schele was granted the Orden pour le Mérite by 
the Kaiser, the financial debacle unleashed by the 1894 Hehe Expedition 
combin
was wasteful led to his eventual recall without any explicit refutation of those 
         
ed with his failing health (he had become ill while campaigning during the 
rainy season of 1893, probably while fighting the Mbunga Confederacy) led to his 
recall by the authorities in Berlin on 26 April 1895.435  The fact that he was 
awarded the Kaiserreich’s highest military medal of honor for a campaign that did 
not bring decisive results, had nearly ruined German East Africa’s treasury, and 
was characterized by critics as one of “barbaric acts of the first order” is perhaps 
suggestive of the lack of accountability enjoyed by German officers in the field 
regardless of their performance or the potentially criminal nature of their actions, 
particularly in the colonies, so vividly described by Isabel Hull and others.436  
Indeed, a decade later, General Lothar von Trotha would be granted the same 
honor under similar circumstances during the German-Herero War in Southwest 
Africa, during which he encircled but failed to defeat the Herero at the infamous 
Battle of Waterberg.   Similarly, the storm of protest unleashed by his inhumane 
treatment of Herero women, children, and the elderly and claims that his strategy 
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 policies.  It should be noted, however, that some colonial militaries were even less 
accountable than the Schutztruppe, whose metropolitan superiors at least had to 
explain themselves to the Social Democrats.  The Force Publique of Leopold II’s 
Congo Free State—so graphically depicted in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and 
Adam Hochschild’s King Leopold’s Ghost—could and did depopulate entire 
districts larger than all of Belgium with total impunity. 
In the case of East Africa, von Schele was replaced with none other than 
Hermann (recently elevated to von) Wissmann, the original founder of the 
Sudanese and Shaangani Wissmannische-truppe and Germany’s most famous 
Africa explorer, who would rule the colony as governor from April 1895 until 
December 1896.  Wissmann, who had a reputation for “vigorous action” and total 
ruthlessness gained from his defeat of the “Arab Revolt” from 1889-1890 and of 
the Maasai in 1890, was quite explicit that the Hehe were a continual threat to 
German interests.  Wissmann had been eager to attack the Hehe and avenge the 
death of his protégé Zelewski since 1891 and, as mentioned in chapters three and 
four, in 1892 then acting Governor von Schele had forced “Reichskommisar H. 
Wissmann” to desist in any attempt to go after the Hehe while the latter was on 
the so-called “Dampfer-Expedition” (during which Germany’s “greatest African,” 
as he was known by the 1930s, brought a steamship in pieces to Lake Nyasa in 
order to explore the region and in theory fight the slave trade).  Now three years 
later as governor, he hoped to provoke a conflict in order to “remove Mkwawa 
from his position” and install a more quiescent successor.  Should this fail, he and 
Prince intended to “shatter the Hehe Empire into its small component tribes” (das 
 192
 Reich der Hehe in ihre kleinen Sonderstämme zu zersplittern).437  Based on his 
extensive experience in East Africa and with “pacification” in particular, 
Wissmann fully expected to be able to eradicate the “Hehe-menace” in a timely 
fashion during his tenure as governor, but like his two predecessors, he was to be 
disappointed by the tenacity of Hehe resistance and the continued sway of 
Mkwawa’s leadership over his nominally defeated people. 
438 
Governor Wissmann 
  
 
Mkwawa and the Hehe State after Kalenga  
Far fro efeat as Schele had anticipated, Mkwawa and 
his supporters decided on a two-track policy.  On the one hand, rather than face 
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 the Germans directly in battle as in the unsuccessful counterattack at Mage, Hehe 
ce tough fear or otherwise.  The station chief at Kilossa, Freiherr 
von Sc n
                                                
forces would settle into dogged, guerrilla-style resistance against the Germans.  
Mkwawa ordered his forces to avoid pitched battles, to continue raiding official 
and caravan traffic, to attack isolated German patrols, and to harass the growing 
but still scattered and incomplete network of German boma, or fortresses.439  On 
the other hand, Mkwawa would continue his attempts to negotiate with 
encroaching German authorities.  While the destruction of Kalenga certainly 
made an impression on the Hehe and on their neighbors in particular (who 
increasingly saw the Germans as the eventual victors in the struggle with 
Mkwawa), the fact that almost the entire Hehe army had escaped and that 
Mkwawa and his forces were allowed to reoccupy the Kalenga site almost 
immediately convinced Mkwawa that the Germans could still be forced to come 
to some sort of compromise.  The Hehe moved back to Kalenga and began the 
partial rebuilding of the royal lipuli, if not on the same scale as before the siege of 
October 1894.   
 Mkwawa faced a similar situation to that confronting the Germans 
after Rugaro—a decline in prestige and the sharp reduction of his ability to 
impose complian
he ck, reported that, in the wake of the German victory at Kalenga, many 
of the jumbe (chiefs) in his district were now accepting the German flag and the 
“protection” of the colonial state.  “The constant fear of the Wahehe, which up 
until had hindered every activity and development among the inhabitants of 
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 Kondoa, has now almost completely disappeared.”440  Von Prince reported a 
similar decline in the fear of the Hehe among local people near the Kilimatinde 
Station (near Konko).441  The decline of Mkwawa and the Hehes’ reputation 
should, however, not be overstated.  While it is clear that Merere IV and the 
Sangu—who were busy annexing territory in western Uhehe with the approval 
and indeed assistance of the Germans—as well as many Bena no longer feared, or 
at least no longer respected, the authority of the once dreaded Mkwawa, most 
Hehe continued to obey him in the year and a half following Schele’s leveling of 
Kalenga, and many would continue to do so even after the establishment of the 
Iringa garrison by von Prince in May 1896.  Tribute continued to flow to the royal 
court from Hehe vassals, and Mkwawa was still able to field and command troops 
drawn from the male populace of Uhehe.  More problematic than the fealty of 
“ordinary Wahehe” were the aspirations of Mkwawa’s younger brother, Mpangile 
(also rendered as “Mpangire” in some German documents) and his allies.  After 
the disaster at Kalenga, Mpangile pushed for the abdication of his older brother, 
blaming him for the catastrophes that had befallen the Hehe in 1894.  While 
nothing came of this “treason” initially, a year and a half later when the newly 
promoted Captain Tom von Prince returned to Uhehe to found “New Iringa,” it 
would be Mpangile who would be selected to be the new Hehe “Sultan.” 
 
German-Hehe Relations after Kalenga 
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 However much von Schele’s successor in Dar es Salaam, Hermann von 
Wissmann wanted to crush the Hehe once and for all, like Soden and Schele (in 
his first year as governor), he was soon forced to concede that the colony did not 
utright.  Indeed, he was also directly 
                                                
have the resources to defeat Mkwawa o
ordered before his departure from Germany that “now finally this constant waging 
of war would have to end.”442  This recognition of reality meant that Mkwawa 
found in him a willing negotiating partner, at least initially.  In May of 1895 
Mkwawa sent a peace delegation to Kilossa, and Wissmann entrusted the station 
chief, Lt. Georg von Elpons, with the negotiations.  As had been the case in 1892 
and 1893, the negotiations dragged on with no conclusion for months. This time, 
however, an agreement was actually reached between Elpons and Mkwawa’s 
representatives on 23 December 1895.  Mkwawa agreed to subject himself to the 
Kaiser’s supreme authority and to return any prisoners-of-war or weapons he still 
had in his possession.443  He also agreed to cease any operations beyond Uhehe’s 
jointly recognized border.  In return, the Germans recognized Mkwawa as the 
supreme authority in his territory, and they agreed to return several Hehe 
prisoners taken in October 1894.  The official organ of the Colonial Department, 
the Deutsches Kolonialblatt, went as far as to declare: “According to the 
conviction of experts, the marauding attacks of the Hehe may be at an end, peace 
may reign, and trade and traffic may now be open.”444  It looked to many on both 
 
442 Alexander Becker, Aus Deutsch-Ostafrikas Sturm- und Drangperiode: Erinnerungen eines 
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 sides as if peace would finally prevail in and around Uhehe after four and a half 
long years of bloody and indecisive warfare between Mkwawa and the German 
445 
colonial state.446  Had this agreement been honored by both sides, it might have 
laid the foundation for a form of “indirect rule” in the southern highlands.  Such a 
situation was not beyond the realm of possibility, as the Germans would soon 
come to precisely this sort of an arrangement with the powerful, highly 
centralized, Great Lakes monarchies in Bukoba, Urundi, and Ruanda.   
But there were problems on both sides.  Elpons reports that at one point 
during the negotiations, Mkwawa declared his unwillingness to appear at the 
Kilossa Station in person out of fear that it would be a trap.  When his brother 
Mpangile eagerly offered to come in Mkwawa’s place, however, the latter 
threatened Mpangile with death.  “According to statements by chiefs in this area, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
445 Wissmann negotiating with Africans during the “Arab Revolt,” 1890. Uwe Timm, Deutsche 
Kolonien (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch Verlag, 1986), 17.  
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 Quawa
     
 is full of mistrust for his close relatives.  He believes that Mpangire wants 
to align himself with the Germans in order to eliminate him.”447  Mkwawa’s 
paranoia was well known even before the disasters of 1894—now it reached a 
fever pitch (with justification as it turns out, at least as regards the ambitions of 
his brother).  Mkwawa also feared the rapacity of his neighbors and former 
vassals.  His bitter rival, Merere IV, was obviously scheming to annex large 
portions of western Uhehe and still enjoyed excellent relations with the Germans.  
The treaty between the Hehe and the Germans declared that the latter had the 
responsibility of mediating disputes between local powers, but this was cold 
comfort to Mkwawa and those subordinates that remained loyal.  Eight months 
after the signing of the treaty, a letter from Mkwawa to Lt. Engelhardt dated 1 
August 1896 laments not only Merere’s marauding and violence, but also 
complains about the “once-loyal” Bena chiefs who by 1896 had been openly 
flaunting Mkwawa’s authority for over three years.  Mkwawa requested German 
permission to “teach them a lesson.”448  The Germans, for their part, did even 
more to undermine the agreement.  Although Mkwawa had explicitly proclaimed 
his legal and symbolic subjugation to German authority, the authorities in Dar es 
Salaam held fast to their demand that a military station be established in Uhehe, 
despite the fact that it was well known that Mkwawa would consider such a move 
as an act of war.449  In addition to Governor Wissmann’s unwavering conviction 
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 that troops had to be garrisoned in Uhehe, many local German officers continued 
to demand a war that would result in their “total submission.” 
Knowing full well what the result would be (having been warned by von 
Elpons and others of the inevitable consequences), Wissmann nonetheless gave 
the order to Capt. von Prince in May of 1896 to establish a military station near 
Kalenga (now referred to by the Germans as Old Iringa).  In the event that 
Mkwaw
                                                
a resisted Prince’s attempt to establish this station, the captain had orders 
to respond immediately “with violent means” and to remove Mkwawa from the 
territory.  Thereafter he was ordered to replace Mkwawa with a more German-
friendly monarch, or—in the event no one suitable could be found—to divide the 
Hehe Empire into pieces (in the event the Germans would end up doing both).450  
As Elpons had predicted in his reports of the previous year, Mkwawa resisted 
what he considered a violation of the spirit if not the letter of the December 1895 
agreement.  In Prince’s mind, his drive into the heart of Uhehe was only directed 
at Mkwawa personally, who he considered to be a bloodthirsty tyrant (indeed, he 
had vowed his overthrow in 1891), and not at the Hehe as a people.  He at least 
hoped to limit any operations directed at the populace.451  Prince gave the Sultan 
ten days to comply and allow the construction of a station near the Kalenga 
fortress, and a Hehe delegation negotiated day after day with the Germans.  Prince 
claims that he “tried everything peaceful,” but it became obvious after ten days 
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 that Mkwawa was just stalling for time.452  He therefore launched his attack as per 
Wissmann’s and Bennigsen’s (the lieutenant governor) instructions in the middle 
of the discussions with the Hehe: on 31 August Prince’s detachment assaulted 
Mkwawa’s camp, catching the Hehe by surprise.  The result was a rout as the 
Hehe “scattered in wild flight,” and the Askari began an “energetic pursuit.”453  
Prince hoped to drive Mkwawa into less populated areas and then hunt him 
ruthlessly so that he and his men would have no time to prepare one of the 
surprise counterattacks for which the Hehe were by now justly famous.  
Henceforth, the government in Dar considered Mkwawa a “deposed rebel,” not a 
“sultan” with any legitimate political or legal standing. Prince’s superiors ordered 
him to arrest Mkwawa and initiate legal proceedings against him for his numerous 
“acts of murder.”454  Just as Hehe troops operating against the Germans in 1891-
1894 had been criminalized as “bandits” and “marauders,” thereby obstructing 
Hehe attempts to negotiate with the Germans as equal opponents in a legitimate 
armed conflict, Mkwawa and his supporters could now expect nothing other than 
German summary justice meted out against them as if they were common 
criminals.   
In the course of the next few weeks, Prince’s units continued their pursuit 
of Mkwawa and his men, and they engaged in a series of “one-sided bloody 
encounters” in which at least 500 Hehe were killed.  Additionally, 50 men, 600 
                                                 
452 Kompagnieführer Prince, “Ueber eine Zug nach der Landschaft Uhehe und the Begründung 
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 women, numerous children, and 8,000 head of cattle were seized.455  These 
prisoners were either held as hostages to compel Hehe men still in the field to 
surrend
                                                
er or sent to “government villages” near the newly established Iringa 
Station, which lay about two and half hours from what was henceforth known as 
“Old Iringa” (meaning Kalenga).  Prince’s lieutenants (von Stocki, Graf Fugger, 
and Glauning) brought a steady stream of captives and body counts to “New 
Iringa,” and cattle and other livestock were seized as part of a policy of food 
denial designed to starve Mkwawa and his soldiers into submission.456  Prince 
remarked with pride that “[t]he belief of the Hehe in Quawa, who now could not 
even protect his cattle was shattered; the dense organization that made the Hehe 
and their tributaries so dangerous has been loosened.”457  Upon observing the 
speed and dexterity with which the Bena, Sangu, Kinga and others entered 
negotiations with the new master of Iringa, Prince claims that they “express 
surprisingly clear political terminology for negroes,” once again demonstrating 
the profound contempt and lack of understanding on the part of the Germans for 
indigenous political structures.458 
Prince quickly moved to consolidate political and military control over 
Uhehe.  In October, Mpangile came to the Germans and struck the alliance with 
them that Mkwawa had always feared—Mpangile was made head of central and 
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 eastern Uhehe, and western Uhehe was separated and given to Merere IV as a 
reward for his and his father’s participation in hostilities against the Hehe since 
1892.  That this meant handing over Bena villages to a ruler who was as feared 
and detested as Mkwawa was of little consequence to the Germans, further 
contributing to the impression of third party observers that the German-Hehe War 
was just a sordid tale of oppressors replacing each other one after the other.459  By 
November 1896 ninety percent of Mkwawa’s soldiers had laid down their arms, 
and Prince declared the region to be pacified: “the tasks assigned to me are 
complete.  Quawa has been removed and is followed by very few loyalists.”460  
Prince believed that hostilities were now over and that he could begin the real 
work, namely the economic development of the Iringa District.  
The new ruler of Iringa was indeed correct in that there would never again 
be any set-piece battles between the Hehe and the Germans.  But he and his 
superiors were to be severely disappointed—in January 1897 Mkwawa began a 
protracted, bitter guerrilla war against German power and anyone who  
461 
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 collaborated with it in Uhehe.  He attacked smaller military outposts, ambushed 
supply trains, attacked patrols, and murdered “German-friendly” Hehe in large 
numbers.  Terrain is everything in waging (and winning) guerrilla conflicts, and 
Uhehe was tailor-made for a prolonged partisan war with its numerous valleys, 
hills, and caves.  Mkwawa and his supporters also knew this terrain infinitely 
dreary, two-year guerrilla war [ ] prevailed, which to be sure offered no 
those operating in small groups, on patrol, on transport duty, or serving as 
always cold-bloodedly snuck by units right next him on watch, or he 
refused to provide our troops a single piece of information, lied about the 
ght to deliberately lead us 
 
  
could not refuse him.  The troops pursuing him managed to surprise 
                                                
better than their German pursuers (though the latter could increasingly make use 
of “government loyal” Hehe guides).  As Nigmann put it, “From this point on a 
Kleinkrieg
more large battles, but whose demands still claimed a large number of lives of 
messengers.”462  Quoting Prince, Nigmann continues:  
This officer [Glauning] managed to follow Quawa for weeks on end 
through the bush without any trails.  It soon became clear that Quawa 
slipped between the lines of patrols.  He was able to do this whenever the 
population sustained him while on the run.  Quawa was in fact always 
provided with food, supplies, and news while these same inhabitants 
obvious signs of Quawa’s recent presence, sou
astray, among other things.  It gave the impression that the people were
active participants in all of this, because in spite of the constant and rapid 
change of Quawa’s position, there always existed a close correspondence 
between his movements and the behavior of the indigenous people.  In the 
middle of the bush while on Quawa’s trail we would find meals and local 
beer placed out [for Mkwawa].  The people always knew where Quawa 
was to be found, in which direction he was moving, which points he 
would pass.  It often happened that Quawa would dismiss his exhausted 
retinue—usually 20 to 30 men and more women—and simply take the 
entire population of the nearest village with him [as replacements].  
Overall it was obvious that he exercised considerable personal influence 
over the local people, because in spite of any threat to their lives they 
Quawa’s caravan several times; but in these cases the locals threw 
themselves against the attacking soldiers, offering up themselves in 
 
462 Nigmann, Geschichte, 55.  
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 sacrifice and thereby giving Quawa time to take flight.  A planned capture 
of his persons was therefore unthinkable, no one know what he looked 
like.463  
escription that is all too familiar with those acquainted with the history of 
ars” (to use De Gaulle’s formulation—la sale guerre—in reference to the 
 War) in the twentieth century.
 
It is a d
“dirty w
Algeria
familia
late ni
were r
igmann.  Euro-American commanders from the Philippines to Cuba, Rhodesia 
to South Africa, Aceh to New Zealand were locked in struggles very similar to the 
one now facing the Schutztruppe.   In all of these cases, the “cowardly tactics” 
of the insurgents encouraged the occupiers to engage in ruthless wars of attrition, 
as the situation described by Prince above led them to the conclusion that victory 
could only come by waging war on entire populations in order to force them to 
stop supporting the “bandits.”  If the guerrillas were “fish in the ocean,” (to use 
Mao’s famous formulation) and the local populace was the water, then 
government forces would have to (as Chiang Kai-shek put it) “dry up the sea.” 
                                                
464  Prince’s contemporaries were also quite 
r with the sort of war he was describing.  Across the colonial world in the 
neteenth and early twentieth century, countless indigenous insurgencies 
esisting foreign occupation in the manner described by Prince and 
N
465
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 Over the course of the period from late 1896 to mid-1898, the 
Schutztruppe under the command of Capt. von Prince operating out of the New 
Iringa Station waged precisely this sort of war of attrition against Mkwawa, his 
followers, and any civilians perceived to be giving them aid. Mkwawa’s 
“banditry” and “marauding” infuriated the Germans, and his attacks and murders 
pushed them to retaliate with ever growing ferocity, creating a frightening and 
destructive spiral of reciprocal violence and atrocity.  Wissmann’s failing health 
led to his departure from the colony on 3 December 1896, and it would be up to 
his replacement, Eduard von Liebert to bring the vicious Kleinkrieg to its 
conclusion.467  Liebert, who was the first member of any unit in the German  
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7 Kolonial-Lexicon, vol.3, 721.  
 
46
 
 205
 468 
colonies to make it to the rank of general, was a military man like Schele and 
Wissmann.  He had taught at the military school in Hannover before becoming a 
staff officer to the Hanoverian army, and he subsequently commanded a regiment 
in Frankfurt an der Oder.  He was also very sensitive to the rapidly evolving pro-
colonial faction in the Reichstag and their constituents, whose interests he claimed 
to represent, particularly with regards to the “settlement question.”  As the new 
governor he was now determined to “put an end to the matter” of Mkwawa and 
continued Hehe resistance.  The conflict with the Hehe, which Liebert refered to 
alternately as “little war” or, more often, as “Pori-Krieg”—derived from the 
Kiswahili word for bush—had already dragged on far too long and had cost too 
many lives, German and African (meaning both Askari and local allies).469  
“Quawa and his followers, who had fled into the extensive mountainous terrain of 
                                                 
468 Typical path through the “bush” in East Africa—and ideal terrain from which to fight an 
insurgency.  Weule, Negerleben, 313.  
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 Utschungwe and Ukalinga, attacked the small German military posts, set fire to 
the locations surrounding the German stations and led prisoners and cattle off into 
the mountains,” thereby “making the subjugation and pacification of large tracts 
of Uhehe and Ubena as difficult as possible.”470  As he frankly put it, “the 
protracted resistance against German overlordship [Oberherrschaft] has already 
cost Quawa the possession of his empire, has made him into a restlessly shifting 
bandit captain, and undoubtedly must yet cost him his body and his life.”471  He 
immediately proclaimed a 5,000 Rupie (worth nearly 8,000 Reichsmark) bounty 
on Mkwawa’s head.  By way of comparison, the bounty on the feared Nama 
guerrilla leader Hendrik Witbooi eight years later in Southwest Africa was only 
5,000 Reichsmark.  But as was the case with his predecessors, it would take 
Liebert nearly half a year to gather the necessary Askari, porters and supplies for a  
472 
substantial expedition into Uhehe—until then Captain von Prince would be on his 
own, supported by the adjacent Kilossa, Ulanga, and Kisaki garrisons as well as 
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 the numerous smaller stations that left the Germans spread extremely thin on the 
ground.  Prince’s forces relentlessly hunted Mkwawa throughout 1897 with no 
success, despite the ever growing number of Hehe auxiliaries now working for the 
Germans, brought over to the Germans’ side by his constant and tireless 
negotiation with the evolving local leadership.  As his wife, Magdalene von 
Prince, reports, her husband spent at least as much time in tense and complicated 
Schauri (negotiation) with the Hehe elite as he did in the field hunting for the 
“rebels.”   
Magdalene von Prince’s diary also vividly described the perpetual sense of 
unease and fear that the inhabitants of New Iringa felt during this period of 
constan
                                                
t harassment and attack by Mkwawa and his insurgents.  Her account 
offers perhaps the most vivid and detailed account of this final, protracted period 
of the German Hehe War..473  Almost daily, she reports that Askari and jumbe 
loyal to the Germans turn up murdered by Mkwawa’s insurgents, an experience 
that deeply shook the Princes, as some of these “loyal Africans” had been their 
friends for six months or more.474  She also reports Mkwawa’s ruthless and, for a 
time, highly effective campaign of terror against Bena and other non-Hehe 
Africans that had sought protection in or around the station.475  Mkwawa’s agents 
even succeeded in killing the brother of Chief Kiwanga, the most important Bena 
“collaborator” with the Germans in the era before Maji Maji.  The constant fear 
 
473  Magdalene von Prince, Eine deutsche Frau im Innern Deutsch-Ostafrikas (Berlin: Ernst 
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 felt by the Germans at the Iringa station was enhanced by the fact that “[i]t is 
difficult here, to tell friend and foe apart.”476  Magdalene von Prince had a keen 
understanding of Mkwawa’s attrition strategy: 
Quawa has ordered the Wahehe to strike down everything that gets in their 
the whites, then to disappear into the 
way, caravan traffic, post, traders, etc., to murder all Wahehe friendly to 
Pori [bush] so that it would wear 
down the Germans and they would withdraw.  In this manner he wishes to 
 
She is 
haunted ne way: with the 
their annihilation, they began this struggle through their murderous deeds.  
rward aggressively, because Tom’s humane 
policies were held by the Hehe, who are accustomed to Quawa’s cruelty, 
 
Magda
Mkwaw the Germans and their 
African subjects were ever to know a moment’s peace. 
                                                
drive us form the land.  He can terrify us, he proves that daily—but we 
will remain nonetheless…  When one is back home in Germany, one 
thinks that it is easy to finish these Neger, they are after all lowly 
creatures, that it would be a small matter to rule them.  Now I wish that 
everyone who holds this view (as I earlier did) could be hear to see that 
people without an education  are also very clever.477   
clear that this constant sense of fear and resentment—Mkwawa even 
 the Europeans in their dreams—can only end o
annihilation of one side or the other. 
We stand in a genuine struggle for our existence.  The Wahehe wanted 
Now it is a matter of going fo
to be a sign of weakness.  The nights are horrible.  Today I could not sleep 
at all because the calling up of patrols droned through the night and kept 
me awake.  I am incidentally not doing well.  Winkler and Stierling also 
are not sleeping well because they dream of the Wahehe, murder, and 
being beaten to death, despite their iron nerves. 478 
lene echoes the opinions of the other Europeans in the Iringa garrison: 
a and his insurgents had to be “annihilated” if 
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 Bad as things were militarily, politically things did not go well for the 
Germans either.  Having nominated Mpangile to the position of “Sultan” on 
Christmas Day 1896, by February 1897 Prince suspected that Mpangile was, in 
fact, g
 
                                                
iving succor to the enemy and was still in contact with Mkwawa.  He 
decided that Mpangile was a traitor and had him executed with three of his 
relatives.479  Prince briefly considered placing Merere IV in charge of all of 
Uhehe, but quickly reconsidered and decided not to nominate anyone to the 
position of “Sultan of the Wahehe.”  The Hehe would not live under a monarch 
until the British period, when they nominated Adam Sapi, Mkwawa’s son, to be 
the “warrant chief” of the Hehe as part of their policy of Indirect Rule.  
 In June of 1897 Liebert assembled a sizeable force to “explore” Uhehe and to 
put an end to Mkwawa’s “marauding.”  The governor wanted to tour the region 
first and foremost in order to assess its economic potential: Schele had declared
Uhehe to be a “most valuable object of exploitation for us,” and Elpons, Arning, 
and others had all commented on how fertile the soil on the Uhehe plateau 
seemed, and the altitude (about 5,000 meters) meant that the climate was mild 
enough to grow European foodstuffs (today large amounts of potatoes are gown in 
 
479 See the diary of Prince’s wife for an extended discussion of the Mpangile episode. Magdalene 
von Prince, 55-74.  See also Adams, Alfons Adams, Im Dienste des Kreuzes.  Erinnerungen an 
mein Missionsleben in Deutsch-Osafrika (St. Ottilien, Oberbayern: St. Ottilien, 1899), 53-61.  
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indeed collaborating behind Prince’s back, but in February 1897 Mkwawa found out that 
Mpangile was sleeping with his wives.  Furious, he let the rumor spread that he would be 
attending one of the funerals so common to this period the following week, and he left his ladder 
on the wall of Mpangile’s residence.  When Prince inevitably heard the rumor about Mkwawa’s 
intended presence in Iringa, he rushed to Mpangile’s house and found the dreaded bandit leader’s 
ladder.  Not believing Mpangile’s insistence that he know nothing about the matter, Prince had 
him executed.  Interview with Mungai, 25 August 2005. 
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 Uhehe).480  More importantly, its geography made it relatively free of disease in a 
manner similar to the “White Highlands” in neighboring Kenya.  As in Kenya, 
observers in the colony and back in the metropolis, eagerly anticipated the 
possibilities of European settlement on the plateau.481  Several parliamentarians 
had already contacted von Liebert about the possibility of establishing settlement 
societies in Uhehe to draw in willing agricultural colonists from the Fatherland.482  
On 17 July Liebert’s massive expedition set off, and it was even larger than the 
one deployed by von Schele three years earlier: it contained 2,000 Askari, 
“Hilfsvölker” (auxiliaries/friendlies), and porters.  Liebert’s force simultaneously 
surveyed Uhehe and attempted to hunt down and destroy Mkwawa and his 
remaining 800 warriors.  As they advanced through Uhehe, they methodically 
burned all the crops and all the villages, seized all the livestock, and shot down all 
those who resisted them.  Over 500 women and children were taken prisoner, and 
a large swathe of Uhehe was laid to waste in an attempt to deny Mkwawa and his 
men supplies or assistance by any Hehe civilians.  The German forces resorted to 
a strategy of attempting to “devour the land of Mkwawa” [das Land des Mkwawa 
aufzufressen], in other words the intentional causing of famine in “rebel areas” in 
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 order to bring about an end to hostilities.483  Liebert was explicit about his 
policies; he intended to: 
…stop Quawa through the confiscation of supplies and the destruction of 
crops, to make life impossible for his people and thereby to bring about 
 
August Bebel’s objections aside, Liebert’s campaign of mass hostage-taking, 
                                                
the dissolution and steady reduction of his retinue.  All captured women 
will be brought with their children to Iringa.  In many cases this compelled 
the men to follow their women [to the government village at Iringa] and to 
subject themselves to “bwana sahran” [the German authorities]—not out 
of love, but rather because without the women the fields remain 
uncultivated.484  
food-denial, and search and destroy missions gradually “made life impossible” for 
Mkwawa and those Hehe still loyal to (or at least terrified of) him.  But the 
eventual German triumph was attributable to more than the just application of a 
“rücksichtlose Politik” (as Deputy Governor Lothar von Trotha referred to it).  
Crucial to German victory was the fact that the Hehes’ traditional rivals, the 
“deutschfreundliche” Sangu and the Bena quickly sided with the Germans and 
waged a parallel war of vengeance against the Hehe.485  Furthermore, the Hehes’ 
allies and vassals systematically deserted them one after the other as the Germans 
proceeded to thoroughly demolish the Hehe military state, much to the 
satisfaction of participants like Prince.486  By late 1897-1898 many of auxiliaries 
deployed by the Schutztruppe were in fact Hehe, and it was only through the 
participation of these local levies of “Hehe-Hilfskrieger” (recruited by chiefs 
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 systematically installed or backed by the Germans) that the colonial forces were 
able to seal off villages and fields, thereby preventing the local populace from 
assisting Mkwawa.487  Liebert was adamant that without the ever growing force 
of loyal Hehe jumbe and soildiers, the insurgency would have gone on for years 
longer.  The destruction of the Hehe Empire was made possible by the very 
people who had so deeply feared its hegemony for decades.  It was highly ironic, 
therefore, that the Hehe managed in 1905 to completely turn the tables on these 
same enemies, an issue that will be addressed in chapter seven. 
 
488 
But try as they might, the expedition still could not find Mkwawa.  As 
Governor Liebert explained, “there was nothing left for us to do other than 
continue with the campaign of annihilation [Vernichtungsfeldzug] and war of 
                                                 
487 “Allein durch diese Hilfskräfte war es möglich,...ihm Abbruch an Leuten und Vieh zu thun und 
ihm langsam die Existenzmittel zu entziehen.“  Liebert, 8. 
 
488 East African women compelled to work for the government, probably in the form of 
Steuerarbeit (tax-labor), around 1900.  Timm, 53. 
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 destruction [Zerstörungskrieg] of earlier expeditions in order to cut his followers 
off from the means of existence ”489  Capt. von Prince heartily agreed, arguing: 
“The stomach is what affects the Neger the most, and this reality would help me 
years later in bringing the harsh mentality of the Hehe under German rule, to 
impose order on them, which allowed neighboring peoples to live in security.”490  
Ten years later during Maji Maji, Governor Liebert’s successor, Adolf Graf von 
Götzen, would make the same arguments and use the same scorched earth policies 
to devastating effect against the very people Prince was “protecting” in the 1890s.  
Nearly as effective a weapon as famine, Liebert adds that the hostage policy—the 
mass roundup of Hehe women and children in “rebel areas”—was one of the 
“most effective means in this type of Negerkrieg” at breaking the men’s will to 
fight, an assertion likewise turned into policy by the British in South Africa 
against the Boers during the same period.  Eventually these policies had the 
desired effect.  Fourteen further expeditions in the hills and valleys of Uhehe 
between mid-August and early November 1897 brought in 1,700 half-starved 
Hehe prisoners, mostly women and children.  Station Chief von Prince’s wife, 
Magdalene von Prince, was shocked and appalled at the “miserable physical 
condition” of the prisoners.491  Many of the prisoners were in fact captured while 
they were desperately scrounging for insects and roots with which to feed their 
starving children. 
                                                 
489 Liebert, 33. 
 
 
490 Prince, 174. 
 
491 Magdalene von Prince, 138.  
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 By January 1898 German patrols were running into “mostly just 
skeletons,” as Prince put it.492  Prince declared the last region in rebellion, 
Uhafiwa, “pacified” on 14 April 1898, the last 250 of Mkwawa’s followers 
having been either shot or taken prisoner.493  This left Mkwawa alone, still 
relentlessly pursued by German patrols and by “pro-government Hehe” seeking 
the sizable bounty on the former sultan’s head.  The German-Hehe War finally 
ended on 19 July 1898 when Mkwawa, driven to total desperation after nearly all 
 
494 
 
of his soldiers had surrendered and the land was stripped of food and supplies, 
was finally cornered by as small patrol led by Corporal Merkl from the Iringa 
Station.  In a final act of defiance, the once-mighty Sultan committed suicide with 
                                                 
492 Prince an Governement, 17 January1898, BAB, R1001/289, 19.  
 
493 Liebert an das Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswätigen Amtes, 14 April 1898, BAB, R1001/289, 
44-7.  
 
494 The cave at Mlambalasi where Mkwawa spent his last days, about 50 km from Iringa town.  
Photograph taken by author, 15 August 2005. 
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 his rifle near the cave at Mlambalasi where he has spent the last few months of his 
life.  His head was taken and sent back to the Bremen Anthropological Museum 
as a final trophy of German victory.495  Specifically mentioned in the Article 246 
of the Versailles Treaty in 1919 as a part of the reparations that Germany owed 
the victorious allies, Mkwawa’s skull was supposed to be returned within six 
months of the ratification of the treaty, but it was not brought back to Tanganyika 
until 1954.496  Mkwawa’s suicide marked the end of an era for the Hehe and for 
German power in the southern highlands of East Africa.  “With the death of 
Quawa the struggles in Uhehe came to an end; since that time the Wahehe have 
never risen against the government again, even during 1905 when they managed 
to stay out of the Uprising.”497  It is true that the Hehe would never again take up  
 
                                                 
495 For the bizarre and disturbing story of the fate of Mkwawa’s skull, see Martin Baer and Olaf 
Schröter, Eine Kopfjagd: Deutsche in Ostafrika, Spuren kolonialer Herrschaft (Berlin: Links 
Verlag, 2001).  
496 ARTICLE 246 (http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/ver231.html) 
Within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, Germany will 
restore to His Majesty the King of the Hedjaz the original Koran of the Caliph 
Othman, which was removed from Medina by the Turkish authorities and is stated to 
have been presented to the ex-Emperor William II. 
Within the same period Germany will hand over to His Britannic Majesty's 
Government the skull of the Sultan Mkwawa which was removed from the Protectorate 
of German East Africa and taken to Germany. 
The delivery of the articles above referred to will be effected in such place and 
in such conditions as may be laid down by the Governments to which they are to be 
restored. 
497 Nigmann, 58.  
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arms against the colonial regime.  Indeed, in the years after 1898, they would 
become some of the Germans most important allies in the southern highlands and 
would serve as a major source for police and military recruits.  This dramatic 
reversal of Hehe fortunes and of the political situation in the southern potion of 
the colony is the subject of the next and final chapter, which will also attempt to 
draw conclusions from the course and outcomes of the German-Hehe War.
                                                 
498 Skull of Mkwawa at the Kalenga Museum, picture taken by author, 15 August 2005.  
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Chapter VII: 
Aftermath, the Evolution of G and Conclusions (1899-1914) 
 
he Laws of war have always answered two questions: When may one wage war?  
ing  
he Point must be stressed.  When we note the surprising fact that the 
 
ftermath 
kwawa’s death in 1898 ended hostilities between the Germans and the Hehe 
once and for all.  Thereafter, the Hehe never again challenged German authority.  
After years of uncertainty, constant violence, and instability, the “peace of the 
                                                
erman Power, 
T
What is permissible in war?  And international law was always given two 
completely different answers to these questions, depending on who the enemy is.  
The laws of war protect enemies of the same race, class, and culture.  The laws of 
war leave the foreign and the alien without protection.  When is one allowed to 
wage war against savages or barbarians?  Answer: always.  What is permissible 
in wars against savages and barbarians?  Answer: anything. 
    -Sven Lindqvist, A History of Bomb 500
 
T
concentration camp was invented by Britain, in 1900, this is an indictment not of 
Britain but of 1900.  The concentration camp was called forth by the times 
themselves.  War was total, so that the enemy population had to be dealt with. 
    -Reviel Netz, Barbed Wire: An Ecology of Modernity501
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499 Karl Weule, “Ostafrikanische Eingeborenen-Zeichnungen: Psychologische Einblicke in die 
Künstlerseele des Negers,” in Ipek: Jahrbuch für Prähistorische und Ethnographische Kunst 2 
(1926): between 96 and 97.    
 
500 Sven Lindqvist, A History of Bombing, trans. by Linda Haverty Rugg (New York: The New 
Press, 2001), 2. 
 
501 Reviel Netz, Barbed Wire: An Ecology of Modernity (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University 
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 graveyard” now prevailed in Uhehe.  The chief of the Iringa station and the 
conqueror of Mkwawa’s once mighty empire, Captain Tom von Prince, proudly 
reported in 1899: 
The political circumstances are such that the locations named [various 
locations in Uhehe] appear in the long term, indeed for all time, to be 
secure. The jumbe that we have installed are either people that proved 
themselves to be trustworthy in difficult times or are the descendents of 
those aristocratic families that have all the reason in the world to hate 
Quawa and his Wahehe.  All of them owe their present position to the 
station.  No jumbe has enough power to maneuver on his own, and the 
unity of the Wahehe has been eliminated for all time.  This is all the more 
important in that the station chief has ruled out the possibility that other 
tribes near northern and eastern Uhehe could be cultivated as a 
counterweight.502 
 
The years after 1898 were characterized by the gradual consolidation of German 
authority in the southern highlands.  While some districts in German East Africa, 
particularly those that had been “pacified” first such as Lindi and Tanga on the 
coast, were turned over to civilian authority, the Iringa district remained under 
military authority until the coming of the First World War.503  Pundits like the 
former Governor Eduard von Liebert, the former Schutztruppe doctor Wilhelm 
Arning, and others attempted to rally support back in the metropole for a 
systematic settlement program in Uhehe,  The conclusion of the presentation of 
Dr. Arning, who had served for several years in the stations in and around Uhehe 
and was the commander at the Battle of Munisagara discussed in chapter four, 
makes it clear that the formerly “rebellious” land of Mkwawa and his insurgents 
                                                 
502 “Bericht des Stationschefs von Iringa über die dortigen Verhältnisse,” Deutsches Kolonialblatt 
(the official publication of the German Colonial Department, hereafter DKB) 10 (1899): 658.  
 
503 See John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule 1905-1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1965), chapter 3 and L. H Gann and Peter Duignan, The Rulers of German Africa 1884-
1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 118-20. 
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 was now one of the best possibilities in the Germans’ colonial empire for 
settlement.  He concluded his talk, “May the warm-hearted man who now stands 
at the top [of the administration of, the governor] of German East Africa feel 
satisfaction that there in the highlands is developing that which be believed he had 
found upon his first visit to Uhehe—a new Germany.”504  Attempts were made 
both by the state in the form of an agricultural research station and by the 
missionaries (discussed below) to plant and cultivate European crops such as 
potatoes, wheat, and European vegetables in anticipation of supporting a new 
European settle population and of creating a cash-driven market in food crops.505 
506 
The situation on the ground was also changing as Christian missionaries 
began to arrive in Uhehe and other highlands areas in ever-growing numbers.  
Many Hehe, Bena, and other peoples of Uhehe had fled to the emerging network 
of missions in the conquered territories in response to the extreme privation 
unleashed by the war.507  Life at these mission stations was in many ways 
preferable to facing either the exactions of Mkwawa’s insurgents or the harsh 
                                                 
504 Wilhelm Arning, Uhehe als Ansiedlungsgebiet für deutsche Landwirte: Vortrag, gehalten in 
der Deutschen Kolonialgesellschaft, Abteilung Berlin (Göttingen: Hofer, 1910), 16.  
 
505 “Deutsch-ostafrikanische Berzirksämter und Stationen ium Berichtsjahure 1899/1900,” DKB 
11 (1900): 515 and Versuchsstation Uhehe (Dabaga), January 1891-July 1900, Bundesarchiv 
Berlin (hereafter BAB), R1001/8647. 
 
506 An African depiction of a mission church in southern Tanzania, Weule, Zeichnungen, between 
96 and 97.  
 
507 See Giblin, 30.  
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 realities of life in the Germans’ forced “settlements” around their stations.  The 
first civilians to arrive in this context of deprivation and insecurity were the 
Benedictine missionaries from St. Ottilien, Bavaria, who in the latter phase of the 
hostilities between the Hehe and the Germans established the Tossamaganga 
Mission on the very spot from which Governor von Schele’s artillery had shelled 
Mkwawa’s fortress at Kalenga in 1894.508  Indeed, this station was established 
under the protection of Prince’s Askari and was built with mostly unfree labor as 
part of the ever-more systematic practice of extracting corvée Steuerarbeit (tax-
labor) from Africans in areas under colonial administration.509  The Catholics 
were soon followed by Lutherans and Moravians, who established missions 
across the southern highlands, particularly in the former Bena territories of the 
Hehe Empire and along the Uhehe-Usangu border.510  The Berlin (I) Mission, 
founded by the Bohemian Lutheran Pastor Jänicke in 1800, established a mission 
in Uhehe in 1900 and several more stations in the years thereafter, and it along 
with the other missions in Uhehe began the systematic process of compiling 
ethnographic and linguistic information about the Hehe and their neighbors the 
Bena, the Kinga, and others (who the missionaries noted were all “tribal- and 
                                                 
508 See Adams, Alfons Adams, Im Dienste des Kreuzes.  Erinnerungen an mein Missionsleben in 
Deutsch-Ostafrika (St. Ottilien, Oberbayern: St. Ottilien, 1899), conclusion and Rev. Fr. Sebastian 
Wolfgang Napachihi, The Relationship between the German Missionaries of the Congregation of 
St. Benedict from St. Ottilien and the German Colonial Authorities in Tanzania 1887-1907 
(Peramiho, Tanzania: Benedictine Publications Ndanda, 1998), 78-9.  
 
509 For a discussion of unfree labor in German East Africa see Thaddeus Sunseri, Vilimani: Labor 
Migration and Rural Change in Early Colonial Tanzania (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002);  
Bernd Arnold, Steuer und Lohnarbeit im Südwesten von Deutsch-Ostafrika, 1891 bis 1916: Eine 
historisch-ethnologische Studie (Münster: lit Verlag, 1994); and Jan Georg Deutsch, 
Emancipation without Abolition in German East Africa c. 1884-1914 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 2006), 220. 
 
510 See Marcia Wright, German Missions in Tanganyika 1891-1914: Lutherans and Moravians in 
the Southern Highlands (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 66-75. 
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 language-relatives”).511  The Catholics likewise sought to become more adept at 
understanding and maneuvering at the local level, offering sermons in Bena and 
Hehe and engaging in medical work, such as the inoculation of tens of thousands 
of Africans against smallpox.512  Uhehe was slowly becoming not just a land 
appropriate for the settlement of German Landwirte, but a Christian land as well.  
The Tossamaganga Mission was actually one of the only mission stations not 
attacked during the infamous Maji Maji uprising of 1905 due in part to the close 
relationship that prevailed between Ernst Nigmann—von Prince’s successor at 
Neu-Iringa—and the Hehe jumbe.  
513 
 There were other ways, however, in which the people of Uhehe were 
proving difficult to manage: drawing in their labor via any means other than direct 
coercion.  As elsewhere, the Germans hoped to pull Hehe and other highland 
peoples into the labor market, but in many cases they refused to deal with the 
colonial state.  Missionaries and administrators alike lamented the Hehes’ 
                                                 
511 “Aus dem Bereiche der Mission und der Antisklaverei-Bewegung,” DKB 11 (1900): 465. 
 
512  “Aus dem Bereiche der Mission und der Antisklaverei-Bewegung,” DKB 11 (1900): 552. 
 
513 Photograph by author of the Tosamaganga Mission established by the Benedictines from 1896 
to 1899.  
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 unwillingness to give up “stealing” and “swindling” and turn instead towards jobs 
linked to the evolving colonial cash economy.514  On one occasion, the head of 
the Berlin Mission station at Musindi even attempted to offer grain out of the 
mission’s sizable stockpile during one of the periods of repeated shortages that 
occurred following the German-Hehe War.  The Hehe refused any assistance from 
the Germans and chose instead to go elsewhere, sometimes over great distances, 
to get relief from family members or distant relatives rather than to rely in any 
way on the generosity or goodwill of the AvaDaliki.515  And relief from the state 
was also hardly generous: the Hehe were given grain from the state’s collected 
surplus but were forced to repay it later with interest, when a good harvest 
allowed it either in kind or in cash.516  The local economy and ecology of Uhehe 
had been severely disrupted: scorched earth tactics by both sides had lead to 
chronic shortages, the once mighty herds of Hehe cattle (one of the primary 
resources in Uhehe) had been dramatically reduced, and the mass movement—
both voluntary and, more often than not, involuntary—of people in and around 
Uhehe unleashed by the war had led to a major decline in harvests all over the 
district.  It was a prelude of things to come.   
 
 
 
                                                 
514 DKB 11 (1900): 552.  For an extened discussion of the “Arbeiterfrage” (the discourse regarding 
the chronic shortage of labor in German East Africa), see Sunseri, Vilimani, Op. cit.. 
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 Uhehe During the Maji Maji Revolt, 1905-1907 
l circle for the Hehe with the 
                                                
By 1905, it seemed that the wheel had come ful
outbreak of the Maji Maji Revolt all across southeastern Tanganyika.  In that 
year, the Sangu, Ngoni, and other former German allies rose in revolt against their 
erstwhile “protectors” in an attempt to prevent the collapse of their authority in 
the face of the harsh changes brought about by a decade of colonial rule.  Tom 
von Prince and others complained bitterly about the deep sense of betrayal they 
felt watching the people that they had “saved” from the Hehe rise against them.517  
The brutality of the German response, which led to an even greater loss of life and 
property than the German-Hehe War, was such that the Maji Maji Revolt of 1905-
1907 is sometimes referred to as “the greatest uprising in the whole of early 
colonial Eastern and Central Africa.”518  Maji Maji in many ways is the pivotal 
point around which both the scholarship on German rule and the debates about 
“Tanzanian nationalism” revolve, and it is worth reiterating the ways in which 
Maji Maji has been described and explained insofar as these relate to many of the 
themes elaborated upon in the present work.   Several schools evolved in the 
historiography to explain the revolt, and because of the highly politicized nature 
of Maji Maji (it was continually invoked by the Tanzanian liberation movement, 
TANU, and its supporters as an antecedent to their struggle for independence) and 
 
517 Tom von Prince, Gegen Araber und Wahehe: Erinnerungen aus meiner ostafrikanischen 
Leutnantszeit 1890-1895 (Berlin: Ernst Sigfried Mittler und Sohn, 1914), 119.  Only the Bena 
remained “deutschfreundlich” from the early colonial period until 1918, probably because they 
viewed all of the contenders for power in the southern highlands—Hehe, Sangu, Ngoni, and 
Germans alike—as power-hungry, ruthless conquerors.  See A. T. & G. M. Culwick , Ubena of the 
Rivers (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935), chapter I and James L. Giblin, A History of 
the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania (Oxford: james 
Currey Ltd., 2005), 29-30. 
    
518 Koponen, 229. 
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 indeed of earlier “anticolonial revolts” such as that of the Hehe against German 
rule, each school was closely affiliated with a specific political orientation.   
Broadly stated, the theories designed to explain the revolt’s outbreak, and 
implici
                                                
tly its significance, can be cast as positing either economic or ideological 
causes for the revolt.  Most historians used both but heavily emphasized one or 
the other.  East German historians cited economic exploitation and German 
brutality as the cause of what became in essence a large “tax revolt” aimed—
secondarily—at independence.519  The “Dar es Salaam School” of historians, 
centered around T. O. Ranger, Iliffe, and G. C. K. Gwassa, attempted to show the 
unifying, “trans-ethnic” character of Maji Maji’s religious “hongo” ideology.  
Maji Maji was cast as an attempt to overcome internal divisions, the primary 
obstacle to effective resistance, via an innovative messianic ideology.  It was also 
explicitly cast as a precursor to TANU’s struggle in the 1950s and 1960s for 
independence.520  These two lines of interpretation evolved contemporaneously 
with the revolt itself.  Governor von Liebert’s successor, Governor Gustav Adolf 
von Götzen, and the authorities in Berlin explained the revolt as a “witchdoctor 
conspiracy,” therefore ideologically driven.  Leftwing critics from the Social 
Democratic Party, as always spearheaded by the intractable critic of the German 
 
519 Helmuth Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa: From the Beginnings until the Second World 
War (Berlin: Akadamie-Verlag, 1986), 148. 
 
520 The mark of T. O. Ranger is profound in the Dar School.  His work on the Ndebele and Shona 
revolts was the pre-eminent example of a work focusing on religion as a trans-ethnic, organizing 
force that facilitated resistance.  T. O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia: A Study in African 
Resistance, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967.  As to the continuity between primary 
and later nationalist resistance, the foundational work was his two-part “Connections between 
‘Primary Resistance’ Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa,” 
Journal of African History, IX, 3 (1968): 437-53 and IX, 4 (1968): 631-41.  
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 Empire, August Bebel, disputed this, claiming that it was economic exploitation 
and administrative malfeasance that caused the desperate Africans to rebel.521 
 Representative of, and indeed the foundation of, ideologically centered 
treatments was once again the work of Iliffe.  Beginning with his “The 
Organization of the Maji Maji Rebellion” (1967) and extended and qualified in 
his 1969 and 1979 monographs, Iliffe offered a three-stage model of the outbreak 
and spread of Maji Maji that attempted to avoid overly teleological and regionally 
undifferentiated simplifications.522  In the eastern region where the rebellion was 
first organized and initiated, Maji Maji was an overwhelmingly peasant 
movement caused by the specific hardships and abuses engendered by the newly 
introduced German cotton regime.523  Its subsequent spread was only possible 
because surrounding areas received Maji Maji as a prophetic, millenarian 
movement whose ideas resonated with local symbols and ideologies.524  Finally, 
once Maji Maji spread into the southern highlands where indigenous state 
structures were more established (among the Sangu, Ngoni, and some Bena), it 
crumbled as “pan-tribal” unity gave way to a disjointed rebellion based on pre-
revolt kinship, ethnic, and political loyalties.525  Overall, Maji Maji was “an 
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 explosion of African hatred of European rule.”526  East German scholarship 
characterized Maji Maji similarly if rather monolithically as a “national struggle 
against foreign rule” and as a “peoples’ war” brought about by German 
exploitation and brutality.527  West German scholars such as Karl-Martin Seeberg 
fell more in line with the Dar es Salaam School interpretation.528  The title of his 
1989 work is clear enough: The Maji Maji War against German Rule: Historical 
Origins of National Identity in Tanzania.  The revolt was both a “religious and 
rational revolution” that “paved the way” for the independence struggles of 
TANU.529  It represented Tanzania’s first “collective experience” and was a 
profound act of “ethnic solidarity. 
 Scholarship of the 1990s focusing on local politics and issues of 
gender has convincingly shown that the arguments of Iliffe, Seeberg, and others 
require a good deal of qualification, and these newer works highlight many of the 
themes discussed already in relation to the German-Hehe War.  The strongest of 
these were Thaddeus Sunseri’s “Famine and Wild Pigs” (1997) and Jamie 
Monson’s “Relocating Maji Maji” (1998), which did much to show how Maji 
Maji was understood and utilized at the local level, belying overly simplistic 
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 master narratives of the revolt.530  Sunseri asserted that the outbreak of Maji Maji 
had a good deal to do with the traumatic restructuring of gender relations in 
Tanganyika, brought about by the changes wrought by the colonial economy.  As 
more and more men had to leave their communities in order to avoid forced labor 
and pay taxes, ever more burden fell on female producers.  The Germans’ 
prohibition on killing game and cutting down trees led to a massive increase in the 
number of wild pigs, formerly kept away from the fields by men.531  Women had 
to defend crops against predators and do most of the clearing once performed by 
men, causing them to demand recognition of their increased burden and right to 
appropriate male gender roles. German cotton policies only exacerbated the labor 
shortages and deepening exploitation of women.   
German labor and agricultural policies seem to have doubled the 
frequency of famines in the region by 1904, even in those areas that had not 
suffered the harshness of German counterinsurgency tactics as the Hehe had in the 
1890s.  Ultimately, it was a catastrophic famine in early 1905 that caused 
Africans in the Uzaramo region to revolt.  Male elites whose power was 
evaporating before their eyes felt compelled to act: “A primary motive for the 
participation in the Majimaji war for headmen was to reclaim their authority in 
rural society by turning back German policies which upset local patters if 
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 environmental control and household stability.”532  Most men and particularly 
women, however, spent the majority of their time struggling to prevent the total 
dissolution of their communities rather than engaging in armed revolt.  Even the 
spread of “hongo” had more to do with women’s attempts to salvage agriculture 
than with “trans-ethnic solidarity.”533  Monson also emphasized the 
disproportionate burden that fell on women before, during, and after the revolt.534  
Their increasing discontent and agitation did much to encourage elites in the 
southern highlands to consider revolt as a means of restoring their waning 
power—the war was largely launched by Ngoni elites and was intended to benefit 
them.535  Likewise, those that sided with the Germans did so entirely for their 
own political reasons rather than any ideological solidarity with the colonial state, 
as demonstrated by the Bena, who by this point were sick of repeatedly 
exchanging one oppressor for another.536  Overall, one must examine the 
extremely fluid ethnic and political boundaries in Tanganyikan society and the 
complexity and ever-changing nature of the of the local alliance system before 
reaching conclusions about “peoples’ wars” or “pan-tribal” movements.  Just as in 
the 1890s, the Germans, in fact, were generally seen as one potential ally among 
many, albeit an ever more powerful one.  For many in the southern highlands, it 
was the behavior of German officials and German missionaries in particular that 
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 provoked the insurrection—the Germans were seen as meddling in social and 
political matters that were none of their concern and were perceived to have 
violated an implicit “contract” with their African allies.537  Just as Jonathan 
Glassman demonstrated in Feasts and Riot, Maji Maji had as much to do with 
local political, class, and gender struggles as it was caused by the imposition of 
colonial power.538  As in the German-Hehe War, the shifting and contingent 
realities of local politics mattered, and one must be careful when using simplistic 
categories such as “pro-German” or “anticolonial rebel.”   
The methods used to crush all resistance in German East Africa from 
1905-06 during the Maji Maji Revolt are well known and are often cited jointly 
with the Herero-Nama War as compelling proof of the Germans’ proclivity for 
slaughter in the colonies.539  To be sure, the governor and commander-in-chief in 
that conflict, Adolf Graf von Götzen, explicitly declared the burning of African 
infrastructure (homes, crops, fields) and the mass starvation that ensued to be the 
Germans’ “best friends” in bringing the revolt to heel.  Such highly destructive 
tactics were referred to as “indispensable allies” when pacifying recalcitrant 
Africans.540  Since “whole populations” were considered the enemy in districts 
                                                 
537 Monson, 103-6. 
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540 Quoted in Helge Kjekshus, Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African 
History (London: James Curry, 1996), 144-6.  See also G. A. Graf von Götzen, Deutsch-Ostafrika 
im Aufstand 1905-06 (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1909). 
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 like Songea and Rufiji, war was waged on those entire populations in ways all too 
familiar to anyone acquainted with the German colonial state’s way of waging 
war during the 1890s in Uhehe and elsewhere.  Such policies led to even greater 
deaths than in the previous wars in East Africa and indeed led to more fatalities 
than those inflicted on Africans during the Germans’ genocidal war against the 
Hehe and the Nama of Southwest Africa from 1904-1907.  Scorched earth 
methods in southern Tanzania most likely killed hundreds of thousands of 
people.541  German officials themselves admitted that upwards of 75,000 Africans 
had died as a result of “war, failing harvests, famine, and plagues” between the 
outbreak of hostilities in mid-1907 and 1907.542  They also acknowledged that it 
would take years if not decades for some districts (such as Rufiji, Lindi, and 
Kilwa) to recover from the precipitous drop in population caused by the rebellions 
and its suppression.  Modern scholars put the number closer to 200,000 or 
300,000, but it will most likely never be known how many people lost their lives 
during Maji Maji.543 
Returning to the ways in which Maji Maji affected the Hehe, in a striking 
mirror image of the events of the 1890s, the Sangu and Ngonis’ enemies once 
again rushed to share in the spoils of German victory, turning colonial policy to 
their own purposes.  On this occasion, however, it was the Hehe that served as the 
                                                 
541 For a discussion of German scorched earth tactics during the Maji Maji War, see Ludger 
Wimmelbücker, “Verbrannte Erde: Zu den Bevölkerungsverlusten als Folge des Maji-Maji-
Krieges,” in Der Maji-Maji-Krieg in Deutsch-Ostafrika, op cit., 87-99. 
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1906/07 (Berlin:  Ernst Sigfried Mittler und Sohn, 1908), 9. 
 
543 See Becker and Beez, Op. Cit., 94 for a discussion of the numbers provided by Gilbert Gwassa, 
John Iliffe, and others.   
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 Germans allies against the Maji Maji rebels, and they fought with such distinction 
that the German view of them underwent a dramatic reversal.  As local 
commanders pointed out, the Hehe on the whole remained loyal, partially because 
of the trauma inflicted on them in the 1890s and partially because their leadership 
was so divided between different Hehe chiefs.544  This division—which Captain 
von Prince had created by design—was particularly acrimonious between 
Farhenga and Mtaki (who is most likely the same Mtaki who led the Germans to 
Iringa as discussed in chapter five).  Each feared that if he were to throw in his lot 
with the Maj Maji rebels, the other would turn to the Germans for assistance and 
political favor and would thereby become the new “paramount chief” in Uhehe, a 
position that had not existed since the execution of Mkwawa’s brother Mpangile 
in early 1897.  The oral history accounts of the Maji Maji Research Project, 
gathered by students and instructors from the University of Dae es Salaam in the 
1960, echo this sense of fear of the Germans, resentment of the Sangu and Ngoni, 
and internal division amongst the Hehe.545  The informants make clear that the 
maji “medicine” reached Uhehe shortly after it was sent out in all directions from 
the Songea Ngoni, but it met with either an indifferent or an apprehensive 
reception among the Hehe.  Even those jumbe (chiefs) that were inclined to join 
the rebels were dissuaded by fear.  As one informant noted: 
All Hehe jumbes had to lead their people to fight the rebels for the 
Germans.  If any jumbe had remained or refused to aid the Germans he 
                                                 
544 H.A. Tomaschek. “Der Aufstand in Deutsch-Ostafrika und die Wahehe,” Deutsche 
Kolonialzeitung, 30 September 1905.  See also Graf von Götzen, Deutsch-Ostafrika im Aufstand, 
“Der Zug des Hauptmanns Nigmann,” 127-151. 
 
545 The Maji Maji Research Project, 1968; Collected Papers (Dar es Salaam: University College 
of Dar es Salaam, History Department, 1969), especially the interviews on pages 146-196. 
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 would have been suspected of being a rebel and would have been either 
killed or deported.  The Germans were very cruel; they killed people by 
tying them with a rope around their necks.  The Germans had a very 
strong hold over the government and we never dreamt of a day when they 
would leave this country to the British.  The Germans were far more cruel 
than the British.546 
 
Other chiefs fought for the potential to gain wealth and new territory (just as the 
Sanu had in the 1890s at their expense), such as those Hehe jumbe that fought in 
Ubena and Ukwega, who were rewarded with a “gratuity” and the long-term 
control over lands in those areas.547  On the whole, the structure created by von 
Prince in Uhehe after 1896, one characterized by an alliance with those Hehe 
elites that had much to gain by working with the Germans (or feared their rivals 
more), continued to function during the Maji Maji War and beyond. 
 It was this performance during the 1905-1907 period that did much to 
change the German view of the Hehe.  Ernst Nigmann, who led units of Hehe 
Askari during Maji Maji as the new head of the Iringa military district, displayed 
none of the revulsion so characteristic of his predecessor von Prince’s renderings 
of Mkwawa and the Hehe.  The Hehe, who in the time of governors von Schele, 
Wissmann, and von Liebert had been referred to variously as “murderers,” 
“bandits,” and “criminals,” had now become an African “Herrenvolk” (roughly: 
“master race,” analogous to the British notion of “martial races”), and their state 
was now known as the “Prussia of East Africa.”548  Indeed, far from wishing for 
                                                 
546 Interview with Malangali Udimilichuna (3/68/1/3/13),  The Maji Maji Research Project, op 
cit., 177. 
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 the Hehes’ complete destruction as most Schutztruppe officers had in the 1890s, 
Nigmann now feared that the Hehe faced cultural extinction due to the inexorable 
march of progress ushered in by Prince’s self-proclaimed “new era”: 
Already now, the memory of the old customs and manners is fading 
among the surviving line very quickly, which will in just a few years be 
permanently gone.  This made me determined to lay out my collected 
knowledge of this people now and thereby protect the things worth 
knowing about the customs of this high-spirited people from disappearing 
without a trace.549 
 
German colonial Ethnography, which had always been highly contingent on the 
practical realities, dangers, and opportunities of conquest in East Africa, had 
rapidly shifted the analytical framework that it applied to the Hehe.550  Rather 
than a people that deserved destruction (or as Magdalene von Prince had put it in 
the midst of the brutal counterinsurgency war in 1897, “the Wahehe wanted their 
own annihilation”), the Hehe were now an artifact of a more innocent time that 
needed to be preserved for the benefit of future colonial researchers and experts.  
In the wake of Maji Maji, the bewildering complexity of southern highlands 
politics had—once again—led to new alliances, new configurations of power, and 
new perceptions of the definition of friend and foe. 
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 551 
The Primacy of Local Politics and Commanders: Expediency and Violence 
To reiterate the argument made in chapter one and throughout the subsequent 
chapters, the extreme violence that characterized the German-Hehe War was the 
result of the intersection of several factors: the collision in southern Tanzania of 
two aggressive states that were the products of separate military revolutions (the 
European military revolution of the nineteenth century and the Mfecane state 
system initiated by Shaka Zulu); the volatile nature of politics in the southern 
highlands in the nineteenth century; and the realities of conquest for a force of 
Europeans who were outnumbered, underfunded, often ignorant of local 
conditions, and far from the direct supervision of any superior authority.   
However much their behavior was determined by the cultural and ideological 
baggage they brought with them from the Reich—and this baggage was 
considerable—officers of the Schutztruppe were thinking far less about Hegel or 
their training at home (which had focused entirely on set-piece battles between 
European armies) than about the dirty realities of imposing authority on a people 
that lived thousands of kilometers from the empire’s center with scant resources 
to accomplish this task.   The price of failure was more than just humiliation or 
the end of any last chance to save their already damaged careers (see the 
                                                 
551 Punitive labor during the Maji Maji uprising.  Weule, Zeichnungen, between 96 and 97.  
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 discussion below on honor courts)—as Zelewski, Brüning, Maas, and other 
Germans had discovered, failure when fighting the Hehe meant certain death. 
The period after the fall of Kalenga (1895-98) had been particularly 
destruc
                                                
tive and corrosive to the morale of both sides, as “expediency” in this case 
meant a policy of scorched earth, a “logical” if frightening response to the 
uncertainty and fear generated by successful insurgencies.  German frustration 
came not only from the disastrous defeat they had suffered at Rugaro in 1891, but 
also from the massive but ultimately unsuccessful operation against the Kalenga 
fortress in 1894.  Attempts by the Hehe to negotiate in 1895 and 1896 were either 
rebuffed or accepted and immediately violated by local German officers who 
demanded a war that would result in their “total submission,” and Prince had 
seized on the Hehe refusal to allow troops to be stationed in their territory to 
recommence hostilities, this time as commander of all forces.552  As descried in 
the previous chapter, the war dragged on for a further two and a half years as 
Mkwawa and his forces fought a highly mobile, skilled partisan war.  The 
Germans had responded with “strategic hamlets” (the concentration of all Hehe in 
fortified, patrolled villages), the destruction of crops and villages on a massive 
scale, and the mass execution of anyone accused of assisting the Hehe rebels.  As 
Governor Liebert explained, “there was nothing left for us to do other than 
continue with the Vernichtungsfeldzug and Zerstörungskrieg of earlier 
 
552 The governor at the time, Hermann Wissmann (former commander of the force that crushed the 
coastal revolt of 1888), acknowledged the Hehe as a continual threat to German interests, and he 
hoped to provoke a conflict in order to “remove Mkwawa from his position” and install a more 
quiescent successor.  Should this fail, he and Prince intended “das Reich der Hehe in ihre kleinen 
Sonderstämme zu zersplittern.”  Wissmann an Hohenlohe, 24 September 1896, BAB, R1001/287, 
8-17 and 70. 
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 expeditions.”553  The German forces resorted to a strategy of attempting “das 
Land des Mkwawa aufzufressen” (devouring the land of Mkwawa), in other words 
the intentional causing of famine in “rebel areas.”554  One typical report from 
Commander Prince cited in the last chapter described one engagement as a series 
of “einseitig blutigen Zusamenstößen” (one-sided bloody engagements) in which 
500 Hehe were killed, 600 women and children taken as hostages, and 8000 cattle 
seized.555  The war only ended in 1898 when Mkwawa, driven to total desperation 
after nearly all of his soldiers had surrendered and the land was stripped of food 
and supplies, committed suicide in.  These policies, which were well known in 
other colonial contexts (some of which will be discussed below), were not the 
result the inherent weakness of African armies and political structures or their 
inability to resist the partition of the continent.  The Hehe were all too good at 
killing, both their local African adversaries and—when the opportunity presented 
itself—their German opponents.   
German triumph in their war against the Hehe was attributable to more 
than th
                                                
e application of a “rücksichtlose Politik” (as the infamous Lother von 
Trotha referred to such policies later in Southwest Africa).  Crucial to German 
victory was the fact that the Hehes’ traditional rivals, the “deutschfreundliche” 
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(Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1898), 33. 
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 Sangu and the Bena quickly sided with the Germans and waged a parallel war of 
vengeance against the Hehe.556  Furthermore, the Hehes’ allies and vassals 
systematically deserted them one after the other as the Germans proceeded to 
thoroughly demolish the Hehe military state, much to the satisfaction of 
participants like Prince.557  By late 1897-1898 many of auxiliaries deployed by 
the Schutztruppe were in fact Hehe, and it was only through the participation of 
these local levies of “Hehe-Hilfskrieger” (recruited by chiefs systematically 
installed or backed by the Germans) that the colonial forces were able to seal off 
villages and fields, thereby preventing the local populace from assisting 
Mkwawa.558  The destruction of the Hehe Empire was made possible by the very 
people who had so deeply feared its hegemony for decades.  Likewise, Mkwawa’s 
power over the Hehe had been undermined and eventually destroyed by the 
Germans’ success at offering his Hehe rivals and vassals better, or at least more 
lucrative, opportunities under colonial rule.  It was highly ironic, therefore, that 
the Hehe managed in 1905 to completely turn the tables on these same enemies, 
as discussed above. 
As was noted repeatedly in the preceding chapters, the power politics of 
Uhehe 
                                                
and the surrounding regions were characterized by fluidity and dramatic 
reversals both before and during German rule, but in the end and over time, this 
was a situation that progressively benefited German colonial Herrschaft.  It was a 
 
556 Alison Redmayne, “Mkwawa and the Hehe Wars,” Journal of African History, IX, 3 (1968): 
414 and Prince, 190-1. 
 
557 Prince, 185. 
 
558 “Allein durch diese Hilfskräfte war es möglich,...ihm Abbruch an Leuten und Vieh zu thun und 
ihm langsam die Existenzmittel zu entziehen.“  Liebert, 8. 
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 situation that would be entirely familiar to the conquerors of Mesoamerica or the 
Indian subcontinent.  Cortez’s victory over the Aztecs was possible only because 
of the tens of thousands of indigenous allies that assisted him, allies who saw the 
Conquistadors as a means of finally ending Aztec exactions and conquest.  
Likewise, India was conquered by the British using almost entirely Indian troops 
and Indian wealth.  While this reality is generally recognized by scholars of 
imperial expansion, often the phenomenon of collaboration or “divide and rule” is 
cast in terms of European desires and clever manipulation.  As should be clear 
from the Hehe case, it was in fact African initiative at least as much as the 
German aspiration to work though local agents that led to the alliances that 
brought down the mighty Hehe Empire.  The Sangu, Ngoni, and Bena, alienated 
by decades of Hehe dominance of the region, readily seized the opportunity to use 
the Wazungu as an instrument of their power. Likewise, the dramatic change of 
affairs in and around the Iringa district in the 1905-1907 period created new 
opportunities for the Hehe, many of whom who in the latter parts of the struggle 
with Mkwawa had already become trusted German liwali and jumbe.  The very 
peoples that had turned down Mkwawa’s attempts at creating a “pan-southern 
highlands alliance” in 1892-1893 were now the targets of Hehe attacks under 
German auspices.  Any attempt to examine the series of wars that raged across the 
highlands and beyond without an eye to East African political realities can only 
lead to simplification and misappraisal. 
 In the same vein, approaches to the German-Hehe War that focus 
solely on policies—or military culture—emanating from Berlin and Dar es 
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 Salaam
reasons why both rebellions [Herero-Nama and Maji Maji] can be counted 
man, indeed European, colonial 
history.  During the wars, the militarization of colonial policy on the spot 
                 
 overlook the fact that it was largely officers on the spot who determined 
the course of events, often in direct violation of their instructions, as they 
attempted to deal with situations that were chaotic, complicated, and (as the 
Zelewski case showed) potentially deadly.  On several occasions in the 1890s, 
German officers such as Zelewski and Prince initiated or prolonged hostilities 
with the Hehe with total disregard for the desire of political authorities, be they 
Hehe or German, to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict (especially during 
the tenure of the “dove” governor, Julius Freiherr von Soden).  Similarly rash, 
ambitious behavior on the part of officers had provoked the outbreak of the 
Herero-Nama Uprisings of German Southwest Africa. 559  Likewise, Maji Maji 
spread to many areas that were initially unaffected as punitive expeditions led by 
over-zealous officers fanned out, shooting any Africans they encountered.  As 
Tom von Prince stated in his account of the Hehe War, it was well nigh 
impossible for the Germans to tell the various “Neger” apart.560  Kirsten Zirkel 
offers a trenchant analysis of this phenomenon:  
The attitudes and actions of local military commanders were the main 
among the most destructive wars in Ger
reached its apogee and brought German colonial rule close to collapse.  
The collapse was prevented only by massive expenditure on the part of the 
Reich and, finally, by a radical change in policy.561 
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 The ac
the Reich due to the war’s smaller scale, proceeded according to a similar pattern 
ne of the only 
actors e
                                                
tions of officers like Prince during the Hehe War, while far less costly to 
of contempt for authority and the utmost ruthlessness based on what commanders 
on scene felt was the best, or at least the most expedient, policy.    
 Tom von Prince, who served in the colony from 1890 until 1900, 
wrote one of the primary memoirs of the conflict, and he was o
pr sent from beginning to end (during the same period four different 
governors ruled the colony). Gegen Araber und Wahehe highlights both the 
centrality of alliance politics with Hehe rivals and, inadvertently, the near total 
autonomy granted to officers like Prince in conflicts against “natives.”  Prince is 
ecstatic once he is granted his own unit of “Zulus” and sent to operate alone in the 
field, and for months at a time a mere lieutenant, almost completely unsupervised, 
had almost total political and military power over areas populated by tens of 
thousands of people.562  At the same time, Prince admits to almost total ignorance 
about the Hehe or the local political situation in most of the areas in which he was 
operating—he was, therefore, almost entirely dependent on “Arabs” and jumbe 
(chiefs working with the Germans) for information and interpretation.563  Many of 
his operations involve granting “protection” to peoples allegedly terrified of the 
Hehe.  While such statements should not be taken at face value, it is clear the 
Sagara, Kutu, Konda, and other communities were eager to make use of German 
 
562 Prince, 109, 114-6, 185-6.  
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 “protection” for their own benefit after years of living under the shadow of 
Muhinja “the Butcher.”564 
Prince also demonstrates near total contempt for the orders of Governor 
von Soden and other civilians and a willingness to use the most extreme methods 
to achi
                                                
eve victory against a determined, numerically superior enemy.  Soden had 
explicitly forbidden any operations after the Zelewski disaster, but Prince’s 
memoir describes numerous small-scale Strafzüge against Mkwawa’s allies and 
vassals such as the Gogo.  Following the destruction of Zelewski’s column, Prince 
is quite clear about his state of mind: “From this moment on, particularly as a 
member of the old expedition, my uninterrupted striving was directed at avenging 
the annihilation of this corps, and henceforth I established no station, led no 
expedition, engaged in no battle, did nothing official that would not somehow be 
connected with this goal.”565  The campaigns he waged, both authorized and 
“unofficial,” were characterized by such frequent violence and brutality that 
Prince at one point complains after shooting a group of Hehe from 100 yards, 
“again the old situation, several enemy dead, otherwise nothing.”  Later, he 
describes a multiple execution carried out on his orders, casually noting 
afterwards, “as always something repulsive [to do]!”566  His policy overall is put 
accurately enough: “The stomach is what affects the Neger the most, and this 
reality would help me years later in bringing the harsh mentality of the Hehe 
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 under German rule.”567  What this translated to in reality, as Prince himself 
describes, was the widespread destruction of crops and food-stores during his 
“cleansing” (Säuberung) and “pacification” (Beruhigung) operations in the 
valleys of Uhehe, a policy that by design could only and did result in famine.  Ten 
years later during Maji Maji, Governor Götzen would make the same argument 
and use the same scorched earth policies to devastating effect against the very 
people Prince was “protecting” in the 1890s.   
In the rare moments he admits to having qualms about the task at hand, he 
is quite
                                                
 clear that “such is the nature of African warfare” and that the fault lay 
entirely with the targets of punitive operations because they had resisted German 
authority and—crucially—continued hostilities against German allies.568  The 
hundreds of warriors he cuts down with Maxim guns and Mauser rifles merely 
demonstrate the inferiority of ”unkultivierte” (uncultivated or uncultured) enemies 
vis-à-vis European-equipped armies.569  His narrative ends with his appointment 
to captain and joint commander of operations in 1895, precisely the moment when 
he, as noted, personally initiated hostilities against the Hehe in spite of their 
attempts to negotiate.  The long, bloody guerrilla war of 1895-1898, during which 
Prince was in command, disappears entirely from his narrative.  “I will speak on 
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den Krieg praktisch kennengelernt, ich habe 30 Jahre hindurch unausgesetzt mich mit 
Kriegswissenschaft und im Besonderen mit Kriegsgeschichte beschäftigt, aber was ich hier in 
Uhehe erlebte, stand außerhalb des Rahmens alles bisher Dagewesen.  Es war echt Afrikanisch.” 
Liebert, 28.  That the „echt Afrikanisch“ character of the war had much to do with Liebert’s own 
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 that another time.”570  For the Hehe, the adventures of Prince, Schele, and Liebert 
were nothing short of a catastrophe.  With regards to the German imperial 
enterprise, however, Prince’s performance was exemplary in spite of his 
disobedience.  Operating almost entirely on his own initiative, firmly locked into 
the complex politics of the region, Prince’s war of destruction against the Hehe 
was expedient and, for the governments in Dar and Berlin, cheap. 
 
“Civil-Military Dualism” and the Operation of German Colonial Policy 
Prince, Schele, and other officers were operating as the empire’s agents; it was 
they who had the task of actualizing an authority that before the wars of the 1890s 
had only existed on paper.  Why then, did officers in East Africa so frequently act 
in ways that actually subverted the goal of “stability” in so far as they perpetuated 
or in some cases even provoked costly, bloody hostilities?  In order to understand 
what seems to be a rather contradictory situation, one must turn to the manner in 
which colonial rule operated in German East Africa. 
As Marcia Wright and Kirsten Zirkel have compellingly demonstrated and 
this study has confirmed, both military and civilian policymaking were largely 
driven by “men on the spot” responding to the exigencies and complexities of 
local social and political realities.  Wright argued forcefully for the importance of 
the local context in the form and function of German policy.  Nearly every 
decision made was conditioned by the necessity to rule through local proxies.  
The language of the colony became Kiswahili out of expediency, and Islam was 
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 allowed to flower despite vociferous protests from Berlin and from local 
missionaries.571   
Following the pattern set in Cameroon, the first colony brought under 
effective German control, the military in East Africa had considerable autonomy 
from the beginning.  The Schutztruppe, while allegedly responsible first and 
foremost to the governor, had its command vested in a separate office.572  The 
considerable esprit des corps of the officers meant that if they made a concerted 
effort—as happened on several occasions, they could often outmaneuver the 
governor to such an extent that at times they made policy as much as they 
enforced it.573  This situation did not change significantly until after the 1906-
1907 “colonial scandals” in Germany, which erupted largely because of the 
reports of horrors entailed in suppressing the almost simultaneous Maji Maji and 
Herero-Nama revolts.574  Even after the regularization of administration after 
1907, officers maintained an enormous amount of influence over civilian 
policy.575 
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 The autonomy granted to local military officials, especially in the early 
colonial period, had a good deal to do with the financial structure of the German 
colonies.  It is often said that the British were “parsimonious” and “frugal” in 
their imperial undertakings; the Germans were downright stingy.  This reality was 
a result of the fact that the German colonies were under the control of the 
metropolitan legislature to an extent unique among the colonial powers.  Contrary 
to Wehlerian models of the German Empire, which argue that the Reichstag was a 
“sham parliament,” the budget for each colony was reviewed and extensively 
debated by the Reichstag every year.576  Every single expenditure down to 
salaries, the hiring of translators, or the purchase of capital goods had to be 
justified to the legislature, leading to a continual lack of funds available to local 
officials.  It was for this reason that colonial officials had to depend so much on 
indigenous allies, and they were left to acquire whatever resources they could 
locally.  Before the colonial economy was established and revenue could be 
collected via taxation, this meant, more often than not, “requisitions” from the 
local populace, particularly when on campaign in “hostile territory.”  Like 
Frederick the Great in the eighteenth century or Mkwawa in the nineteenth, the 
Schutztruppe was waging war to pay for war.  
                                                 
576 This is the major interpretive thrust and great innovation of Iliffe’s Tanganyika under German 
Rule 1905-1912.  See particularly chapters 1 and 3.  See also Margaret Lavinia Anderson, 
Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000) and Helmut Walser Smith, “The Talk of Genocide, the Rhetoric 
of Miscegenation: Notes on Debates in the German Reichstag Concerning Southwest Africa, 
1904-14,” in The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and its Legacy, ed. Sara 
Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantop (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1998). 
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 From the very beginning, military conflict provoked by local officials had 
subverted Berlin’s intentions of setting up a civilian-administered, inexpensive 
colony.  German imperial rule in East Africa ended as it began, in a conflagration 
of sanguinary, unauthorized violence.  In 1884 and 1885 East Africa was 
“claimed” for Germany by, the infamous Carl Peters, who fancied himself a 
German Cecil Rhodes.   But rather than working towards the establishment of 
political stability, he spread destruction in his wake with total contempt for his 
instructions not to foment any expensive trouble in German East Africa.577  As he 
himself proudly described one incident: “The Sultan shall have peace, but eternal 
peace. I shall show the Vagogo what the Germans are!  Plunder the villages, 
throw fire into the houses, and smash anything that will not burn.”578  Similarly, 
the 1888 rebellion, was ignited in part by the arrogant behavior of the same Emil 
von Zelewski who was to be martyred in 1891.  It was this rebellion that forced 
Bismarck to accede to annexation.579  Thereafter, attempts to create a “model 
colony” were continually subverted by financial constraints and the ambitious 
rapaciousness of German officers on the spot.  This phenomenon reached its 
apogee during World War I, when Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck blatantly 
                                                 
577 Chancellor Bismarck, never an avid proponent of colonialism, was quite explicit on this point 
in his biting criticism of the expansionist pretensions of the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft: 
“the possibility of military expeditions is out of the question… I would rather give up the whole 
East African colonial venture than agree to a military campaign in the interior.”  Quoted in Zirkel, 
95. 
 
578 Quoted in Sven Lindqvist, Exterminate All The Brutes (New York: The New Press, 1996), 50. 
 
579 The Germans arrived at the coast during the important Muslim religious holiday, Idd al-Hajj, 
and at one point burst into a mosque during prayers wearing boots and accompanied by Zelewski’s 
hunting dogs.  Behavior of this sort, which was frequent, caused an uproar on the coast and did 
much to ignite an already volatile political situation.  Glassman, 5.  
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 disregarded the instructions of Governor Heinrich Schnee and the General Staff in 
Berlin and waged his own private guerrilla war across a vast stretch of East 
Africa.580  The campaign itself led to hundreds of thousands of African dead and 
left whole swathes of Tanzania, Nyasaland, and Mozambique in ruins.581  As 
indicated above, the Hehe-German War was to a considerable extent defined by 
the same dynamic as the wars that came before and after it, and as such is a 
preeminent example of a larger pattern.    
 The first official governor of East Africa, Freiherr von Soden, was 
painfully aware of the stringent financial constraints within which he had to 
operate, and as a civilian he sought as much as possible to create a stable, civilian 
bureaucracy for the colony.  Furthermore, he hoped to avoid expensive military 
conflict at all costs; it was for this reason that he sought to integrate officers of the 
Schutztruppe into the local administration.582  His assumption was that by 
appointing military personnel as district officers throughout most of the colony, 
he would strengthen his control over them and deploy them as instruments of 
policy as he saw fit.  Precisely the opposite occurred—this decision, imposed on 
Soden by financial realities and the fact that the Schutztruppe were practically his 
only method of imposing control, led to the near total militarization of the 
administration of East Africa.  Between 1891 and 1897, local commanders, acting 
                                                 
580 See Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, Meine Erinnerungen aus Ostafrika (Leipzig, Koehler, 1920).  
See also Melvin E. Page, ed., Africa and the First World War (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1987). 
 
581 David Killingray, “African Voices from two World Wars,” in Historical Research, vol. 
LXXIV, no. 186 (November 2001): 439.  
 
582 Zirkel, 97. 
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 putatively as proxies of the governor, in fact officially waged more than sixty 
campaigns against the African population.583  Many of these were not authorized 
by the governor much less by metropolitan authorities, and this number does not 
even include the hundreds of small-scale operations undertaken by commanders 
which were not even reported to their superiors.   
 Soden euphemistically termed this system and the problems that it 
generated “civil-military dualism,” and it was a system that continued to plague 
German attempts to run a peaceful, profitable colony up till 1918.  As stated, this 
policy was not motivated by something intrinsically praetorian about German 
colonial policy, but by the Reichstag’s unwillingness to generously fund colonial 
adventures and by the local realities of conquering a colony nearly as large as 
Western Europe inhabited by over seven million people.  The fact that colonial 
and particularly military officials on the ground could dominate the decision-
making process that led to the consolidation of colonial rule was hardly the 
preserve of the Germans any more than mass killing.  David Killingray quotes the 
British strategist Lord Chatfield in describing the reality of this situation in the 
British colonies: “soldier argued with soldier, political agent with political agent, 
and both with each other.”584  The French conquest of the Western Sudan is a 
textbook example of military men on the spot handing their metropolitan 
                                                 
583 Zirkel, 97 and Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, chapter 1. 
 
584 Killingray, 9.   
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 superiors fait accomplis in flagrant defiance of their orders from Paris or from 
civilians on the scene.585   
But the administrative friction of the sort that plagued Soden and his 
successors perhaps reached its apogee in the short-lived African empire of the 
German Reich.  In both German East Africa and German Southwest Africa, 
military officers maintained an enormous amount of influence over the nature and 
course of colonial policy making, a state of affairs preserved even after the 
supposed conversion to “civil administration” in the wake of the colonial scandals 
of 1905-07.586  Zirkel points out that “the military could even reach a position of 
omnipotence in times of war… The actual decision-making powers vis-à-vis the 
periphery rested less with the Colonial Department in the Reich than with the men 
on the spot.  Thus the former acted purely as a means of legitimating fait 
accomplis which had long before been brought about by military participants.”587  
Indeed, this situation was largely tolerated by authorities in Berlin and in the 
colonial capital of Dar es Salaam as long as officers in the field could deliver 
“victories” without the necessity for additional expenditure or forces.   This 
                                                 
585 See A. S. Kanya-Forstner, “The Régime du Sabre—West African Style: The French Marines in 
the Western Sudan, 1880-99,” in Armies of Occupation, ed. Roy A. Prete and A. Hamish Ion 
(Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1984), 55-76.  See also A. S. Kanya-
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586 Zirkel, 109.  The profound friction between military officials and their civilian superiors both 
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Vorbeck blatantly disregarded the instructions of Governor Heinrich Schnee and the General Staff 
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 effectively gave them carte blanche in their districts.  This combination of local 
autonomy with the lack of available European manpower or expenditure had 
several decisive consequences for the nature of warfare in the 1890s generally and 
for that waged against the Hehe specifically. 
  The combination of little or no supervision as well as no logistic 
support created a strong incentive for officers to proceed with extreme 
ruthlessness, defeating opponents in as “expedient” a manner as possible.588  
What they lacked in material support from Berlin or Dar es Salaam they made up 
for in sheer terror and crass vandalism when dealing with effective guerrilla 
resistance.  Vastly outnumbered, German officers exploited the advantages that 
they did have—superior weaponry and a willingness and ability to annihilate the 
productive base of indigenous societies.  This was a highly effective—and 
cheap—way in which to subjugate populations who often outnumbered the 
invaders by hundreds or even thousands of times.  This is precisely what occurred 
during the campaign against Mkwawa and the Hehe.  It is often recognized that 
this is what led to the draconian suppression of the Maji Maji Revolt, but such 
policies did not begin in 1905.  These tactics were institutionalized in the wars of 
the 1890s, many of the same officers, Askari, and African auxiliaries (in the case 
of the Hehe jumbe that turned against Mkwawa form 1896-98) serving both then 
and against Maji Maji. 
                                                 
588 The colonial encyclopedia  complied by the last governor of German East Africa, Heinrich 
Schnee, has a section devoted to colonial warfare.  The dearth of material resources and lack of 
infrastructure in the German colonies were such that the contributors emphasized swift, brutal, 
total victories over indigenous opponents as the most “zweckmäßiger” way to victory.  Schnee, 
1.Band, 683-5. 
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 A second effect was the Germans’ near total dependence on indigenous 
allies, either imported from outside the colony or raised locally through a 
complicated system of alliances with African societies and polities.  The 
overwhelming majority of the Schutztruppe was made up of mercenary forces, the 
Askari.  As discussed in chapters two through four, initially these were Muslim 
levies from Sudan or Shangaani from Mozambique (referred to erroneously by the 
Germans as “Zulus”), but these were gradually replaced with Swahili Muslim 
soldiers from the coast and Nyamwezi troops from the area around Tabora in 
central Tanzania.589  The Askari, directed by white officers, provided the majority 
of the Germans’ professional manpower in East Africa, and as such they acted as 
one of the primary instruments of conquest.  Needless to say, their view of their 
role and of the tasks they were given was not identical to that held by their 
“superiors,” but on the whole they proved highly reliable, even during the 
appalling conditions of the First World War.  As Tom von Prince and Ernst 
Nigmann discuss at length, the Askari already had some proficiency at warfare, 
especially the Sudanese, most of whom were survivors of the Mahdist expulsion 
of the British in the 1880s.  They were given extensive European-style training 
and equipped with the latest Mausers and Maxims, against which most 
Tanganyikan adversaries could only muster spears or muskets (which were 
                                                 
589 Glassman, 250.  There exist no extensive studies of the Askaris at the present time, but there 
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 admittedly quite deadly if the Africans got close enough or could surprise colonial 
units). 
Just as the Germans were also forced to work through jumbe 
administrators (usually Swahili or Arabs from the coast imposed on local 
societies), they had to rely until a very late date on local allies to pacify 
“rebellious tribes.”590  German conquest of the interior would have been well nigh 
impossible without the frequent participation of “native levies.”591  The extensive 
involvement of Africans in the German conquest was the main factor that 
prevented a unified resistance against the Schutztruppe, which the tiny colonial 
forces would have been in no position to oppose.  Such alliances had everything 
to do with local politics, as many Africans—particularly African elders and 
leaders—saw the Germans not as alien invaders as much as an opportunity to 
settle old scores and reinforce their power within their own societies and vis-à-vis 
their neighbors.  The free hand enjoyed by Prince and his colleagues, when 
combined with the ease with which they could find ready and willing allies 
proved a deadly mixture for the Hehe.  Indeed, it was the interaction of these two 
elements that led to the Hehe Empire’s destruction. 
 
                                                 
590 Iliffe argues the era of compromise lasted until the end of the decade before World War One, at 
which point most of the alliances were replaced by a regular administration and attempts at settler 
“self-government.”  See Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, chapter 7 and Sunseri, Vilimani: 
Labor Migration and Rural Change in Early Colonial Tanzania (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 
2002). 
 
591 Zirkel, 97.  
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 War in Colonial East Africa 
Having established the actions of local officers as key catalysts in both the Hehe 
conflict and colonial wars in East Africa more generally, one is still left 
wondering why their tactics were so wasteful of the very “human capital” that 
was so desperately needed for the colonial labor force, a labor force which was 
the colony’s primary asset and a continual obsession for German officials until 
1918.592  German behavior during the Hehe conflict begs the question, why did 
the autonomy of officers in the field not have a moderating effect on their 
behavior?     
The overwhelming violence deployed by Prince, Schele, and Liebert is 
indeed part of a broader pattern of behavior displayed by the colonizers during 
their wars in East Africa.  The depredations of Peters and later Lettow-Vorbeck 
have already been cited, but their behavior pales in comparison with the well-
known brutality and destruction wrought by the Germans in their suppression of 
the Maji Maji Revolt of 1905-1906, one of “the two greatest risings in East 
Central Africa.”593  The “scorched earth” methods used to crush all resistance in 
German East Africa during the Maji Maji Revolt are often cited jointly with the 
Herero-Nama War as compelling proof of the “Hun’s” proclivity for slaughter in 
the colonies.  To be sure, the governor and commander-in-chief in that conflict, 
Adolf Graf von Götzen, explicitly declared the burning of African infrastructure 
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 (homes, crops, fields) and the mass starvation that ensued to be the Germans’ 
“best friends.”  As noted above, these highly destructive tactics were referred to 
as “indispensable allies” when pacifying recalcitrant Africans.594  Such policies 
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Africans, most of whom were 
not even involved in the conflict.595 
The manner in which German officers exercised their freedom of action 
had everything to do with their sociology and the situation they faced the on the 
one hand, and the nature imperial project as a whole on the other.  As to the first 
issue, the scholar Wolfgang Petter offers several explanations for the officers’ 
eagerness to initiate Buschkriege.596  Many of the officers in the colonies faced 
honor courts back in Germany for gambling debts, adultery, and various other 
offenses.  Others saw themselves as having no prospect of advancement in the 
metropole, lacking the connections or background often necessary to win 
promotions in the peacetime army.597  The colonies offered a second chance to 
such officers, and there was therefore strong incentive to engage in hostilities 
whenever possible in order to deliver career boosting victories.  For individuals 
living like warlords, surrounded by Askari loyal to them and them alone, 
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 controlling the destiny of thousands of people with practically no oversight, the 
temptation to engage in “excesses” was great indeed. 
Added to this was the situation faced by all colonizers during the initial 
decades of their rule in Africa.  The Schutztruppe were often thrust into the 
middle of “enemy territory,” surrounded by vast numbers of “hostiles” whom the 
Germans did not know or understand.  “Often the time spent in the middle of 
potential enemies led to nervousness and, connected with the awareness of 
superior firepower, to the overreaction typical of all colonial wars.”598  The 
constant fear felt by Magdalene von Prince and her husband during their time in 
the Iringa garrison, discussed in the last chapter, proved to be a powerful 
incentive to engage on policies that bordered on massacre.  Paranoia combined 
with Europe’s most sophisticated killing instruments was a deadly mixture; as the 
English writer Henri Belloc put it: “Whatever happens we have got/ the Maxim 
gun and they have not.”599  The late nineteenth century was characterized by the 
greatest disparity in world history between the arms of Europeans and those of 
their opponents; it was a gap that would steadily close throughout the twentieth.   
The people of the southern highlands were hardly strangers to warfare; 
indeed, it had been endemic to the region for decades as discussed in the context 
of the formation of the Hehe Empire in chapter two.  And African warfare was 
anything but “Neger with spears” (as German officers thought all too often before 
experience taught them otherwise)—the Shaka revolution, adopted and elaborated 
                                                 
598 Petter, 164. 
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 upon by Munyigumba and Mkwawa, provided the Hehe state with enormous 
coercive capability and a standing army full of some of the most proficient killers 
on the continent.  The Hehe even proved to be highly adaptable, whether it was 
the tactics they developed to avoid massed German fire or—in contrast to the 
Zulu or the Sokoto Caliphate—their ability to transition from set-piece warfare to 
guerrilla war.  But the kind of warfare brought by these ambitious aliens was of a 
very different character than what the indigenous people had known before.  The 
Germans were equipped and supplied by one of the world’s premier industrial 
powers, a power that did not hesitate to use new weapons on colonial enemies that 
allowed a handful of troops to slaughter untold hundreds, and in some cases 
thousands, of warriors and civilians.600  Furthermore, while the armies of the 
Hehe and their enemies drew on the local subsistence economy and generally took 
sufficient supplies to last one month and could furthermore draw on a formidable 
system of stockpiled food stored across the empire, the Schutztruppe had to live 
off land the land in a manner reminiscent of soldiers of the Thirty Years’ War.601  
Hehe armies were too large to live exclusively on plundered goods, and their 
leaders—even the dreaded Mkwawa—had to consider the political and social 
consequences of destroying the assets of the very people he was trying to absorb 
and incorporate into the ever-growing Hehe tributary state.  German officers and 
their Askari were essentially professional mercenaries who numbered far fewer 
than their African opponents and had no need to return to farm the land—they 
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 could wage “total war” on a local scale indefinitely as long as there was sufficient 
ammunition and, as Prince notes time and again, alcohol.    
Overall, even if the Germans were basically inserting themselves into the 
local political system, their backing from the metropole and ability to muster 
resources from across the colony often meant that they behaved with no restraint 
other than what their own power would allow.  Even Muhinja had to observe 
certain conventions, as it was not impossible that one day his Sangu or Bena 
enemies would return the favor in Uhehe.  The goal of Hehe warfare was to 
incorporate enemies, not annihilate them or drive them to the point of total social 
collapse.  This was precisely how Uhehe had grown in the first place, like the 
Ngoni.  As Nigmann points out, prisoners of war and female captives were taken 
by the Hehe as a crucial part of the agricultural labor force.602  Women were the 
backbone of Hehe agricultural society, and captives from newly annexed 
territories were the primary mechanism of extending chiefly lineages and kinship 
networks.  German officers had neither the ability nor often the inclination to deal 
with large numbers of prisoners; they simply did not bother taking them unless it 
was part of the “strategic hamlet policy” or the Hehe in question were useful as 
hostages to compel “their men” to submit to summary German justice.603  Even if 
the Germans had wanted to instantiate themselves into local African politics, 
which in many cases they did, a variety of factors discussed in the previous 
chapters prevented this process from going smoothly.  The Germans were not 
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603 The policy of summarily shooting or hanging all Hehe taken in battle, as well as an Hehe 
encountered carrying a weapon, was explicitly pronounced by Governor Liebert in July 1897.  
Proklamation Lieberts, 11 July 1897, BAB, R1001/288, Bl. 184. 
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 allowed (legally or culturally) to take African wives or become the founders of 
new African lineages or dynasties (unlike the Portuguese Prazeros of 
Mozambique that had set up kingdoms there between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries), they did not understand African political structures, did not speak the 
local languages, and could not point as the Ngoni or the Hehe could to previous 
generations of local elites that were now high-ranking members of a new imperial 
society.  And after their term of service, unless they became a settler like Tom 
von Prince and his wife, German officers left the colony; they did not have to deal 
with the medium to long-term consequences of their actions the same way that an 
African conqueror like Mkwawa or Merere did.  All of this meant that the 
Germans were inclined—in their minds compelled—to use extreme forms of 
violence as a means of political language, negotiation, and administration. 
 As stated, the extreme brutality that characterized the Hehe War and 
others like it also had much to do with the imperial project as a whole.  In the case 
of German Southwest Africa, Governor Theodor Leutwein was chastised for 
waging a similar war of destruction against the Herero.  His retort is both telling 
and unusually candid:  
A consistent colonial policy would no doubt require the execution of all 
prisoners capable of bearing arms.  I myself would not like to adopt this 
practice, but I would not reproach anyone who did.  Colonization is 
always inhumane.  It must ultimately amount to an encroachment on the 
rights of the original inhabitants in favor of the intruders. If that is 
unacceptable then one must oppose all colonization, which at least would 
be a logical attitude.  What is impossible is to on one hand to take land 
from the natives on the basis of questionable treaties and risk the life and 
health of one’s countrymen to this end, and on the other hand to enthuse 
about humanitarian principles in the Reichstag.  Yet this is precisely what 
many delegates have done.604 
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Indeed, the Germans’ goals—which were non-negotiable—of protecting trade, 
stamping out slavery, and ending “intertribal warfare,” however laudable in their 
own minds and to their advocates back home in Germany, involved an inherent 
outpouring of imperial violence, legitimated by the admitted repugnance of many 
of these practices.  The “new era” the Germans wished to create could only mean 
the end of a way of live for millions of Africans, a way of life they would not give 
up without a life or death struggle.605  
 Colonization was an inherently destructive process as much as it was a 
creative, or “developmentalist” one—indeed, the two were inextricably linked.606  
Colonial regimes tended to move as quickly as possible to regular, peaceful 
administration once “pacification” was complete.  In the German case, this 
occurred only after the end of the great colonial wars of 1904-1907.  Even then, 
the military maintained a disproportionate influence over colonial affairs to the 
institutionalization of their practices and often their modes of thinking as well.  
The historian Bruce Vandervort claims that the “cult of violence” that arose out of 
Europe’s colonial wars led to a cynical belief in the moral supremacy of armed 
force –“might makes right”—that poisoned both European domestic politics and 
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 colonial policy in general.607  Colonial officials, both civil and military, created 
and maintained structures that were fundamentally militaristic in nature, and they 
maintained an almost unwavering faith in the "salutatory effect” of mass killing 
and property destruction that lasted until the end of the wars of decolonization.608  
A racist, and in some cases homicidal, contempt for Africans, already a prominent 
feature of the discourse surrounding the “Scramble,” was enshrined as a 
cornerstone of imperial policy.  But in specific cases such as the Hehe, the official 
attitude towards African peoples could undergo startling reverses in the face of 
changed political circumstances.   The Hehes’ transformation from nemesis to 
romanticized Herrenvolk (“lordly race”) has parallels elsewhere: the Ndebele of 
what would become Southern Rhodesia came to be viewed as a “martial race” 
with noble qualities, and the Zulu—once the terror of British forces—came to be 
seen as Britain’s answer to the American notion of the “noble savage.”609  And 
just as the view of African opponents continually shifted in both the British and 
the German context, policies of extreme violence were hardly unique to the 
Germans.  A few examples of other events around the world that were 
contemporaneous with the German-Hehe War indicate, as the historian Reviel 
Netz in his recent work Barbed Wire: An Ecology of Modernity argues, that “[t]he 
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 point must be stressed.  When we note the surprising fact that the concentration 
camp was invented by Britain, in 1900, this is an indictment not of Britain but of 
1900.  The concentration camp was called forth by the times themselves.  War 
was total, so that the enemy population had to be dealt with.”610  The harsh 
realities of colonization and the horrors of the fin de siècle world, horrors that 
were not confined to any one European power, were recognized at the time, as 
indicated by the satirical cartoon from a 1905 issue of the German journal 
pacification used by all the European powers of the era.   
Thomas Theodor Heine’s depiction of the colonial powers involved in the 
conquest of Africa is one of turn of the century cultural stereotypes.  The 
Germans are so obsessed with order that they post regulations about dumping 
snow, and they attempt to arrange the animals in a neat, subdued row.  The 
English squeeze indigenous peoples dry, pouring alcohol into an African’s mouth 
while money is extracted from him as an Anglican pastor stands by.  The French 
are depicted as interbreeding with their Africans (part of a general disdain that 
both the Germans and the English had for the French policy of assimilation in 
their colonies).  Worst of all, King Leopold II of Belgium dines on a meal of an 
African, a comment on what was then public knowledge: the rubber trade and 
government construction projects were slowly grinding down the Congolese 
population by about half (which, by the Belgians’ own estimate, meant the deaths 
of 10 million people).611  Stereotypical as it is, the cartoon is a frank admission of 
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612 Cartoon by Thomas Theodor Heine from the German satire magazine, Simplicissimus from 
1905 in the midst of the “colonial scandals” of the Herero War and Maji Maji, 1905.  
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 what most Europeans knew at the time—or at least they knew enough to know 
that they did not want to know—that colonization was, at its core, organized 
violence.  Conrad put it succinctly enough: “The conquest of the earth, which 
mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or 
slightly flatter noses that ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too 
much.”613 
 
Colonial Warfare During the Age of the “New Imperialism” 
Other wars of imperial conquest could quickly become every bit as destructive, or 
even “genocidal,” when waged by other powers for reasons similar to those 
indicated above.  Michael Lieven’s article, “’Butchering the Brutes all Over the 
Place’: Total War and Massacre in Zululand, 1879” makes clear what methods 
European commanders would deploy when the threat of defeat at Africa hands 
loomed before them.  Contrary to images of the Zulu War as a “noble conflict” 
that bore no similarity to the slaughter of the Great War, “the war should be seen 
rather as an example of total war in which the British systematically destroyed the 
economic basis of Zululand and carried out a policy of refusing to take prisoners 
and massacring the wounded; towards the end of the war they were only saved 
from a policy of genocide by the capture of the Zulu king.”614  Lieven notes that 
                                                 
613 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness (New York: Heritage Press, 1969), 13.  
 
614 Michael Lieven, “’Butchering Brutes all over the Place’: Total War and Massacre in Zululand, 
1879,” History: The Journal of the Historical Association 84 (Oct 1999), 614.  The only journalist 
with the force at the start of the campaign was unequivocal in arguing that: “the fallacy of fighting 
with an uncivilized race with the same feelings of humanity that dictate out wars with civilized 
races was thoroughly proved; and it thus was shown that in Zululand neither men, kraals, cattle, 
nor crops should be spared on any pretence whatever, except on the complete submission of the 
whole nation.”  Lieven, 618.   
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 the “total war”615 in Zululand stopped just short of the kind waged by the 
Germans in Southwest Africa, but this was only because the highly centralized 
war machine of the Zulu collapsed with the defeat of the monarchy.  As described 
in chapters five and six, Mkwawa’s refusal to surrender and decision to wage 
guerrilla war on the Germans meant that the Hehe war entered a “total” phase 
after 1896.  This was equally true of many conflicts with so-called “acephalous 
peoples” (meaning those that putatively lived without states on clearly defined 
leaders) such as the Nama of Southwest Africa, the “forest peoples” of Congo, the 
Igbo and the Tiv of Nigeria, the Baule of the Ivory Coast, and the Shona in 
Southern Rhodesia, none of whom had clear objectives to take or powerful 
leaders with whom to negotiate (who could then impose a settlement).  The 
greater difficulty in bringing decentralized “guerrilla” armies to heel is amply 
demonstrated in Nigeria.  There, Sir Frederick Lugard experienced exactly the 
same phenomenon.  The conquest of Hausaland was relatively brief and did not 
degenerate into a ruthless scorched earth campaign against guerrilla fighters.  
There, the Hausa state authorities were strong enough to negotiate and enforce a 
settlement with the British on their own people once induced to surrender in open 
battle.616  But when Lugard’s forces attacked the “stateless” Tiv in central 
Nigeria, “they found it a long, difficult, and expensive process—not because the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
615 Lieven uses the term “total war” to refer to the deliberate annihilation of mass numbers of 
people and their source of livelihood, rather than in the sense of the “total war” waged during 
World War One, which referred to a war in which the mobilization of the entire society’s 
productive base and human resources was necessary.   Lieven’s “total war” is in essence a 
Vernichtungskrieg of the sort waged by Prince, Liebert, and other German officers. 
 
616 Woodruff Smith, European Imperialism in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Chicago: Nelson–Hall, 
1998), 180. 
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 Tiv were particularly numerous or warlike, but because no one could surrender 
for all of the Tiv kinship groups together.”617  
In the Zulu case as in German East Africa, commanders on the scene were 
left to figure out how to end the war, but like the German-Hehe case they had to 
act in accordance with the uncompromising mission given them by their political 
masters:   
If [the British forces] used a strategy of total war to reduce Zulu civilians, 
chiefs and warriors to submission then they did so because there was no 
other way to successfully carry out the demands of their political masters 
[total victory].  Ultimately the cause of the massacres and of the policy of 
total war lay not in the morality of individuals but in the logic, or 
pathology, of the European imperial expansion in Africa.618 
 
Just as in East Africa, when metropolitan leadership demanded victory at any 
price and left its men on the spot to their own devices, the result could be 
massacre or even genocide, a situation that “emerged necessarily from the 
pathology of empire when confronted with the possibility of defeat.”619  One 
colonel pointed out, in one sense accurately enough, that killing all prisoners and 
annihilating civilians “was beastly but there was nothing else to do.  War is war 
and savage war is the worst of the lot.”620  He was correct in the sense that 
“savage war,” or what colonial warfare expert Colonel C. E. Callwell 
                                                 
617 Woodruff Smith, European, 180. 
 
618 Lieven, 632. 
 
619 Lieven, 616. 
 
620  Lieven, 622.  
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 Eurocentrically and euphemistically termed “small wars,”621 often turned into 
outright slaughter when Africans offered effective resistance to imperial designs. 
 The revolt against British rule of the Ndebele and the Shona in 
Southern Rhodesia in 1896-1897 bore even more similarity to what occurred, not 
in East Africa, but in German Southwest Africa, a fact that was widely recognized 
at the time in the era before the “Black Legend” of German colonialism (noted in 
chapter one) had gained wide currency.  A flurry of editorials in London and the 
Cape closely followed the outbreak and course of the Herero rebellion in 
neighboring Southwest Africa in 1904, with many observers expressing sympathy 
for the Germans. The reactions in the non-German press did much to place the 
horrors of the Herero revolt and other German colonial wars in an international 
context.  South African and British newspapers forecasted that, as was the case 
with the Zulus, the Germans would have to utterly crush the Herero before they 
would yield.  Many also called for solidarity with the “imperiled” white race in 
German Southwest Africa.  The South African News asserted that the Germans 
were fully justified in responding with extreme severity, as “the Herero, like the 
Matabele [Ndebele], are worse than useless.”622  An editorial in The African 
Review pointed out that the “savagery” of the Africans, rather than German 
malfeasance, was to blame for the revolt.  The Herero were just like the Ndebele 
                                                 
621 See Colonel C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles & Practices (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1996). 
 
622 South African News, 24 February 1904, BAB,  R2111.  This and other articles were 
meticulously annotated and filed by the German Colonial Department of the Foreign Office during 
the Herero-Nama Revolt.  It seems obvious that the government in Berlin was paying close 
attention to both their critics and their supporters in Britain and South Africa.  The international 
context of their actions was at least partially clear to them at the time.  It was certainly clear to 
Theodor Leutwein and Lothar von Trotha.   
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 and deserved to be treated as such—with the utmost severity and swiftness.623  
The London Times praised the infamous Lothar von Trotha as an effective, firm 
commander who would act appropriately.624  As General von Trotha himself 
indicated, he was well aware of precedents for his actions elsewhere in the 
colonial world, and he cited these comparable cases in justifying his own policies.  
Accurately enough, he answered his critics: “Have the streams of blood been 
forgotten that have flowed and still flow in India and in the Cape, in North Africa 
and now in Somalia?  Colonies must be conquered; nothing of that can be 
withdrawn.  The natives have to give way, see America or Australia.  Either by 
the bullet or via mission through brandy.”625   
Harshest of all, a commentator in South Africa echoed von Trotha in 
blasting the missionaries for encouraging the Africans to think of themselves as 
equals to their white masters.  The Herero and Ovambo were among the “dying 
nations” of the world, and as such one was “fully justified” in utilizing “extreme 
measures” to crush them.626  The author then approvingly cited “ethnographical 
opinion” in Britain and Germany, which agreed that “the two races [African and 
European] possess so many physical and instinctive differences that 
                                                 
 
623 The African Review, 30 January, BAB, R2111.  The author then approvingly quoted Sir 
Frederick Lugard (whose campaigns in Nigeria and Uganda were probably as brutal as those 
described above): “It is unfortunately the case that the African savage in his primitive stage can, as 
a rule, understand nothing but force, and he regards arguments and verbal lessons as weapons of 
the weak, to be listened to for the moment and set aside when convenient.  If, however, he is once 
convinced by coercion that the white man has power to enforce his admonitions, he will in future 
respect them to some extent.”  The author dwelled considerably on the exaggerated atrocity stories 
about mutilated German women and children.    
 
624 Times, 9 May 1904, BAB, R2114. 
 
625 Gerhard Pool, Samuel Maharero (Gamsberg: Macmillan, 1991), 248. 
 
626 South Africa News, 31 May 1904, BAB, R2115. 
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 zoographically we should classify them in different species... as much, for 
instance, as horse and donkey, which we admittedly treat very differently.”  He 
concluded by highlighting the “beneficial results” of revolts like those of the 
Herero, Shona and Ndebele, because they suddenly made available to the settlers 
an ample supply of land and subservient, rootless African labor. 
 The comparison was an apt one.  Just as in Southwest Africa, the 
African population in Southern Rhodesia rose in revolt against the settler 
population after years of abuse.  The white population was so outraged that there 
were many vocal cries advocating genocide against the Ndebele and particularly 
against the “villainous Shona.”  General Carrington deployed his 2,140 white and 
603 African troops in April 1896 and immediately began a “scorched-earth” 
campaign to destroy the Ndebele and their productive base piecemeal.627  As was 
so often the case in colonial warfare, the stateless Shona society proved even 
more difficult to conquer—and more vilified—than the relatively centralized 
Ndebele who managed to come to a negotiated settlement quickly.628  When the 
                                                 
627 Carrington’s staff officers were, like their German colleagues, clear on this point.  Without a 
single, stationary king as a target as in the initial conquest of the territory in 1893, the Ndbele as 
whole would have to be ground down.  “In the 1896 rebellion there was no king or country to 
overthrow so the object then was the destruction of kraals and the capture of supplies and cattle, 
and then to hunt the rebels relentlessly into their strongholds and caves.”  Ranger, 178. 
 
628 Significantly, these negotiations occurred at the behest of Cecil Rhodes and the British South 
Africa Company, who were being financially decimated by the conflict.  Negotiations had been 
prohibited by both the civilian and military authorities of the Empire, who demanded nothing less 
than “total surrender” from the Ndebele.  Imperial authorities had consistently demanded a “hard 
line” against the Ndebele and the Shona.  As early as 1885, the Deputy Commissioner of British 
Bechuanaland, Sir Sidney Shippard, declared: “I must confess that it would offer me sincere and 
lasting satisfaction if I could see the Matabele Matjaha cut down by our own rifles and machine 
guns like a cornfield by a reaping machine and I would not spare a single one if I could have my 
way.”  Dane Kennedy, Islands of White (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 130.  Rhodes, 
like Colonel von Deimling in Southwest Africa, handed them a fait accompli and publicized the 
agreement, thereby forcing imperial authorities to accept it.  
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 scattered, acephalous Shona rose in rebellion a few months after the Ndebele, the 
British responded with precisely the sort of “total war” (i.e., war of annihilation) 
described in chapter six and by Lieven in reference to the Zulu War.  For several 
months in 1896 Colonel Alderson’s forces went from kraal to kraal burning the 
dwellings and crops, and “subsequently all the caves which could be located were 
blown up.”629  On 13 October alone 150-200 huts were torched.  The head of the 
Native Department, Brabant, took his “Black Watch” (African auxiliaries with 
white officers) throughout the countryside, blasting and shooting all resistance 
they encountered.630  The systematic destruction of crops by Alderson and 
Brabant threatened entire regions with famine.631  Thousands of women and 
children were taken hostage to force the rebels to surrender, and many women 
were “given” to loyal “friendlies” and African police as rewards for their service.  
British authorities forced those women not given out in patronage to do hard labor 
at camps set up throughout the country, often at missionary settlements.632  By the 
end of 1896 the Shona were so hated that Father Biehler, Grey’s chaplain, echoed 
                                                 
629 Ranger, 283. 
 
630 E. A. H. Alderson, With the Mounted Infantry and the Mashonaland Field Force 1896 
(London: Methuen & Co., 1898), 208.  The Shona were as experienced with and proficient at 
guerrilla warfare as the Nama of Southwest Africa and the Hehe of East Africa.  They had resisted 
both the Portuguese for centuries and the Ndebeles’ attempts at occupation and exaction for 
decades before the invasion of the territory of the B.S.A.C. in 1893.  The Shona possessed a well-
established system of caves into which their communities would flee in the event of attack.  The 
British, infuriated at the Shonas’ unwillingness to “fight fairly” began a systematic policy of 
collapsing these caves with dynamite, killing all inside.   
 
631 Alderson ordered his forces to drive out the Shona, torch their dwellings, and station a small 
garrison in each district to “give the natives no rest and prevent them from planting their crops.” 
Alderson, 165-6. 
 
632 Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, Traders, and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 
1870-1939 (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1992), 39-40. 
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 popular sentiment when “He state[d] that the only chance for the future of the race 
is to exterminate the whole people, both male and female over the age of 
fourteen.”633 
 The “War of the Heads,” generally known as the “Hut Tax War” of 
1906 in British South Africa ended similarly with militia and army units 
systematically destroying the subsistence base of much of the area in revolt and 
killing thousands of Africans.634  To these examples from British Africa could be 
added many others.  It is for this reason that in 1920 the famous British critic of 
colonialism in Africa E. D. Morel attempted to caution his readers against 
uncritically accepting the “Black Legend” of German colonization:  
Without minimising in the slightest degree the action of the Germans in 
South West Africa, we should do well to have at the back of our minds the 
sort of indictment which would have been drawn up by a successful 
enemy in occupation of Rhodesia and Bechuanaland [Botswana], desirous 
of demonstrating our iniquities to the world in order to make out a case for 
retaining those territories for himself.  The treatment of the Matabele and 
the Mashonas by the Chartered Company would certainly not have 
appeared any less black if it had been supported by the affidavits of 
individual Matabele and Mashonas...635 
                                                 
633 Lindqvist, Exterminate, 62.  In February 1897 Biehler reiterated this point: “The different 
method of fighting when dealing with these coward Mashona must be adopted.  It seems to me 
that the only way of doing anything at all with these natives is to starve them, destroy their lands 
and kill all that can be killed.”  Ranger, 295.  Alderson and his successor, Colonel de Moleyns, 
acted in full agreement with Biehler.  Many subsequent observers have been baffled by von 
Trotha, and the settlers’ desire to liquidate much of the very base upon which their livelihood 
depended.  Even at the time Leutwein, Rohrbach, and other observers was astounded at the 
ferocity of the settler community and the troops brought in to quash the revolt.  But the desire to 
“exterminate all the brutes” was the inevitable outcome of an inherently unstable situation.  
Settlers and soldiers, all rhetoric aside, lived in constant terror of the “sea of black” that 
surrounded them.  As Dane Kennedy explains: “Taken to the logical extreme, relief from such 
terror terminated in either the complete segregation or the complete extermination of the 
indigenous inhabitants.  Each scenario represented a pure expression of racial fear.  Equally, each 
posed catastrophe for settlers by eliminating the cheap black labor upon which they depended.  
Thus, a continual tension existed between the extreme demands raised by racial fears and the 
practical needs felt by economic functions.”  See Kennedy, 147. 
634 See Benedict Carton, Blood from Your Children: The Colonial Origins of Generational 
Conflict in South Africa (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000). 
 
635 See E. D. Morel, The Black Man’s Burden (London: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 57.  Morel 
also cites examples in Bechuanaland (Botswana), Sudan, and elsewhere. 
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Morel knew his subject: he was one of the primary movers in the social 
movement that helped end King Leopold II’s rule over the so-called “Congo Free 
State,” and while at the beginning of his efforts he believed that the British model 
represented a more humane form of colonization than that of the Belgians (or 
Germans), by 1920 he had come to the conclusion that the territories flying the 
Union Jack bore witness to just as much brutality and inhumanity as those ruled 
by any other nation. 
Nor should one assume in turn that the British and Germans were alone in 
resorting to “Vernichtungskriege” in Africa.  The French army conquering the 
“hinterland” of the Ivory Coast from 1909 to 1911 in the wake of the Baule 
Revolt quickly came to the same conclusions as their European colleagues.  The 
acephalous Baule proved impossible to defeat with “normal methods,” so the 
French changed their tactics: 
The French strategy was as simple as it was brutal.  Frustrated with their 
failures in previous encounters with Baule guerrillas, the military adopted 
a full-scale search-and-destroy policy culminating in the destruction of the 
homes, possessions, and crops of the rebels.  By pursuing the Baule 
through two successive rainy seasons and systematically destroying their 
newly planted crops, the French brought the rebels to the brink of 
starvation… The population of the region appears to have been diminished 
by hundreds of thousands as a result of the military engagements and the 
famine and epidemic that swept the region in their wake.636 
 
                                                 
636 See Timothy C. Weiskel, “Changing Perspectives on African Resistance Movements and the 
Case of the Baule Peoples,” in West African Culture Dynamics: Archaeological and Historical 
Perspectives, ed. B. K. Schwartz Jr. and Raymond E. Dumett (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 
1980), 556. and Timothy C.. Weiskell, French Colonial Rule and the Baule Peoples: Resistance 
and Collaboration, 1889-1911 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), chapter VI. 
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 Weiskel believes that over 250,000 Baule died and hundreds of thousands more 
fled to neighboring British territory to avoid Governor Angoulvant’s expeditions 
(thereby reducing the population of the north half of the colony by over half).  
Many aspects of the French wars against the Baule echo themes and events 
discussed in the preceding chapters: a crusade against “slavery” in the interior of 
Africa, a dispute over trade and the right to mediate it, recalcitrant African elites 
who refused to bow to French authority, and—due to the acephalous nature of 
Baule political organization—a vicious guerrilla war that only ended after the 
French waged a war of destruction on the entire Baule population.  The scorched 
earth policies utilized against the Baule were also not an isolated incident.      
    637 
                                                 
637 Photo of Governor Angolvant and of a pacification atrocity from the Baule War (the object 
impaled on the stake is a Baule head).  Scanned from Weiskel, pictute section.  
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 During the even larger Volta-Bani War, hundreds of thousands of Africans in 
what is now Burkina Faso took up arms in 1915 against the brutality and 
arbitrariness of French taxation and conscription policies during the First World 
War.  Over a million people joined in the insurgency against French rule, and tens 
of thousands (at least 30,000 and probably more) of “rebels” and civilians 
perished over the course of French reprisal operations, which likewise featured 
widespread crop destruction, the shooting of noncombatants, and the prolific use 
of new weapons like the hand grenade.638  Similar examples could be drawn from 
the French conquest of Madagascar, the western Sudan, and Vietnam.  
 Nor were the original European powers alone in their ability and 
willingness to wage near-genocidal violence against local populations.  The 
American occupation of the Philippines (1899-1913) brought forth tremendous 
violence that may have led to the deaths of between 50,000 and 500,000 Filipinos 
(the number is widely disputed). 639  Some at the time even argued that total 
excess deaths may have numbered close to a million.  In 1908, Manuel Arellano 
Remondo, in a book entitled General Geography of the Philippine Islands, wrote: 
"The population decreased due to the wars, in the five-year period from 1895 to 
1900, since, at the start of the first insurrection, the population was estimated at 
                                                 
638 See Mahir Şaul and Patrick Royer, West African Challenge to Empire: Culture and History in 
the Volta-Bani Anticolonial War (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2001), 24. 
 
639 Retort, Afflicted Powers: Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War (London: Verson, 2005), 
85.  For detailed accounts of the war and American counterinsurgency tactics, see Brian 
McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989) and Frank Schumacher, 
“’Niederbrennen, plündern und töten sollt ihr’: Der Kolonialkrieg der USA auf den Philippinen 
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 9,000,000, and at present (1908), the inhabitants of the Archipelago do not exceed 
8,000,000 in number."640  A similarly volatile mixture of local politics, guerrilla 
warfare, fear and frustration on the part of the occupying forces, and a lack of 
supervision led to myriad atrocities.  H. G. Wells noted at the time: “There is no 
question that our men do ‘shoot niggers’ somewhat in the sporting spirit… 
Undoubtedly, they do not regard the shooting of Filipinos just as they would the 
shooting of white troops… The soldiers feel that they are fighting with savages, 
not with soldiers.”641  The U.S. counterinsurgency war featured many of the same 
acts of extreme violence that characterized the Germans’ war against the Hehe, 
including concentration camps, the destruction of villages and crops, and frequent 
massacres such as that at Budja Daro in 1906, when over 1,500 women, children, 
and the elderly were shot and bayoneted in a volcanic crater as part of “nation 
building” (pictured below).642  The American troops made frequent use of torture, 
including the infamous “water cure” (featured in the picture below), and General 
Jacob H. Smith reportedly ordered his men to turn one island into a “howling 
wilderness” and to shoot every Filipino above age ten.  President Theodor 
Roosevelt was very clear as to the reasons that this sort of violence occurred: 
“The warfare that has extended the boundaries of civilization at the expense of 
barbarism and savagery has been for centuries one of the most potent factors in 
the progress of humanity.  Yet from its very nature it has always and everywhere 
                                                 
640 Quoted in Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power 
(New York: Basic Books, 2002), 125.   
 
641 Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, & the Philippines 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 87. 
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 been liable to dark abuses.” 643  The Filipinos and Hehe would, of course, have 
taken little consolation form the notion that their deaths had all occurred in the 
name of the spread of “civilization.” 
 644 
Why European militaries used such tactics to beat colonial opponents is 
not difficult to explain, and those tactics seemingly depended little if at all on the 
nationality of the colonizers in question in these and other cases.  Commanders 
like Alderson, Carrington, von Liebert, and Lugard felt that they had to beat their 
opponents decisively and completely with limited resources.  The only perceived 
way to overcome the overwhelming numerical superiority of their African 
adversaries was to rapidly destroy the region’s “productive base” (which included 
homes, crops, and often non-combatants) through a scorched earth policy.  The 
deployment of the Europeans’ massive firepower was the other way to 
compensate for their numerical inferiority, and machine-guns, magazine rifles, 
and artillery inevitably and quite deliberately caused crippling losses to any 
indigenous armies the Europeans faced.   “Native warfare” often became a 
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Metford magazine rifle managed to hold off eight Ndebele attackers simultaneously, shooting 
down several and forcing the survivors to flee in terror.  Colonel R. S. S. Baden-Powell, The 
Matabele Campaign 1896 (London: Methuen & Co., 1897), 58. 
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 “partridge hunt” bordering on absolute slaughter, as von Prince, von Liebert, 
Baden-Powell (who fought against the Ndebele in 1896), Angoulvant, and others 
described it.646  Africans were, of course, well aware of this fact after several 
bloody encounters with superior European arms.  It was for this reason that they 
adopted “insidious methods” of guerrilla warfare.  Indeed, Mkwawa learned 
precisely this lesson from the disastrous siege of his capital at Kalenga and 
repeated engagements with the AvaDaliki. 
European technological superiority, therefore, did not mean that the 
Europeans were invulnerable; indeed, as the fate of the Zelewski column shows, 
entire contingents of Europeans and their African troops could be wiped out.  The 
determined ferocity of African opponents and the dehumanizing weaponry the 
Germans, British, French, and others used to crush them were extremely 
brutalizing to the European combatants and the Africans and Asians that served 
with them.  The need to maintain cohesion and discipline in a harsh, alien 
environment surrounded by “hostile hordes” of enemies who would most likely 
not take prisoners, whether they were white or black (in the case of the Askari and 
other similar indigenous forces), had an electrifying effect on colonial soldiers.  In 
all likelihood they could be induced to carry out instructions to kill women and 
children through a combination of factors.  Peer pressure and group bonds that 
enforced conformity in a dangerous situation, the sanctioned authority of their 
superiors, and the perceived need to maintain the “dignity of the master race” in a 
barbaric no man’s land combined to create a potent mix that greatly enhanced the 
likelihood of troops acting with extraordinary ruthlessness.  The widespread racist 
contempt most Europeans seem to have held for Africans by the turn of the 
                                                 
646 Baden-Powell, 63-4.  See footnote 221 on the “Jew hunts” and partisan operations during the 
Ostkrieg. 
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 century both legitimized such behavior by officers and men and encouraged 
“excesses.”  European forces imagined themselves the guardians of a master race 
facing a large, hostile population.  Commanders like von Prince or Carrington and 
their men correctly perceived that they could act with practical impunity when it 
came to defeating “kaffirs.”647  Indeed they were often encouraged to think this 
way by the military and civilian officials above them; the legitimization of the 
soldiers’ behavior by Governors like von Schele and by von Liebert—and Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, who awarded Schele the Orden pour le Mérite —meant that soldiers 
and officers could act to some degree in good conscience because of the powerful 
sanction given them by the state.648  These aspects of the colonial experience 
when taken together made it all too likely that European conquerors would take 
what Sven Lindqvist refers to as the “colonial shortcut,” meaning the targeting of 
entire recalcitrant populations in the event that they resisted the imposition of 
state authority.  As he notes, however, “the ‘colonial shortcut’ was forbidden in 
Europe.  Here it was a crime against humanity to save the lives of soldiers by 
bombing women, children, and old people.  Human rights seemed to forbid what 
military necessity seemed to demand—a contradiction that has colored the entire 
20th century.”649      
                                                 
 
647 While work has been done on this theme in the context of German warfare on the Eastern Front 
in the Second World War, I have yet to see any such treatments of the conduct of warfare in the 
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Fin de siècle Colonial Warfare and World History 
The Germans were, therefore, very much embedded in the discourses, practices, 
and events of their era.   The catastrophic population decline that struck German 
East Africa, described by Kjekshus, Koponen, Iliffe, and others was hardly 
unique.  Enzo Travesto in his The Origins of Nazi Violence offers a short but 
striking list of some of the “achievements” of “civilization” in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  Sri Lanka’s population fell from 4-10 million to 1 
million; Algeria’s population declined from 3 to 2.3 million; the Ivory Coast’s 
population fell from 1.5 million to 160,000, British Sudan witnessed a decline 
from 8 or 9 million to between 2 and 3 million; the Belgian Congo’s population 
declined from 20 to 10 million; and many pacific islands, such as Tahiti and New 
Caledonia, suffered a ninety percent decline in population. “According to the 
most trustworthy calculations, the victims of the European conquests in Asia and 
Africa in the course of the second half of the nineteenth century numbered 50 
million to 60 million, roughly half being due to the famine in India.”650  Indeed, 
the mega-famines of India, which are explored in great detail in Mike Davis’s 
Late Victorian Holocausts, were very much a part of the imposition of 
colonialism and may have carried away as many as 30 million people.651  These 
are truly staggering figures which, while they in no way diminish the brutality and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
650 Enzo Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence, trans. by Janet Lloyd (New York: The New 
Press, 2003), 65.  
 
651 See Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third 
World (London: Verso, 2001)., especially chapter 2   
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 costs associated with German rule in East Africa and elsewhere, serve to put 
German atrocities in perspective.  As Reviel Netz says, “this is an indictment not 
of Britain [or in the present case, Germany] but of 1900.” 
 This atmosphere of conquest, chauvinism, and a profound belief in the 
inevitability and desirability of the spread of Western civilization paved the way 
for even more catastrophic events in the twentieth century.  As several authors 
have pointed out, lessons learned in the course of Europe’s so-called “small wars” 
of the nineteenth-century had dire consequences for the planning of the First 
World War and its disastrous course in the war’s first few months.652  Military 
planners learned, in fact, all the wrong lessons from campaigns such as that 
waged against the Hehe.  Believing their own claims that victory in such conflicts 
had been achieved through moral superiority and the exemplary honor of 
European armies almost totally obscured any realization of the potentially horrific 
effects that modern weaponry and tactics would have on warfare when both sides 
deployed Europe’s newest death tools against one another.  Such dangerous 
misunderstandings about the new nature of warfare were further exacerbated by a 
blind devotion to obsolete conceptions of masculine honor of the sort trumpeted 
by von Prince and other Schutztruppe officers.653  From 1914 to 1918, the 
colonial powers would subject one another to a vast bloodletting all too familiar 
                                                 
652 See John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1975), 
Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1981), and Bruce 
Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa 1830-1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1998), 211. 
 
653 Robert Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998), 226-7.  Such antiquated notions rendered European generals and doctors 
completely incapable of understanding or handling “shell shock.” 
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 to their respective “colonized peoples,” as the weapons and tactics developed to 
conquer and pacify those peoples were turned upon Europeans.  “The death-rattle 
of the dying and the shrieks of the mad [that] echo[ed] in the sublime stillness of 
infinity” were now heard across the European continent itself.654  The First World 
War, the “original catastrophe of the twentieth century,” led in turn to the Second 
and an even grander project of racial conquest and imperial aggrandizement: the 
Third Reich’s war for Lebensraum in the East: 
Deportations, dehumanizations, and racial extermination as undertaken by 
Hitler’s Germany are in line with earlier ideas that were firmly anchored 
in the history of Western imperialism.  The fact that National Socialism 
was the first to envisage a policy of extermination within Europe itself, 
targeting nations of the Old World, and in particular a people active at the 
origins of Western civilizations, does not negate the connection.  The 
“logical and factual precedent” for Nazi crimes is to be found in colonial 
wars, not in Bolshevik Russia. 655 
 
The idea that the Holocaust and the War in the East had its origins, at least in part, 
in previous developments in the colonies is not new—this was one of the major 
thrusts of Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism.  What is often 
forgotten, however, is that her imperial examples were not primarily German, but 
rather British or French—South Africa, Egypt, India, and Algeria.  And the most 
direct examples of colonialism polluting European domestic politics is not 
Germany but rather Spain: the army that laid waste to much of Civil War era 
Spain, that had bombed Guernica, was the very same army that had just finished 
                                                 
654 Der Feldzug gegen die Herero, vol. 1, Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika I 
(Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1906), 213-4. 
 
655 Traverso, 73.  
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waging a ruthless war of destruction against the Berber rebels of Morocco’s Rif 
Rebellion (1921-1926).656  The Rif Rebellion and other colonial wars in Morocco 
had been Franco’s formative experiences: 
In 1920 he participated in the founding of the Spanish Foreign Legion, 
composed of riffraff that liked to parade with their enemies’ heads 
mounted on the points of their bayonets.  The discipline was such that a 
soldier could be shot for the slightest offense, but was allowed to commit 
whatever outrages he liked in the conquered Moorish villages.  It was 
these legionnaires that the German air force moved over to Spain at the 
beginning of the Civil War in 1936.  They brought with them all the 
brutality of the colonial war.  To rule Morocco was to terrorize its people.  
To rule was an expression of inborn superiority.  The people were children 
who needed a father’s firm hand.  Franco brought these colonial attitudes 
back home. The occupation of Morocco stood as the model for his forty-
year occupation of Spain.657  
 
The second European power to blur the distinction between the colonial 
world and the metropole was Italy, whose 1935 war against Ethiopia was both the 
last of the European conquests of the so-called Dark Continent and the first major 
war of what would become the fascist attempt to reorder the world.  The 
Abyssinian War “bridged the gap between nineteenth-century imperialism and the 
                                                 
656 Sebastian Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 
657 Lindqvist, Bombing, 51.  
 
 282
 Nazi war for German Lebensrtaum.”658  Mussolini’s forces in Africa under the 
command of Rudolfo “the butcher” Graziani (a name he had acquired during his 
time as the infamous governor of Italian Libya) utilized tanks, machine guns, and 
even poison gas bombs  in their attempt to crush all Ethiopian resistance.659 
When Hitler, the greatest totalitarian of all, spoke on the connections 
between his war against “Slavic barbarism” and prior imperial projects, his 
examples were indeed global rather than specifically German.  Many were 
references to British India, which the Germans (and indeed the British 
themselves) regarded as one of the primary sources of Great Britain’s global 
power: “What India was for England, the eastern territories will be for us.”  “If 
the English were to be ejected, India would waste away.  Our role in the East will 
be analogous to that of the English in India.”  “It must be possible to dominate 
that eastern region with 250,000 men led by good administrators.  Let us follow 
the example of the English, who, with 250,000 men in all, of whom 50,000 are 
soldiers, rule over 400 million Indians.  The eastern space must be ruled in 
perpetuity by the Germans.”660  He also made frequent references to the “race 
war” between Native Americans and European settlers: “The natives will have to 
be shot… Our sole duty is to Germanize the country by the immigration of 
Germans, regarding the natives as redskins.”  The war in the East was to be like 
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 “the war waged on the Indians in North America.”661  “We also east Canadian 
wheat and don’t think about the Indians.”662 “This will become a real Indian 
war.”663  The resemblances and convergences of colonial warfare with war on the 
Eastern Front go far beyond the random statements the Führer.  To name but one 
specific example of the explicitly colonial character of warfare in the East, S.S. 
Major General Jürgen Stroop, the officer charged with liquidating the Warsaw 
Ghetto after the population there rose in revolt, refers to the Germans’ Baltic 
auxiliaries as “Askaris.”664  This term, used in Warsaw to refer to the Germans’ 
Ukrainian and Latvian troops, was the same Kiswahili word used for African 
soldiers that served with the British and German armies in East Africa.  It seems 
that in both conceptual and very concrete ways the methods and weapons used to 
conquer Africa had indeed come home to Europe itself, and they now transformed 
the colonial metropolitan heartland into what can only be called the true “Dark 
Continent.”665  And these colonial legacies were not the exclusive property of the 
Germans.  As Conrad himself noted when describing the archetype of colonial 
atrocity, the fictional Colonel Kurtz of the Belgian Force Publique: “His mother 
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 was half-English, his father was half-French.  All Europe contributed to the 
making of Kurtz…”666 
667 
 
Even if most Germans have scant memory of their country’s time in East 
Africa, much less its war against Mkwawa, the epic confrontation between the 
Germans and the Hehe still resounds today in the minds of many Hehe, and 
indeed throughout Tanzania.  Their war was not only a part of Tanzanian or 
German history; it was a part of world history.  The brutality, the atrocities, the 
destruction: the German-Hehe War was both a reflection of the many imperial 
episodes that came before it and a dark sign of things to come in the following 
century, a century in which more human beings would be slaughtered than in all 
previous centuries combined.668  If the twenty first century is to be any less 
violent, it is imperative that we reexamine events such as those of German East 
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 Africa of the 1890s in a manner that moves beyond cultural stereotypes—be they 
of Africans or of certain groups of Europeans—and seeks to reintegrate these 
events, however disturbing, into the mainstream of global history.   
 
669 
                                                 
669 African depiction of a chained column of Maji Maji prisoners.  Dr. Karl Weule, Negerleben in 
Ostafrika: Ergebnisse einer ethnologischen Forschungsreise (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1909), 
42.  
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